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VOLUME 44 WINTER 1967 NUMBER 1
SYMPOSIUM: SELECTED PROBLEMS ON LAW
AND THE INDIVIDUAL-AN INTRODUCTION
S INCE the beginning of civilization man has been confronted with
a two-sided problem of existence. The individual, aware that he
is an entity in himself, with his own values and aspirations, finds,
sometimes to his confusion, that he must live in conjunction with
other individuals. This collection of human entities is called society,
and it is the individual's "living" relationship with others of his kind
that poses the enigma of his existence. The individual is faced with
the problem of reconciling his own values to those collective values
of society of which he is a member.
Many of society's values are expressed in the law, a formal set
of rules or social norms of behavior. The law as an expression of
social norms gives order and predictability to society. The formal
law, manifested in statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative
agency rulings, must not be viewed as an end in itself. It is only a
means to an end; an instrument of social order. Its ultimate success
or failure, therefore, must be measured in terms of its ability to reflect
the current values of society.
In this context, one way to measure the success or failure of a
particular law is in terms of its implementation and effect on the
individual. In some cases the implementation may be incongruous
with the stated purpose of the law. Then the practical effect is to
pose problems for those directly affected as well as for those admin-
istering it. Likewise, ambiguity in goals or methods of enforcement
may result in confusion rather than order in the social unit.
The amenability of society to change requires that law be flexible.
Statutory and case law should not be considered as a final resolution
to a given problem. The statute or decision may alter or interpret an
existing rule or it may create new and additional issues. A continuing
study of law in terms of its purpose and effect demonstrates the
merits or shortcomings of the enunciated rule. The value of the law
as a reflection of social norms can then be scrutinized from a practical
viewpoint; if the goal is no longer desirable or attainable, the rule of
law can be altered.
Studying law as the means to an end demonstrates the inter-
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relationship of different forms that law assumes. The legislature
delegates to an agency the authority to deal with particular problems
within a prescribed policy and explicit guidelines. The agency, by
attempting to carry out the particular legislative intent, establishes
more specific rules within the statutory framework. The courts may
be called upon to validate the legislative delegation or review par-
ticular agency determinations. At that time the power and duties of
the agency may be extended beyond the initial legislative intent or
they may be restricted to make the agency ineffectual. The rule of
law in this situation results from a combination of the roles of these
legal institutions. The rule therefore is constantly subject to review,
and change frequently occurs because the application of the rule does
not achieve the desired standard or end.
The Symposium articles discuss specific areas of law from the
perspective of individuals affected by it. Emphasis is placed not upon
what the law prescribes, but rather on how it affects the individual
concerned. The areas of law discussed include child abuse legislation,
the juvenile court system, aid to dependent children, unemployment
compensation, administrative procedure, child custody, and the role
of the personal injury attorney. Although clear delineation of the
area of law and its objective is possible, its effect and the persons
affected are not as easily identifiable. The articles of the Symposium
reveal in a like manner that, although the objectives of a particular
law may be clear, the ramifications of the rule in terms of the
individuals it affects may exceed the intended objectives.
The articles selected are not intended to be all-inclusive. How-
ever, the selected topics do demonstrate the value of studying law as
a dynamic force in relation to its effect on the individual. Such a
study measures the effectiveness of the rule of law in achieving its
objective of order in society. The attorney, judge, administrator, and
legislator are peculiarly situated to benefit from this study, since as
interpreters of the law and members of society, they are able to re-
shape the rule.
The awareness that law is dynamic and evolutionary - that
merely having a statute on record or a case on point is the beginning




CHILD ABUSE -THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
By VINCENT DE FRANCIS*
The subject of Mr. De Francis' discussion is child abuse legis-
lation, the so-called reporting laws. The goals of these laws are early
identification and protection of the victim of abuse. Mr. De Francis,
after presenting the scope of the child abuse problem, analyzes typical
provisions of these laws. He compares the statutory provisions of
different states and criticizes the laws in light of their purpose,
implementation, and effect. Mr. De Francis concludes that the child
abuse reporting laws are steps in the right direction, but that they
alone are insufficient to resolve the child abuse problem. More and
better child protective services are needed to help the child and the
family.
INTRODUCTION
F EW recent social issues have aroused public sensibility or created
as much concern as has the problem of child abuse. Public
awareness demonstrates that it is a shocking reality and a growing
problem which is common to every community. Cases of abuse stem
from the seemingly well regulated home or the country club district
as well as from the seriously disorganized or broken home from the
slum area. These cases are not limited by the economic or educational
level of the parents. While it is true that today more cases are being
reported, this fact does not necessarily mean a rising incidence of child
abuse. It does seem to reflect greater awareness of a problem which
for too long has been ignored or neglected by the community at large.
Current public indignation at this gross disregard for the rights
of children frequently results in punitive action against the parents
who transgress societal ideals about family responsibility for children.
In the progress of pursuing sanctions against offending parents, the
need for constructive planning and for services on behalf of the
abused child is often relegated to a secondary consideration or is
completely overlooked.
Since no accurate national statistics on the incidence of child
abuse exist, several studies serve as an index to the size of the
problem. A study by the Children's Division of The American
Humane Association in 1962,' reviewed cases of child abuse reported
in United States newspapers. These cases represented the grossest
types of child abuse - situations which were reported to law enforce-
ment authorities and which were deemed "newsworthy" by the local
press. The cases studied represent only that portion of child abuse
*Director of the Children's Division of the American Humane Association; admitted to
practice in New York State in 1933; B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1929; LL.B., Fordham, 1932.
1 De Francis, Child Abuse - Preview of a Nationwide Survey (1962).
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incidence which was identified and reported. Educated estimates
place the probable national incidence of serious child abuse at more
than ten thousand cases a year. There are, no doubt, many additional
thousands of cases in which the mistreatment is of less dangerous
proportions.
I. PURPOSE OF REPORTING LAws
The need to discover and identify child victims of abuse required
devising a casefinding tool such as the reporting law. Medical per-
sonnel came to be selected as the principal target group of the law's
mandate because research and study could produce irrefutable evi-
dence that child abuse can be determined by medical diagnosis.
The doctor is in a unique position in the child abuse case. Prac-
titioners can exercise great care when examining children brought to
them for treatment of injuries, and they do not have to accept unques-
tioningly glib stories about such injuries resulting from accidental
cause. The use of x-rays and a study of all symptoms may reveal
findings inconsistent with the history given and may provide the
doctor with reasonable cause to suspect inflicted, rather than acci-
dental, injury. Failure to recognize the "Battered Child Syndrome"
could subject the child to additional or repeated injury and even death.
The logic and force of medical concern has focused attention on
the doctor as probably the first responsible contact who has an
opportunity to see and examine the child and the first competent
person capable of assuming responsibility for positive action on behalf
of the child. Thus, he is seen as the best resource for early identifi-
cation and reporting of these cases.
But would doctors be willing to voice their suspicions by report-
ing these cases when the diagnosis of inflicted injuries was not
clearcut, particularly in the face of denial by the parents? Would
such reporting expose doctors to the possibility of a legal action for
money damages? Would such reporting violate the privileged com-
munication between doctor and patient?
The "reporting statute," requiring a report of a child abuse case
and providing immunity from legal action to persons making such a
report is the suggested answer to these questions. Proposed laws
include waiver of the doctor-patient privilege and recommend waiver
of the husband-wife privilege to enable one spouse to testify about
abuse committed by the other.'
The core objective of the report under these laws is early identi-
fication of abused children so that they can be (1) treated for the
present injuries and (2) protected from further abuse. Acquiring
2 See § I, Waiver of Privilege at 35 infra.
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proper treatment for the child poses no serious problem except in
cases where parents, for religious or other reasons, may refuse per-
mission for medical care. Such care can be obtained by invoking the
authority of the court to order it despite parental objections.'
Protecting the child from future harm raises alternative solutions.
This problem must take into consideration the community pattern
for treating the situation which has evolved. The basic circumstances
determining the ultimate pattern employed are the emotional climate
in the community toward violators of the moral code, the rule of law
and order, and the community awareness and understanding in terms
of social planning in the best interests of children.
A. Punishment of Parents
As noted earlier, the general attitude toward the problem of
child abuse is shock and anger. A natural consequence is a desire to
exact retribution - to punish parents for their acts of cruelty. Where
this philosophy prevails, reporting legislation is frequently viewed
as a tool for identifying parents who mistreat children so that society
may deal with them for the crime of child abuse.
Perhaps the only merit of this approach is that justice, in the
sense of retribution, will be served. Counterbalancing this factor
however, are many negative factors. Criminal prosecution requires
proof through evidence which establishes the guilt of a defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. In child abuse cases the acts usually take
place in the privacy of the home, and parents usually are mutually
protective. Hence, evidence to sustain the legal burden of proof and
to identify the offending parent is difficult to obtain. An unsuccess-
ful prosecution may subject the child victim to increased hazards, for
he will be exposed to the care of a parent who, in addition to his
other problems, may now be embittered by his experience with police
and court. A disturbed parent may view the prosecution's failure to
find him guilty of child abuse as a license to continue to abuse.
Moreover, if the goal of the law is punishment, fear of a poten-
tial prosecution may cause a parent not to seek needed medical care
for the child. The doctors may resist such a law if by so doing they
automatically become involved as witnesses in a criminal proceeding
against the parents. The doctor may dislike being placed in such a
punitive role. The net result could be a defeat of the law's objective
to encourage reporting and early casefinding.
An additional consideration is the fact that punishment does not
correct the fundamental cause of the parents' behavior. If these
parents have mental, physical, and emotional inadequacies, prosecu-
3 E.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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tion and punishment will not produce true change in their behavior.
The basic motivational offender is even more unstable.
This critique is not meant to indicate that prosecution for child
abuse is never permissible. Certainly the community has a duty to act
against parents who commit crimes against children. But the decision
of whether or not to prosecute in a given case should rest with the
county prosecutor. In making this decision he must consider what
happens to the children. No one making a decision to prosecute
parents can afford to overlook the necessity of adequate planning
for the abused child and other children in the family.
B. Protection of the Child
Another approach to the child abuse problem is rooted in a
philosophy which sees the purpose of casefinding as the discovery
of children who, because of abuse, need the care and protection of
the community.
The community carries out this responsibility by making avail-
able the protective social services which will prevent further abuse of
the child and meet the child's needs through social services and
planning to assure maximum protection. Discovery of these children
is achieved if the reporting is directed to the child protective program
in the community.
Child protective programs are especially qualified to reach
families where children are neglected or abused. Their functional
responsibility requires that they: (1) explore and determine the facts
of neglect or abuse; (2) assess and evaluate the damage to children;
(3) initiate appropriate social work services to remedy the situation;
and (4) invoke the authority of the juvenile court in those situations
where removal from parental custody must be sought in the best
interests of the children.
The "helping-through-social-services" philosophy is beneficial to
the parent, since it recognizes that destructive parental behavior is
symptomatic of deeper emotional problems. Rarely is child abuse the
product of wanton, willful, or deliberate acts of cruelty, but usually is
the result of emotional immaturity and lack of capacity for coping
with the pressures and tensions of modern living. The symptoms of
the parents' disorganized state are manifested in defiant behavior and
bursts of violence or anger directed at other people, including their
children.
Many of these parents may themselves have been victims of
parental neglect or abuse and their behavior is a reflection of what
they were exposed to as children. Most of them are not capable of
providing adequate care for their children in the absence of outside
help. These parents need services to guide and counsel them toward
VOL. 44
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accepting their responsibilities as parents, to rebuild their damaged
personalities, and to give them the strength and stability to success-
fully live up to parental roles. A statute utilizing protective social
services provides this skilled service to the parents, protects the child,
and yet permits legal action through juvenile courts in extreme situa-
tions. Thus, this method attains punishment when necessary, but more
importantly, it benefits the community, the family, and the child.
II. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The attention of legislative bodies to the problem of child abuse
has progressed at a pace with little precedent in recent legislative
history. In the span of three legislative years since 1963, a total of
forty-seven states enacted laws seeking reports of injuries inflicted
on children.
4
Some of the laws achieving passage in the three year period
were hastily conceived and reflect public indignation against parents
who abuse children. Most of them however, show awareness of the
imperative need for protective social services on behalf of child
victims.
These laws are characterized by many differences in form and
substance. Some of the differences are minor and may be attributed
to the differing administrative or organizational structure in each
state. Other differences are more generic and reflect a variance in
the philosophy of how to treat the problem of child abuse.
The laws also contain many areas of common agreement and
areas of conformity with suggested legislation and guidelines devel-
oped by national agencies promoting mandatory reporting laws. The
degree of conformity, the extent of common agreement, the stated or
implied philosophy, and the strengths and weaknesses of the forty-
seven enactments are reviewed and assessed in the analysis which
follows.
A. Purpose
The purpose clause of a statute is a declaration of state policy
in regard to the subject matter of a specific law, or a statement which
defines the intent sought to be served by a particular legislative act.
The value of a purpose clause is that the legislature goes on record
with an expression of the ultimate goal and objectives it seeks to
achieve by the law. If any language of the act is ambiguous, the
4 Since preparation of this article two more states and the United States Congress have
adopted child abuse legislation. The following analysis does not include these laws.
Hawaii presently is the only state having no reporting legislation. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7185 (Supp. 1966) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 63-307 (Supp. 1966).
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purpose clause may be resorted to for interpretation or resolution of
the ambiguity.
Approximately one half of the states with reporting laws incor-
porated a purpose clause into their statutes. Table Number One
identifies the states with, or without, a purpose clause.5 The expres-
sion of intent is usually clear and unequivocal: to provide for the
protection of children who have had physical injury or injuries
inflicted upon them. While specific wording may vary, this idea is
expressed in all the purpose clauses.
After defining the primary goal, the legislatures describe the
mechanism which they intend to set in motion in response to a report
of child abuse under the act. All twenty-three states having a purpose
clause employ this or substantially similar language - causing the
protective services of the state to be brought to bear in an effort to
protect the health and welfare of these children and to prevent
further abuses.
Colorado's reporting law injects the added concept of stabilizing
family life by use of this phrase: "to.. . preserve family life wher-
ever possible." 6 Thus, to the primary goal is added language which
broadens the statute's scope and application.
Whether the objectives enumerated in the purpose clause are, in
fact, achieved, will depend almost entirely upon the methods em-
ployed by the law in terms of the procedural patterns prescribed in
the act. For the twenty-four states which did not include a statement
5 TABLE NUMBER 1 :
States with Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Purpose Clause Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia.
States Without Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisi-
Purpose Clause ana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyo-
ming.
For reference to the purpose clauses, see the following statutes: ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-801 (Supp. 1965); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-1 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 1001 (Supp. 1966) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(1) (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-111(d) (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1624 (Supp. 1965) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 52-1419 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.1 (Supp. 1965); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-716 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Supp.
1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3851 (1966) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(1)
(Supp. 1965) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-901 '(Supp. 1965) ; NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.501 (1965) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:25 (Supp. 1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8.1 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-12 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-1 (Supp. 1965) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1351
(Supp. 1965); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 490 4 (80a) (Supp. 1965).
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-1 (1963).
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of purpose in their reporting law, an analysis of procedural patterns
will be made, not to evaluate the adequacy with which objectives are
implemented, but for the purpose of interpreting intent with regard
to objectives. Lacking a definition of legislative intent, a study of the
prescribed procedures will provide clues to help determine the prob-
able purpose sought to be attained by the law and to assess priorities
in objectives.
B. jurisdiction
For a situation to fall within the scope of the law's obligation
to report, it must comply with the two jurisdictional elements found
in the statutes: the age of a child subject to reporting and the exist-
ence of abuse or injury conforming to stated criteria.
1. Age
Considerable variation appears in the upper age limit used by
the states in defining the age of the child coming within the pro-
tection of the reporting law. Four states limit reporting to children
under age twelve; three states use the term "minor." Two states use
the term "child" or "any child." Where a specific age is not used
the law must be read in terms of other state law defining the terms.
In the usual instance a person is considered to be a minor child until
age twenty-one. Table Number Two shows the age limits used by the
forty-seven states.7
7 TABLE NUMBER 2:
Age States
Under 12 Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, Oregon
Under 16 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont
Under 17 Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma
Under 18 Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia
Under 19 Wyoming
Other California-minor; Minnesota-minor; Nebraska-any child, incompetent, or
disabled person; Utah-minor; Wisconsin-child.
The applicable age limits in the various states are found in the following statutes:
ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1965) ; ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.070 (Supp. 1966);
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(E) (Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802
(Supp. 1965); CaL. PEN. CODE § 11110 (West Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-
13-3 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(2) (1965); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74 -111(a) (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1625(c) (Supp.
1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2041 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 52-1420 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-714 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (Supp.
1967
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No indication is shown of the factors which were considered by
the drafters when they determined the specific age limits contained
in the law. One can only conjecture about what criteria they em-
ployed. In states where reporting is limited to children under twelve,
a possible consideration could have been the notion that children over
twelve are able to defend themselves or can speak for themselves.
The validity of this concept is challenged by the fact that some chil-
dren over twelve are mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed,
handicapping conditions which would make them as vulnerable as
children under twelve. Nebraska recognized this problem by bringing
into the reporting law's jurisdiction "any child, or any incompetent
or disabled person..8.."I
The other age limits of sixteen, eighteen, or nineteen were
probably chosen to bring the reporting act into conformity with the
jurisdictional age limits of the juvenile court in dependency and
neglect cases. Age limits based on juvenile court jurisdiction seem
most logical because the court is a valuable resource which may
have to be invoked on behalf of the child by the protective social
services in circumstances of acute risk and hazard.
2. Abuse or Injury
The other important element which brings a situation within
the purview of the law is the existence of injury inflicted on a child.
As with age, great variance exists in the language used to define this
jurisdictional element. Nonetheless, common factors were found in
the definitions of this element in every statute but one.
First is the concept that the diagnosis of inflicted injury does
not have to be conclusive. The person reporting the case does not
have to resolve any doubts he may have as to the true cause of the
injuries. Thus if he suspects that the injuries may have been inflicted,
1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403A (West Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 3852 (Supp. 1966) ;MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11 A (Supp. 1966) ;MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39A (Supp. 1966) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1) (Supp.
1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(1) (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.105(1) (Supp. 1966) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-902 (Supp. 1965) ; Neb.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(1) '(1965); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (Supp. 1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (Supp. 1966) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483-d; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-318.2 '(Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (Supp. 1965); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1966) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp.
1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.740(2) (1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b)
(Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-3(1) (Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-302.1 (Supp. 1965); S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 1; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1201 (Supp. 1966) ; TEx. REV. CQv. STAT. ANN. art. 695c-2(1) (Supp.
1966) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (Supp. 1965) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352
(Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 '(Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 4904(80b) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (Supp. 1966);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.1 (1965).
8 Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 1.
VOL. 44
CHILD ABUSE
he has an obligation to report. The various phrases used are shown
in Table Number Three.9
The second general factor relates to a description or definition
of the circumstances, in terms of the child's condition, which warrant
the report. This factor has two components. One relates to the pres-
9 TABLE NuMBER 3:
Wording to define "sus-
picion of inflicted in- States
jury"
has reasonable cause to Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Hampshire,
suspect" New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont
Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
"has reason to believe" Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wyoming
"having reasonable or Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, South Caro-
just cause to believe" lina, Wisconsin




not explained by medical Arizona, indiana, North Dakota
history as being acci-
dental in nature"
"injuries which were, or
may have been intention- Michigan
ally inflicted"
"injuries which appear
to have been caused" Idaho, Minnesota
Forfprecise phraseology used by the states, see the following statutes: ALA. CODE tit.
27, 21 (Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.010 (Supp. 1966) ; ARiz. REV, STAT.
ANN. § 13-842.01 (Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (Supp. 1965) ; CAL,
PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp.) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-3 (1963) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (Supp. 1965) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1001
(Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(2) (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 7 4 -111(a)
(Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1965) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 2042 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1420 (Supp. 1966) ; IowA
CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (Supp.
1965) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (2) (Supp. 1966) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:403A (West Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (Supp. 1966);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (Supp. 1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 39A (Supp. 1966) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1) '(Supp. 1965) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.554(2) (Supp. 1966) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105(1) (Supp. 1966) ;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-902 (Supp. 1965) ; Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, §
1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(1) (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (Supp.
1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13
(Supp. 1965); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483-d(1) (Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2
(Supp. 1965) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (Supp. 1965) ; OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1966) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1966);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1) (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-3(1)
(Supp. 1965) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.1 (Supp. 1965) ; S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch.
90, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (Supp. 1966) ; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 695c-2(1) (Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (Supp. 1965); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352 (Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030
(Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904(80b) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(1) (Supp. 1966) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.1 (1965).
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ence of an injury; the second, to the cause of that injury. Table
Number Four shows the grouping of states by these components.10
Table Number Four reveals that there are two broad patterns
into which fall more than two-thirds of the statutes. Group I uses
wording which clearly juxtaposes the condition and cause - condi-
tion, "physical injury or injuries"; cause, "by other than accidental
means." The states in Group II accomplish this juxtaposition but
with different wording. Instead of "by accidental means," there is
substituted the phrase, "as a result of abuse or neglect." The states
in Group III merely combine the wording which is used by the other
two groups. Texas substitutes "maltreatment" for the word "abuse."
The states in Group IV introduce distinctly new concepts. New
Mexico and South Dakota introduce the notion of malnutrition.
10 TABLE NUMBER 4:
Condition and Cause States
I. Physical injury (or Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, In-
injuries) other than by diana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hamp-
accidental means shire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming
II. Physical injury as Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, New
a result of abuse or York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah,
neglect West Virginia
IIl. Injury other than by Arkansas, Minnesota, Texas
accidental means, result
of abuse or neglect
IV. Introduce new Arizona, California, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
concepts igan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Washington
Statutory references: ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. §
11.67.010 (Supp. 1966) ; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (Supp. 1966) ; ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (Supp. 1965); CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp.);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-1 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 17-38a(a) (Supp.
1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1001 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STATE ANN. §
828.041(2) (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (Supp. 1965) ; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 16-1641 (Supp. 1965) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1420 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (Supp.
1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
199.335(2) (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403A '(West Supp. 1965);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
11A(c) (Supp. 1966) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39A (Supp. 1966) ; MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1) (Supp. 1965); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (Supp.
1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105(1) (Supp. 1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
10-902 (Supp. 1965); Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 1; NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.502(1) (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (Supp. 1965); N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 483-d(1) (Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp. 1965); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (Supp. 1965); OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page
Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §
146.750(1) (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4 330(a) (Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-3(1) (Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.1 (Supp.
1965); S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (Supp.
1966); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 695c-2(1) (Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-16-2 (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352 (Supp. 1965) ; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904(80b) (Supp.




New Mexico treats this factor as a cause of injury, whereas South
Dakota considers it a condition. Washington adds a new element -
sexual abuse as a cause for the injury.
Massachusetts does not relate the injury to a defined cause,
but ties it to the act of a perpetrator; the wording "inflicted by a
parent" would seem to imply that the act be willful because it con-
notes an act of commission. Four states inject the element of willful
intent and, in contrast to Massachusetts, leave no doubt as to their
meaning. Michigan provides, "who has physical injuries . . . inten-
tionally inflicted .. . ."" Montana directs, "has had serious injury or
injuries inflicted upon him.., as a result of abuse or neglect, or has
been willfully neglected .... 12 Iowa provides, "has had physical
injury ... as a result of abuse or willful neglect . 1.8.."" Oregon uses
strong language to define the element of intentional or willful act.
Injury is defined as "any physical injury to a child of the age of
twelve or under caused by blows, beatings, physical violence or abuse
where there is some cause to believe that such physical injury was
intentionally or wantonly inflicted and includes wanton neglect, as
revealed by a physical examination, which leads to physical harm to
the child." 
14
Arizona, California, Maryland, Nebraska and Pennsylvania fall
into a special category. These states incorporated the reporting law
into their penal codes, and the circumstances or conditions for report-
ing are tied to the concept of crimes and punishments.
Arizona first defines the crime of permitting the life, health or
morals of a minor "to be imperiled, by neglect, abuse or immoral
associations...""5 and prescribes the punishment for this misde-
meanor. The next subsection of this law is the reporting act which
seeks reporting by "any physician ... whose examination of any minor
discloses evidence of injury or physical neglect."' 6
California's 1965 amendment to its 1963 reporting law leaves
the act in the penal code. The connotation of crimes and punishments
is clearer in the amended law than it was in the earlier one. Deleted
by the amendment is the provision for reporting to the nearest child
welfare agency offering child protective services. In its place the
District Attorney's Office was substituted. Since the role of the district
attorney is to evaluate cases for purpose of prosecution, the direction
SMICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1) (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
12 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-902 '(Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
13 IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
14ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.710(2) (1965).
15 ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842 (Supp. 1966).
1
6
ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(A) (Supp. 1966).
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which the law now takes is clearly in terms of handling reports of
child abuse as reports of a crime.
An added factor to strengthen this assessment of the California
law is the enactment of a new section which mandates copies of child
abuse reports to be filed with the State Bureau of Criminal Identifica-
tion. While this may be seen as a service in the nature of a central
registry, with all of the benefits accruing from a central index
(i.e., an aid in medical diagnosis, etc.), placing the service in this
Bureau adds confirmation to the assumption that child abuse is viewed
as a crime.
The Maryland law, first defines the crime of child abuse as
"Any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent
or temporary care or custody... of a minor child under the age of
sixteen years who maliciously beats, strikes or otherwise mistreats
such minor child to such degree as to require medical treatment
for such child shall be guilty of a felony .... ."' It then describes
the child whose condition must be reported as a child brought for
treatment "under circumstances which indicate violation of the fore-
going [penal act]."
In the Nebraska statute reportable injury and cause are identified
by the phrase, "severe physical injury ... willfully inflicted upon any
child .. . ."I" The context of the law and the spelling out of a willful
act leave no doubt as to the nature of the report as a report of a crime.
Pennsylvania's statute is a subsection of the penal law requiring
medical practitioners to report situations where any person is brought
for treatment "suffering from any wound or other injury inflicted...
by means of a knife, gun, pistol or other deadly weapon, or in any
other case where injuries have been inflicted ... in violation of any
penal law ... "19
Although, it was not listed with this group because its applica-
tion is other than merely the reporting of a crime, New York's
law is also found in the penal code. The factor which removes
reporting from the connotation of crimes and punishments inherent
in the penal code is the law's direction that reports be made to
resources not specifically identified with law enforcement. Reports
of child abuse injuries are made "to a society for the prevention of
cruelty to children or other duly authorized child protective agency
or to a public welfare official .... .20 The clear intent is non-
17 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 1lA(a) (Supp. 1966).
18 Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 1.
19 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(a) (Supp. 1965).
2N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483-d(1) (Supp.).
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punitive and is designed to invoke social services on behalf of the
reported children.
Several types of injuries may remain outside the statutory defini-
tions of injuries. The child suffering from malnutrition has been
described medically as the infant who fails to thrive. Although it is
a different kind of neglect and abuse, the dangers to children sub-
jected to it are as acute as the worst type of child battering. But only
two states have included such injury under the reporting law. These
provide that reportable events include "injury or injuries inflicted...
as a result of abuse, neglect or starvation." The South Dakota statute
contains the phrase, "having reasonable cause to suspect that any
child ... has been starved or has had serious physical injury .... 21
Such provisions are worthy of commendation. The child whose
health is seriously jeopardized by neglect or abuse resulting in mal-
nutrition should also be the subject of the reporting law. Since the
medical profession is the primary target group for reporting legisla-
tion, medical personnel are the logical and most qualified people to
make this specific diagnosis and report these cases.
C. Nature of Abuse or Injury
The question of whether the injury must be willfully inflicted
before it is reportable warrants further consideration. A number of
states seem to take the position that to be reportable the injury to
children must be willfully or intentionally inflicted. While the legis-
lation in Michigan, Montana and Oregon is not found in the penal
law, these states clearly identify with the group which relates the
reporting law to situations of willful or intentional injury.
A number of other states may be classed with the "willful intent"
group because their statutory language is subject to that interpretation.
Alabama law specifies "any wound or injury which.., appears to be
unusual or of such a nature (so as) to indicate ... [itfwas caused by
physical abuse, child brutality, child abuse or neglect." 22 The coupling
of child abuse with child brutality may infer either an intention to
distinguish between the two or to identify them as synonymous. If the
latter, then willful intent is implied.
Similarly, Utah's phrasing of "unusual or unreasonable physical
abuse or neglect" may, by implication, be interpreted to mean a delib-
erate or intentional act. In the same vein is Iowa's legislative language
which says, "abuse or willful neglect." Here, abuse is coupled with
willful neglect implying that both are intentional.
In contrast, a large block of states evade the question of inten-
tional injury by the use of the term, "as a result of abuse or neglect."
21 S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 1.
22 ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1965).
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Whether the terms "abuse" and "neglect" carry an implication of
willful intent is debatable. Both, of course, may be intentional, but
they need not be. Abuse may be defined as "physically harmful treat-
ment." 23 A parent may treat a child badly or mistreat him without truly
intending to cause injury. For example, the classic medical illustration
of the battered child syndrome is a fracture of the arm caused by
dragging or lifting a child by the arm, thereby twisting and breaking
it. While this type of handling results in mistreatment and injury,
there may be no intention to hurt the child. The action may be care-
less and thoughtless, but not intentional in the legal sense.
Nor is the term "neglect" intentional in the legal sense. Neglect
is defined as "not to care or attend to [something] sufficiently or
properly; or to fail to carry out [an expected or required action]
through carelessness or by intention.''24 Child neglect is usually unin-
tentional and a product of carelessness or functional inadequacy.
Lending force to the argument that intent may not necessarily be
ascribed, even by implication, to an act of abuse or neglect is addi-
tional language in some statutes. Montana catagorizes the acts as
abuse or neglect or willful neglect,2" clearly introducing intent in the
latter cattegory. Utah describes the acts as "unusual or unreasonable
physical abuse or neglect .... ,,26 This language indicates a higher
degree of culpability than with acts of abuse or neglect.
Thus, except for the states where willful intent is defined or
implied as a necessary element of the injury to the child, the injury
which must be reported need not result from a deliberate act of
commission or omission. All that is required is an injury to the child
resulting from some act, or from an omission, without regard to
intent. This conclusion is supported by the statutory language defin-
ing reportable injuries as an "injury or injuries caused other than by
accidental means." That language excludes from mandatory reporting
only such injury as may properly be attributed to accident. Excluded
would be accidents such as a fall from a crib or from a chair or down
a flight of stairs. But if any suspicion exists concerning the truth of
the history given in regard to accidental cause, the suspicion must
be resolved in favor of reporting.
D. Identify Perpetrator of Abuse
Many states introduced the requirement that the reporting source
identify the perpetrator of the act. The perpetrator must fall within
a class of persons responsible for the care of the child. Phraseology




MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-902 (Supp. 1965).
2UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2'(Supp. 1965).
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such as "by parent or caretaker," or "by a parent, step-parent, legal
guardian or any other person having custody" requires that the person
be identified.
Meeting this requirement places the reporter in an accusatory role
- particularly in states where intentional infliction of injury must
also be spelled out. It is far less demanding upon the reporting
source to report only cases where the circumstances are suspicious -
where, if he is a doctor, he cannot reconcile the symptoms with the
history - without the necessity to identify either intent or perpetrator.
Making the simpler, nonaccusatory report does not require the doctor
to struggle with his conscience or with ethical considerations. Those
problems will arise and will become acute if he has to point a finger
at a parent as the willful perpetrator of the injury. Table Number
Five groups the states according to their requirements on this point.
27
The philosophy requiring a nonaccusatory report was adopted in
nine states. In those states, the report need recite only the suspicion
of inflicted injury without identification of who did it.
27 TABLE NUMBER 5:
Type of Report States
Non-accusatory Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin
Accusatory Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Wyoming
The type of report required can be found in the following statutes: ALA. CODE tit.
27, § 21 (Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.010(a) (Supp. 1966); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 '(Supp. 1966) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (Supp. 1965) ;
CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-3 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003
(Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(2) (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a)
(Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1965) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23
§ 2044 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1420 (Supp. 1966); IowA
CODE ANN. § 235A.4 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (Supp.
1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:403A (West Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (Supp. 1966) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (Supp. 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 39A (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1) (Supp. 1965); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105(1) (Supp.
1966) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-902 (Supp. 1965); Neb. Sess. Laws 1965,
ch. 206, § 1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.503(2) (e) (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
571:27 (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-9-12 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483-d; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2
(Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (Supp. 1965); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1966);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.710(2) '(1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b) (Supp.
1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-3(1) (Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-302.1 (Supp. 1965); S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 2; TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-1202 (Supp. 1966); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 695c-2(1) (Supp. 1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352 (Supp.
1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030(1) (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 4904(80b) (Supp. 1965); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (Supp. 1966) ; Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-28.2 (1965).
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The basic question is whether a child has been injured as a result
of some cause other than that given in the child's medical history.
Whether the injury was inflicted intentionally or resulted from an act
of commission or omission without deliberate intention to injure
should not be material for purposes of reporting, if the root objective
is to protect the child from further injury. Nor is it important to
identify at the time of report who perpetrated the injury. The ques-
tions of intent and identity of the offender become material only in
regard to the action taken by the community after a report is made.
Both would be important issues in the communities where punitive
action is initiated against the offender. But in communities where
the action is directed toward providing protective social services and
taking remedial steps to protect the child and change neglectful or
abusive behavior in the home, these issues are of minor concern.
In the last analysis, however, it is more important that the person
or institution making the report should not be burdened with the
responsibility for evaluating whether the suspected injury was will-
fully or intentionally inflicted, or to point to the possible offender.
The reporting source should be charged only with responsibility for
reporting such injuries which probably are not the result of an
accident. After ruling out the probability of accident the reporting
source should be free of any other obligation for further diagnosis.
All other determinations must be the responsibility of the community
resource designated to receive the report and investigate the circum-
stance in more detail.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHILD ABUSE STATUTES
The states have adopted various means for achieving the stated
goals of the reporting laws. The means of implementing the acts will
be analysed and assessed in light of the purpose of the act.
A. Source of the report
All but three of the forty-seven statutes designate the medical
profession as the principal target group of reporting legislation.
Medical practitioners constitute the most logical and responsible
group to come in contact with children whose injuries require treat-
ment. They are also the most competent to make the diagnosis that
an injury was probably not caused by accident.
However, the statutory language designating who falls into the
category of the medical profession has many differences. The terms
used to define who in the medical field are covered by the law range
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from the simple statement, "any physician" (Maryland, Michigan,
Texas, and Missouri), to a detailed enumeration such as is used in
Illinois, "any physician, surgeon, dentist, osteopath, chiropractor,
podiatrist or Christian Science practitioner." Many states include a
phrase about hospital personnel such as "any interne, resident physi-
cian, hospital superintendent or manager, or any nurse, pharmacist
and laboratory technician." Common to a majority of the states is
inclusion of a provision which fixes responsibility for reporting in a
hospital setting. Specifically, this provision provides that where the
attending physician is treating the child while on hospital service he
shall notify the person in charge of the hospital or his designated
delegate who shall take responsibility for the report.
The three states which do not follow the general patterns are
Nebraska, Tennessee, and Utah. These states impose responsibility
for reporting on any person having knowledge (Tennessee); or
"having cause to believe" (Utah); or "having reason to believe"
(Nebraska) that injury has been inflicted.
In addition to requiring reporting from medical personnel, a
number of states included other professional groups. Alabama,
Kansas, and Alaska added social workers and school teachers to the
reporting group. Ohio and West Virginia also included social
workers, visiting nurses and teachers, but they qualified their respon-
sibility by the phrase, "acting in their official capacity."
Nevada is even more inclusive; in addition to the medical group
it lists social workers, teachers, school authorities, attorneys, and
clergymen. New Mexico adds social workers, visiting nurses, teachers,
and ordained ministers of any established church.
North Carolina limits the term "social worker" to employees of
county departments of welfare and substitutes "school administrators"
for "teachers." Wisconsin retains the broader category of "social
workers" but also uses the phrase "school administrators" in place
of the more frequently used "teachers."
South Carolina and South Dakota use categories unique to
themselves. South Carolina adds to the general description of medical
personnel "medical officers of the United States on duty in this
State.....28 South Dakota says, "or any law enforcement officer.
"29
Broadening the law's coverage, in terms of who reports, results
2 S. C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.1 '(Supp. 1965).
29 S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 1.
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in putting into legislative mandate the moral obligation of citizens
to come to the aid of neglected, abused, and exploited children by
invoking in their behalf the protective social services of the com-
munity. Nebraska, Tennessee, and Utah implement the concept that
casefinding is an obligation of all citizens by carrying the idea to its
logical conclusion. Their laws direct that any person having knowl-
edge of child abuse is required to report. Universal application of
the law would assure appropriate protection of the maximum number
of children. The simplicity with which they designate who must
report makes the obligation an unavoidable duty of all responsible
persons with knowledge or suspicion of specific instances of child
abuse.
Realistically, and as a matter of practical experience, members
of the helping professional disciplines are more likely to respond to
that duty. This would be true not only because their professional
ethics would not permit them to ignore a serious responsibility, but
also because their duties would place them in frequent contact with
children and afford them greater opportunity to see and observe signs
of neglect and abuse. Yet the national experience of Child Protective
Service agencies documents the fact that a large proportion of reports
of child neglect or abuse come from non-professional sources.30
Common sources of original reports are relatives, neighbors, and
friends. These people have reported in the past without benefit of
the immunity which modern reporting law provides for those who
report in good faith. The reporting law, with its immunity protec-
tions, would probably encourage even more reporting from these
non-professional sources.
B. Mandatory or Permissive Reporting
Reporting legislation is a device for compelling or inducing
persons with knowledge of suspected child abuse to report the facts
to the agency designated by the law. Consensus favors the concept
of mandatory legislation. Forty-one of the forty-seven states made
their law mandatory. Six states - Alaska, Missouri, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Texas and Washington - passed permissive report-
ing laws.
What can be said for the permissive law is that it may induce
some reporting sources to report because of the immunities granted
30 Child Protective Services have been in existence in some communities since 1875. See




by the law. But, regardless of the protections which the law provides
for those who do report, the choice to report is theirs to make. Under
a permissive law the decision will probably be based on the personal
convictions and personal convenience of the potential reporter rather
than on the consequences to the child if the report is not made.
Supporters of permissive legislation advance another argument
to justify their position. Under mandatory reporting, they say, parents
who abuse children may be deterred from seeking medical treatment
for the child because they know the doctor must report the case.
The argument is specious and falls of its own weight. If fear of
exposure through mandatory reporting is a deterrent, it is not cured
by a permissive law. An abusing parent will not know, until after
he has brought a child for treatment, whether the doctor will exercise
his option to report under permissive legislation. His doubts about
the consequences of seeking treatment could be an equally deterring
factor whether the law is mandatory or permissive.
The better answer probably lies in a combination of mandatory
reporting and a broadened base of reporting sources to include other
than the medical profession. With the parent subject to possible
exposure by other than medical sources, he will probably want to
minimize the effects of his abuse by taking the child for treatment
as soon as possible. Only if the reporting law is made mandatory
can we be sure that no child, identified as needing protection, is
left unaided. To make the law permissive emasculates its intent and
purpose. It results only in suiting the convenience of the reporting
source and, too often, may fail to bring protection to children in
grave hazard.
C. Time for Report
An overwhelming majority of the states emphasize the impor-
tance of urgent action in reporting suspected inflicted injury. Usual
language is the phrase, "an immediate oral report shall be made by
telephone or otherwise." Another common phrase is "forthwith by
telephone or otherwise." Most of the states calling for an immediate
oral report have the added requirement that this be "followed by a
report in writing." Specific time limits are not usually indicated
with one exception - Delaware. In that state the person reporting is
to report not later than three days after the discovery.3 1
31 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (Supp. 1966).
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Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska and North Carolina do not define
how the report is to be made; Massachusetts does not specify as to
oral or written report but directs that it be made in accordance with
the rules of the Department of Public Welfare. Florida and North
Dakota direct that the report be in writing. However, North Dakota
adds the qualification that if the circumstances are such as to warrant
immediate action it shall be made orally by telephone or otherwise.
California says the report shall be made "by telephone and in writ-
ing." Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, and West Virginia require the
report to be in writing but, "if it is not in writing, in the first instance,
it shall be reduced to writing as soon as may be after it is made orally
by telephone or otherwise."
D. Contents of the Report
Most states adopted, in whole or part, the suggested language
of the several model acts regarding the necessary contents of the
report. These acts were proposed by national agencies promoting
reporting laws. Essentially, the information sought in the report is:
1. The name and address of the child;
2. The name and address of the child's parents;
3. The nature or extent of the injuries;
4. Evidence of previous injuries and the nature and extent of
previous injuries; and
5. Any other information which in the opinion of the physician
may be helpful in establishing the cause of the child's injuries
and the identity of the perpetrator.
Six states - Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
York, and Wisconsin- do not define the area of content in the
reporting law.
E. Recipient of the Report
A critical determination for the lawmakers is the decision about
which resource to designate for receiving reports of child abuse. On
this important decision rests the effectiveness of the reporting law in
achieving the goals cited in its purpose clause. The right choice will
bring into play the appropriate resources. A poor or bad choice may
produce results not contemplated by the law. For example, if the
declared legislative intent is to make available the protective social
services to prevent further abuse, safeguard and enhance the welfare
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of such children, and to preserve family life wherever possible, the
logical procedure, consistent with the stated goals, would be to imme-
diately invoke the services of the social agency charged with that
special function. Reporting them should be directed to specific child
protective agencies or to the department of public welfare, where
child protective services are a functional responsibility of its child
welfare unit. As a second line of protective social services, an appro-
priate designation to receive reports could be the family or juvenile
court. Either referral would involve a psycho-social investigation of
each case, with evaluation of the circumstances surrounding each act
reported. The needs of the child victim, the possibility of continuing
hazard to the child, and the risk to other children in the family,
would be assessed. Also evaluated would be the potential for a social
work treatment of the problem to achieve all the goals defined in
the statement of purpose. If a study of the case shows need to assure
protection of the child by removal from parental custody, the author-
ity of the juvenile court could be readily brought into play by the
protective service agency or the court's own probation staff.
On the other hand, given the same declaration of purpose as
above, a reaching of the objectives hampered, if not defeated,
by selection of some other resource to receive reports. If, for
example, the legislature were to designate a law enforcement agency
to receive the report, that choice would not be consonant with the
declared intent. A law enforcement agency might be the police or
the sheriff or the prosecuting attorney of the community. Their
orientation, their functional responsibilities, and their modus operandi
are not in tune with the legislative intent of "invoking the protective
social services." Such a choice would be more compatible with a
legislative intent to view the occurrence in terms of crimes and pun-
ishments. Social services are not a component of the law enforcement
agency. Law enforcement personnel are trained to investigate and
oriented to determine whether a crime has been committed. While
some personnel in large police forces are given special training as
juvenile officers, these constitute but a minute proportion of the
country's police force. Thus, reporting to law enforcement agencies
gives little assurance that such reporting will, in fact, invoke pro-
tective social services.
1. Pattern in Statutes with Purpose Clause.
Table Number Six represents the reporting pattern in the twenty-
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four states having a purpose clause in their reporting statute.32  In
3TABLE NUMBER 6:
Purpose State Report to:
"to invoke protective Georgia Protective service agency, if none, to
social services" police
Idaho Department of Public Assistance
Maine State Department of Welfare and
County Attorney
Rhode Island Dept. of Social Welfare
Tennessee Juvenile Court
New Mexico District Attorney
Colorado Law Enforcement Agency
Utah Law Enforcement Agency or State
Dept. of Welfare
to cause the protective Florida Juvenile Court
services of the State New Hampshire Bureau of Child Welfare
-to protect the health
and welfare Vermont Department of Social Welfare
-prevent further
abuse" Indiana County Dept. of Welfare or law
enforcement
Kentucky Oral to police, written to
State Child Welfare
Arkansas Police Authority
Washington Law Enforcement Agency
"to provide for pro- Iowa County Department of Welfare and
tection of children
-who may be further
threatened by the
conduct of those re-
sponsible for their care"
Delaware
Kansas
County Attorney, Police in emergency
Family Court
Juvenile Court
Oklahoma Public child protective agency, public
welfare official, sheriff, County
Attorney, police
Minnesota Police authority and County Welfare
Department
Montana County Attorney
New Jersey County Prosecutor
West Virginia Prosecuting Attorney
Nevada Police or Sheriff
Purpose clauses are found in the statutes cited note 5 supra. Agencies to which the
reports are made are designated in the following statutes: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-801
(Supp. 1965) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-3(3) (a) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1003 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041'(2) (Supp. 1965); GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-111(b) (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1965);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1419 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.4 (Supp.
1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
199.335 (Supp. 1966) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (Supp. 1966) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (Supp. 1966) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-902 (Supp.
1965); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.502(1) (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:27
(Supp. 1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (Supp. 1966) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13
(Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 40-13.1-3(1) (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1965);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
4904(80b) (Supp. 1965).
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eight states the purpose of the reporting statute was defined as "in-
voking protective social services." Five states, Georgia, Idaho, Maine,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee, implement procedures toward that
goal by designating an appropriate agency to carry out the intent.
Named by these states were the state or county department of welfare
or the family or juvenile court. One of the eight states, New Mexico,
negates the declared objective by designating that reports be made
to the District Attorney.
Colorado and Utah compromise the question. Colorado requires
reports to the proper law enforcement agency (police or sheriff),
but it uses law enforcement simply as a means for transmitting the
report immediately to the county department of welfare which is
mandated to investigate and offer social services. Utah's compromise
is in terms of giving a choice to the reporter who may report "to
the city police or county sheriff or office of the Utah State Welfare
Department."
In Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, and Washington, the purpose is given as "causing thereby
the protective services of the state to be brought to bear to protect
the health and welfare of such children and prevent further abuse."
Of these, the implementation of Florida, New Hampshire, and Ver-
mont remains consistent with the stated intent. Florida requires the
juvenile court to be notified; New Hampshire requires reports to be
made to the Bureau of Child Welfare; and Vermont directs the re-
ports to the Department of Public Welfare. Arkansas and Washing-
ton require that the report go to an agency whose function is not
consonant with the stated objective - Arkansas directs report to "an
appropriate police authority" and Washington designates the recipient
as a law enforcement agency.
Indiana straddles the issue by requiring that reports go to the
county department of welfare or "to the law enforcement agency
having jurisdiction."
Kentucky requires an immediate oral report to an appropriate
police authority, to be followed as soon thereafter as possible, by a
written report (to police) with a copy to the Department of Child
Welfare for investigation. Construing this language in the light of
the stated purpose it would seem that major service is contemplated
from the Department of Welfare, with the police acting on the oral
report in cases of emergency.
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The remaining nine of the twenty-four states with a purpose
clause express an intent to provide for the protection of children who
have had injury and who may be further threatened by the conduct
of those responsible for their care and protection.
Protection in the protective social services context, is provided
for by Delaware and Kansas which designate the family court and
juvenile court respectively, as the agencies to receive reports of abuse.
Iowa's law directs reports to the county department of social welfare,
thus putting in motion the protective social services. However, where
the reporting source believes immediate protection is needed it shall
also report to an appropriate law enforcement agency for emergency
action. Iowa also provides that if the reporting source is other than a
health resource (e.g., doctor or hospital) the report may be directed
to any county department of social welfare, a county attorney, or a
law enforcement agency; but the receiving agency, if other than a
county department of social welfare, must promptly refer the report
to the county department of social welfare.
Minnesota directs reports to both the appropriate police author-
ity and the county department of welfare; but the police are directed
to immediately notify the county department of welfare upon receipt
of a report. This would seem to emphasize exploration and service
by the child welfare program, a supposition fully supported by the
legislative mandate to the county department of welfare.
Oklahoma seems to incorporate a priority system. The law states
that reports shall be made to a public child protective agency, to a
public welfare official having responsibility for the enforcement of
laws for the protection of children, to a sheriff, the county attorney,
or to the police. If the order in which the various agencies are
name is indicative of a priority preference, then the protective intent
will be carried out in accordance with the priority designation.
Nevada directs reports to any police department or sheriff's
office.
Montana, New Jersey and West Virginia round out the total of
states with declared intent. These states direct reports to the county
prosecutor, thereby involving an assessment of the facts with a view
toward possible prosecution of the offenders.
2. Pattern in Statutes without a Purpose Clause
Table Number Seven shows the reporting pattern in the twenty-
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three states without a purpose clause. 3 Analysis of the procedural
pattern employed to implement the law furnishes clues to the intended
objective of the law.


















Dept. of Welfare, if none, police
State Department of Welfare
State Department of Welfare
Director, Division of Child Welfare
-Emergency to Juvenile Commis-
sioner or State Attorney
SPCC or Dept. of Public Welfare
County Director of Welfare
County Dept. of Welfare
Judge, Juvenile Court or
Child Protective Service
Juvenile Court (proper authority with
jurisdiction over minors)
Judge of the County Court
Municipal or county peace officer
County Dept. of Welfare or Sheriff
May invoke protective Alabama Police, sheriff or nearest
social services, if child protective agency
reporter chooses, or Connecticut Commissioner of Health,
law enforcement Commissioner of Welfare,
local police, state police
Michigan Prosecuting Attorney, County Dept.
of Welfare, state officer of State
Dept. of Welfare
Texas Juvenile Court, County Attorney, law
enforcement, county probation officer
Invoke law enforce- Arizona Municipal or county peace officer
ment machinery California Head of police, sheriff or
District Attorney
Louisiana Municipal police or nearest law
enforcement agency
Maryland Appropriate law enforcement agency
Missouri Appropriate law enforcement agency
Nebraska County Attorney
Oregon Medical Investigator
Tennessee Judge having juvenile jurisdiction in
county where child resides
The following statutes indicate to whom the reports should be directed: ALA. CODE
tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1965) ; ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.020 (Supp. 1966) ; ARZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01A (Supp. 1966) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp.) ;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§
2043, 2047 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403B (West Supp.
1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(d) (Supp. 1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 119, § 39A (Supp. 1966) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(2) (Supp. 1965); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 210.105(2) (Supp. 1966); Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 1; N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 483-d(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp. 1965) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25-01 (Supp. 1965) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page Supp.
1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b)
(Supp. 1965) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.1 (Supp. 1965) ; S.D. Sess. Laws 1964,
ch. 90, § 2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (Supp. 1966). TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 695c-2(1) (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (Supp. 1966); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-28.2 (1965).
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Twelve of these twenty-three states obviously designed the law
to invoke the protective social services of the community on behalf of
abused children. The key to this conclusion is their choice of social
service agencies to receive reports of abuse.
Alaska, Massachusetts and North Dakota designated the state
department of welfare as recipient of the report. All but Massa-
chusetts provided an alternative action to meet emergencies. Alaska
provides that if no office of the department is available the report
may go to the nearest local law enforcement agency,34 but the depart-
ment must be advised of this additional report. North Dakota directs
that, if immediate action is warranted, the report may go to the
juvenile court or to a juvenile commissioner.
North Carolina and Wyoming law request that the report be
made to the county department of welfare. New York directs report-
ing to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, or other
duly authorized child protective agency, or to the (county) depart-
ment of welfare. New York's position is interesting in that although
the law is placed in the penal code, the purpose of the law seems
nonpunitive because the report goes to the protective social services
in the community. Pennsylvania is in a similar situation, with report-
ing requirements located in the penal code, but the juvenile court
receives reports of abuse.
Ohio and Wisconsin fall into a special category. Ohio law directs
reports to municipal or county peace officers. However, upon receipt
of the report that officer must refer it to an appropriate county
department of welfare which is then mandated to investigate and
provide social services to protect the child and preserve the family.
This is almost identical to the Colorado law.
In Wisconsin, while the county child welfare agency or the
sheriff may receive the reports, the county child welfare agency will
always be involved because the recipient of the report must notify
the other within forty-eight hours. The sheriff may also refer to the
district attorney if he feels legal action is necessary. In any case, the
child welfare agency is directed to act in accordance with its powers
and duties, thereby seemingly assuring a protective social service to
child and family.
South Dakota directs that the report be made to the juvenile
court.35 South Carolina is not very specific. The law orders reports
be made to the proper county authority having jurisdiction over
minors or to the sheriff. Subject to local interpretation, it would
seem that the juvenile court would fit best the description of "proper
county authority with the jurisdiction over minors."
3 4
ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.026(a) (Supp. 1966).
35 S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 2.
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Four of the remaining eleven states permit reporting to pro-
tective social services or to law enforcement agencies. The choice
seems to be left to the person making the report, unless the order in
which the agencies are named may be deemed to be indicative of
priority. Alabama permits reporting to the police or sheriff or to the
nearest child welfare agency with child protective services. Connecti-
cut asks that the report go to the State Commissioner of Health, the
State Welfare Commissioner, to the local police department or to the
resident state policeman. Michigan directs the report in quadruplicate
with one copy to the prosecuting attorney, one copy to the county
department of welfare, one copy to the Lansing office of the State
Department of Welfare and one copy to the Probate Court. Texas
lists the receiving agencies as the juvenile court judge, the district
attorney, the county attorney, local law enforcement agency, or the
county probation officer.
The remaining states in this group direct reports to law enforce-
ment authorities, although different resources are named. Arizona
names municipal or county peace officers. California asks for reports
to the head of the police department, sheriff, or district attorney;
Louisiana to the municipal police department or the nearest law
enforcement agency; Maryland to the appropriate law enforcement
agency; Missouri to an appropriate law enforcement agency; and
Nebraska to the county attorney. Oregon stands alone in directing
reports to the medical investigator. These seven states patently
regard reports of child abuse as matters requiring police investigation,
implying a policy of arrest and prosecution where the facts are sub-
stantiated by the investigation.
Where the reporting source has an option to choose which
agency it reports to, the probability exists that the ultimate community
action taken on the report will vary with the agency chosen. This
seeming flexibility of action may be the result of a deliberate decision
by the legislature to give an option to the reporting source. On the
other hand, it may be the result of indecision on the part of legislature
-a lack of conviction about which is the better action- or, more
likely, it may represent a compromise of conflicting views. A third
possibility is that the legislature wished to provide alternative courses
of action in the event that the first choices were not available in a
given community.
F. Responsibility of Agency Receiving Report
As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of reporting laws in
accomplishing the intended objective rests on the agency chosen to
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receive the report because these agencies operate within defined
functional areas. Thus, what the agency does about the report, how
quickly it acts and how responsibly it provides service, will determine
the adequacy and degree of protection which the community makes
available to abused children.
It would seem helpful, however, if in addition to making the
proper choice, the legislature were to provide direction or guideline
to indicate what is expected and to impose responsibility upon the
agency charged with receiving the report. To a degree, the purpose
clause with its expression of intent and goals provides a blueprint
for action. However, twenty-four of the twenty-seven statutes carry
more explicit directions which mandate particular action or permit
options for discretionary action by the agency receiving the report.
An interesting study in this connection relates to a breakdown
of the forty-seven states in accordance with the presence or absence of
a purpose clause and/or a mandate to the receiving agency. While
the number of states which have purpose clauses (23) and mandates
(25) to the receiving agency is approximately the same, the two
groups are not identical. Table Number Eight identifies the states in
relation to purpose clause and legislative mandate.36
38 TABLE NUMBER 8:
Category States
I. Purpose clause and Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota,
legislative mandate Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia
II. Purpose clause but Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Okla-
no legislative mandate homa, Utah, Vermont
III. Legislative mandate Alaska, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
but no purpose clause North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Wisconsin,
Wyoming
IV. No purpose clause, Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Louisiana,
no legislative mandate Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas
Legislative mandates are listed in the following statutes (statutes with purpose clause
in note 5, supra): ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.040 (Supp. 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. §
22-13-4 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (Supp. 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, § 2047 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1422 (Supp. 1966) ;
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.5 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Supp.
1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A (Supp. 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 39B (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(4) (Supp. 1966); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 10-903 (Supp. 1965); Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 3;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.504 (1965) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:25 (Supp. 1965) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.5 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-14 (Supp.
1965) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.3 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-03
(Supp. 1965) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 146.740 (1965) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-4 (Supp. 1965) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1204 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (Supp.
1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904(80c) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
48.981(1) (Supp. 1966) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §. 14-21, 14-28.3 (1965).
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The importance and value of legislative language defining the
responsibility of the agency receiving reports of child abuse is vividly
emphasized by the examples cited below. Minnesota's law contains
a concise statement of responsibility: "The county welfare agency
shall investigate complaints of neglect and abuse of children and
offer protective social services in an effort to protect the health and
welfare of these children and to prevent further abuses."'s7 Other
statements range from Kentucky's two-word mandate, "[to the De-
partment of Child Welfare] ... for investigation, ' 3 8 to the minutely
detailed instruction found in Iowa.
Between these extremes is the language in the Colorado law
adopted in whole or in part by Illinois, Nevada, Ohio and Rhode
Island. In those states the law defines the duties and imposes limi-
tations on the receiving agencies. For the police department (or
sheriff), Colorado law states that upon receipt of a report "it shall
be the duty of the law enforcement agency to refer such report to
the department [county department of welfare]."4 The limitation
is equally clear. "No child upon whom a report is made shall be
removed from his parents.., by a law enforcement agency without
consultation with the department unless, in the judgement of the
reporting physician and the law enforcement agency, immediate re-
moval is considered essential to protect the child from further injury
or abuse."41
This limitation recognizes the importance of a decision to re-
move a child from his home. Such a step is not only a major in-
fringement of parental rights, but also, it may have long lasting and
damaging effects on the child. Removal must be predicated on a
clearcut evaluation of imperative need and the child's best interests.
Consultation with the department provides a basis for this evalua-
tion with the opinion of the department or the physician supporting
the action of the police.
The Colorado law then defines the duties of the department.
The department shall: (1) investigate to determine the cause of
the injury and who was responsible; (2) provide social services to
protect the child and preserve the family; (3) advise the law en-
forcement agency of its investigation; (4) if further action is neces-
sary, (a) refer the case to the district attorney for prosecution or
(b) file a petition of neglect in the juvenile court.
4 2
3 7
AIINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(4) (Supp. 1966).
3
8 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Supp. 1966).
39 IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.5 (Supp. 1965).
40
COLo. REV. STAT. § 22-13-4(1) (1963).
4 1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-4(2) (1963).
42
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-5 (1963).
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North Dakota introduces an important concept - the need to
protect siblings of the abused child and the need for social services
to the parents: "The division of child welfare and the county wel-
fare board shall provide protective services for the injured or neg-
lected child and his siblings as may be necessary for their well-being,
and shall offer such other social services, as the circumstances war-
rant, to the parents....4
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New Jersey, and West Vir-
ginia, which require that reporting be directed to the county prose-
cutor, define the duties of that official upon receipt of the report.
The language is substantially of two types- one, as in West Vir-
ginia, relates to prosecution; the other, as in New Mexico, permits
referral for social services. The New Mexico law reads: "The dis-
trict attorney .. . shall investigate the report immediately to deter-
mine who caused the reported injury or abuse. If it is found that a
parent ... inflicted the injury or abused the child, the district attor-
ney immediately shall take such action as may be necessary to pre-
vent further injury .... The district attorney shall also, whenever he
deems it appropriate, notify the local office of the department of
public welfare... for investigation and report or other appropriate
action .... ,,44 West Virginia provides: "The prosecuting attorney
•.. shall forthwith investigate, or cause to be investigated ... to de-
termine the cause of such injury and determine the person or persons
responsible, if any. If it is found that any person wilfully inflicted
such injury or abuse on such child, the prosecuting attorney shall
immediately take... such action as may be necessary to prevent any
further injury or abuse ...and to punish the person ...responsi-
ble .... -45
G. Immunity under the Law
The granting of immunity against criminal or civil action to
persons reporting under the act is an important element of the law.
Freedom from fear of retaliation by angry parents is considered
necessary to promote reporting. The medical profession, a special
target group of the law, felt itself particularly vulnerable to law-
suits without such protection. All forty-seven statutes provide some
form of immunity. While the language varies, the import is the
same - to provide a defense against civil or criminal actions based
43 N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-03 (Supp. 1965).
44 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-14 (Supp. 1965).
45
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904(80c) (Supp. 1965).
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on the making of the report. Table Number Nine shows the classi-
fication of states by the type of immunity provided.46
Typical language is: Any person participating in good faith
in the making of a report pursuant to this act or participating in
a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom shall in so doing be im-
mune from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be
incurred or imposed. The inclusion of the concept of "good faith,"
which was done in thirty-five states, is important because the law
would be inequitable if it were to provide absolute protection in the
face of a malicious intent to injure the party against whom a report
is made. Some states establish a "good faith" standard although in
other wording. For example, Kansas provides, "without malice";
Maine applies the phrase "unless done in bad faith or with malicious
purposes"; North Carolina provides, "unless such person acted in
bad faith or with malicious purpose."
46 TABLE NuMBER 9:
Immunity Granted Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
if in Good Faith Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
Immunity Granted Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Montana, New Mexico, South
Presumption of Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia
Good Faith
Immunity Granted Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland,
No Mention of Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wash-
Good Faith ington
Immunity provisions are contained in the following statutes: ALA. CODE tit. 27, §
23 (Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.050 (Supp. 1966) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-842.01(c) (Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-804 (Supp. 1965); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-6 (1963) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003
(Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(4) (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(c)
(Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, § 2045 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1423 (Supp. 1966);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.7 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-718 (Supp.
1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:403C (West Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3854 (1966); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26, § 11A(g) (Supp. 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
39A (Supp. 1966); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(3) (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.554(5) (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105(3) (Supp. 1966);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-904 (Supp. 1965) ; Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, §
2; NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.505 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:28 (Supp.
1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.6 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-15
(Supp. 1965); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483-d(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp.
1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-04 (Supp. 1965); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 847 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE.
REV. STAT. § 146.760 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b) (Supp. 1965);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-13.1-6 (Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.3
'(Supp. 1965); S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1206
(Supp. 1966); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 695c-2(3) (Supp. 1966); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 55-16-4 (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1354 (Supp. 1965);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904
(80d) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (Supp. 1966); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-28.4 (1965).
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Eight of the thirty-five states establish a presumption of good
faith in regard to the report: "Every report made pursuant to this
act shall be presumed to have been made in good faith." Out of these
eight, only Illinois identifies the presumption of good faith as a re-
buttable one by the use of the term - "prima-facie." Whether the
other seven are also subject to rebuttal is not clear, and as yet
untested.
It would seem that the twelve states which do not qualify im-
munity by the test of good faith provide uncontestable immunity.
This question has also not yet been tested by litigation.
Other differences in the nature of immunity exist. Four states -
Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Nebraska - seem to provide
immunity only in civil cases. Idaho says, "immunity from civil liabil-
ity. ."- and Maryland provides, "immune from any civil liabil-
ity . 48 The Massachusetts language is ambiguous; "any infor-
mation contained in such report ... shall not constitute slander or
libel."49 Nebraska's statute is equally unclear; "the information con-
tained in any report ... shall be absolutely privileged and shall not
constitute slander, libel, breach of confidence, or invasion of any
right of privacy. '"50 Whether the latter two are limited to civil
actions is uncertain.
Wisconsin stands alone as being the only state to provide im-
munity solely from criminal liability.
H. Penalty under the Law
The penalty clause is a provision which makes it a misdemeanor
for a person to willfully violate provisions of the act. In this in-
stance, the duty is the obligation to report, if in possession of infor-
mation which tends to indicate that the child was injured by other
than accidental means, or injured in the specific manner described
by the state reporting law. The clause is a device for enforcing the
law.
Opinions differ regarding the value of a penalty clause in a
law of this nature. The chief argument against the penalty clause
is the fact that failure to report must be willful. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to establish willful intent in a failure to report be-
cause of the fact that suspicions about the cause of a child's injury
are uniquely subjective and not provable by objective standards.
These injuries are vastly different from a clearly identifiable gun-
shot wound or stab wound, the frequent subjects of other mandatory
47 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1965).
48 M.D. ANN. CODE art. 27, § l1A(g) (Supp. 1966).
4 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39A (Supp. 1966).
50 Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 2.
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reporting legislation. Since suspicion that given injuries were in-
flicted rather than accidental is a weighted, subjective diagnosis,
prosecution for failure to report would be confronted with insur-
mountable problems of proof, which may render the penalty clause
ineffective.
Lack of agreement on the merits of the clause was reflected in
the fact that the forty-seven states were evenly divided on the point.
Twenty-four incorporated a penalty clause into the law, and twenty-
three omitted that provision. As might be expected, six of the
twenty-four without penalties are the states which made their re-
porting laws permissive rather than mandatory. Table Number Ten
lists the states with, or without, a penalty clause. 1
Differences exist in the language used and the penalties pre-
scribed by the twenty-four laws. Substantially, the wording reads,
"Anyone knowingly and willfully violating the provisions of this act
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The severity of penalties ranges
from Vermont's low of a fine of not more than $25.00, to Pennsyl-
vania's high of one year in jail, a $500.00 fine, or both.
I. Waiver of Privilige
Because the medical profession expressed concern over the
propriety of divulging confidential matter disclosed to them in the
doctor-patient relationship, the reporting act provides a waiver of
that privilege. By such waiver, a doctor is freed from legal or ethical
restrictions against revealing confidential information.
A similar privilege exists between husband and wife. Neither
may divulge information damaging to the other in any criminal
51 TABLE NUMBER 10:
With Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky,
Penalty Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
Clause shire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming
Without Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Penalty Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New
Clause Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, West Virginia
Statutes from those states with a penalty clause are found in the following statutes:
ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 25 (Supp. 1965); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(D)
(Supp. 1966) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-806 (Supp. 1965) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1003 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(6) (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-720 (Supp. 1965); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(6) (Supp. 1966);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.403E (West Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 3855 (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(5) (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.554(7) (Supp. 1966) ; Neb. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 206, § 4; NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.507 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:30 (Supp. 1965); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.7 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.990 (1965) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b) (Supp. 1965) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-302.4 (Supp. 1965);
S.D. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 90, § 5; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 '(Supp. 1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-6 (Supp. 1965); V. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1355 (Supp.




proceedings without a release from the spouse against whom the evi-
dence is being given. Since, in child abuse cases the only witnesses
to the abuse may be the parents themselves, some reporting laws
make the husband-wife privilege inapplicable.
Not all states waived these privileges and the pattern is irregu-
lar. Table Number Eleven shows a breakdown of the forty-seven
states in terms of the type of privilege waiver found in the law.
5 2
Fourteen states provide waiver of both privileges. Five states waive
the doctor-patient privilege "or similar privilege or rule against dis-
closure." It may be argued that this clause ("or similar privi-
lege. . .") can be construed to include the husband-wife privilege.
However, if more strictly interpreted, the phrase may apply only to
similar medical privilege, i.e., nurse-patient, or hospital-patient.
Twelve states used a waiver for the doctor-patient privilege
only. Idaho only waived the husband-wife privilege. The balance
of fifteen states provided neither waiver.
5 2 
TABLE NUMBER 11:
Type of Privilege State
Doctor- patient and Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
Husband-wife tucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota
Doctor- patient Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma
"or similar"
Doctor-patient Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, North Caro-
only lina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Wyoming
Husband-wife only Idaho
No waiver of California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
Privilege chusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin
The following statutes provide for waiver of privileges: ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24
(Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.060 (Supp. 1966); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-842.01(C) (Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-805 (Supp. 1965); COLo.
REV. STAT. § 22-13-7 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (Supp. 1966);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(5) (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp.
1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2046 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 52-1425 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.8 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-719 (Supp. 1965); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(5) (Supp.
1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403D (West Supp. 1965); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.564(4) (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(6) (Supp. 1966); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 210.105(4) (Supp. 1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-905 (Supp.
1965) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1207'(1963); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.506 (1965) ; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:29 (Supp. 1965) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-16 (Supp. 1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-05 (Supp. 1965) ;OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page
Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (Supp. 1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §
146.770 (1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b) (Supp. 1965) ; S.D. Sess. Laws
1964, ch. 90, § 4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-5 (Supp. 1965) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.





Special provisions are present in some statutes which have seri-
ous implication. Of special significance is an exception to the re-
porting law in the statutes of Alabama, Minnesota, and Ohio. Each
of these states defines the reportable injury as one which appears
to have been caused by abuse or neglect. Use of the word "neglect"
gives rise to the special provisions. Their purpose is to exclude
from a possible definition of neglect the child who is under "spir-
itual" treatment.
The intent and purpose of the exception is stated clearly in the
Minnesota statute: "Provided, however, that no provision of this
section shall be construed to mean that a child is neglected or lacks
proper parental care solely because said child's parent, guardian, or
custodian in good faith selects and depends upon spiritual means or
prayer for the treatment or cure of disease or remedial care of such
child."'53 Alabama's clause reads: "provided, however, that a child
who is being furnished Christian Science treatment by a duly ac-
credited Christian Science practitioner shall not be considered a
physically neglected child for the purposes of this section."'5 4 The
Ohio law states, "Nothing in this section shall be construed to
define as a physically neglected child, any child who is under spiritual
treatment through prayer in accordance with the tenants and practice
of a well-recognized religion in lieu of medical treatment, and no
report shall be required as to such child.""5
Both Alabama and Ohio inject an element not found in the
Minnesota language. This factor is the requirement that the spir-
itual treatment be under a duly accredited religious practitioner (Ala-
bama) or in accord with the tenants of a well-recognized religion
(Ohio). This provision seems important to rule out the fraud or
the quack-healer, and also the parent whose reliance on prayer may
be a manifestation of emotional illness rather than adherence to re-
ligious conviction.
The author has grave reservations about these exclusions. In
twenty-five years of practice in the child protective field, numerous
cases were found in which a child's life was endangered by parental
refusal to permit needed emergency surgery or a blood transfusion.
Where parental objection is based on religious grounds, a neglect
petition in the juvenile court seeking a court order to permit neces-
sary medical treatment becomes the only recourse open to the com-
5 3 MN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (Supp. 1966).
5ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1965).
5OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1966).
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munity for safeguarding the child's life. In many of these cases,
after court orders were obtained, parents expressed relief at being
freed of the onus to resolve the conflict between the prohibitions
of their religious tenants and a genuine concern, and despair, for
the child's life.
The language employed in these special clauses result in pre-
venting the reporting and identification of the child. What is more
important, however, is the possibility that the exclusion of these
children from being considered neglected may also create a bar to
the filing of a petition in juvenile court should it become necessary
to obtain a court order to save a child's life.
2. Central Registry
Another clause in some reporting laws deals with the creation
of a central registry for child abuse cases. California amended its
reporting law in 1965 to add a section requiring a central registry.
Responsibility for this record keeping is given to the State Bureau
of Criminal Identification and Investigation. The records will con-
sist of all reports of "suspected infliction of physical injury upon a
minor by other than accidental means ... and reports of arrests for,
and convictions of, violations of Section 273a .... 5 The Bureau is
charged with an obligation to, "transmit to the city police depart-
ment, sheriff or district attorney information detailing all previous
reports of suspected infliction of physical injury upon the same minor
or another minor in the same family by other than accidental means
and reports of arrests for, and convictions of violation of Section
273a, concerning the same minor or another minor in the same
family.'"" Information for the registry is forwarded to the bureau
by the head of a city police department, sheriff, or district attorney,
all of whom are designated to receive reports in the reporting law.
The section goes on to say that the information sent by the Bureau to
police, sheriff, and district attorney is to be made available as follows:
"Reports and other pertinent information received from the bureau
[by police, sheriff or district attorney] shall be made available to
any licensed physician and surgeon, dentist, resident, intern, chiro-
practor, religious practitioner ... or probation department and to
any agency offering child protective services.'"'5
The value of a central registry is self-evident. But the advis-
ability of a registry under the auspices of a Bureau of Criminal Iden-
tification is subject to question in child abuse cases, since use of the
registry is primarily intended for purposes of diagnosis. Knowledge
5
0 CAL. PEN. CODE § 11110 (West Supp.).
57 Ibid.
5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West. Supp.).
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of prior experience with the same family will weigh the scales in
terms of suspecting possible abuse in situations where the diagnosis
cannot be readily made. A registry will also reveal any shopping
around for medical services in cases of repeated injuries to the same
child or to other children in the same family.
To place the registry in a police-oriented setting serves only to
stress punitive ends and criminal identification. Many local com-
munities have set up central registries, but under auspices of welfare
departments or health departments - a framework fulfilling the in-
tended use of the registry as an aid in diagnosis, medical treatment,
and services to children and families. The Illinois reporting law also
has a provision for a central registry, but responsibility for the reg-
istry is placed with the State Department of Welfare.
3. Appropriations
A special clause in the Illinois law is an example of sound legis-
lative planning and genuine understanding of special needs created
by new obligations under new law. The reporting law mandates
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to investigate
reports of child abuse and to offer protective social services. The
department is also directed to set up a central registry of all reported
cases. Recognizing that these obligations add a new and heavy
burden to the department, the legislature made a special appropria-
tion of $50,000 to the department's budget to permit expansion of
the program to meet the added responsibility.
A parallel occurrence took place in Michigan. The reporting
law was enacted in 1964. In 1965, the legislature authorized the
State Department of Social Welfare to initiate a Child Protective
social service program to fill a long-term need brought into clearer
focus by the 1964 reporting act. With the authorization, the legis-
lature made an appropriation of $50,000 to the Department to match
Federal Child Welfare funds, the total sum to be used for creation
and expansion of the new program.
CONCLUSION
The rush by states to press through legislation seeking reports
of child abuse cases attests to wide recognition of the problem and of
the dangers to its victims. That forty-seven laws were enacted in the
short span of three years bears witness to general acceptance of the
urgent necessity to do something on behalf of abused children.
To think that these laws will end the child abuse problem is
naive and unrealistic. This legislation is only a beginning. It is solely
a tool for discovering and identifying the child who is abused. The
states which have enacted reporting legislation have taken no more
1967
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than the first step in the process to involve the full compliment of
services necessary to treat the problem, protect the child, and preserve
the family. Unless this fact is understood fully, and accepted com-
pletely, there is danger that communities with reporting laws will
become complacent under the mistaken notion that there need be no
further concern about child abuse and neglect.
One area which requires immediate attention is the child pro-
tective services. These services are essential to the investigation,
diagnosis, and treatment of abused children and their parents. This
specialized child welfare service however, is not universally available.
A 1955 study revealed many serious local and statewide gaps in the
availability of child protective services.59 A current study is showing
a more widespread extension of child protective services, but large
gaps still remain. An encouraging development seen by the new
survey, is the definite pressure for expansion of these programs to
cover all communities in every state.
The lack of or inadequacy of present child protective services
is usually due to one of the following reasons: (1) the local or state
child welfare program lacks a clear legal base for providing child
protective services; (2) the legal base is permissive, rather than
mandatory, and the appropriating body has failed to allocate funds;
(3) there is a legal base and a child protective program has been
initiated, but funds are insufficient to expand services to meet more
than a minimal part of the community needs. The obvious conclusion
is that legislative action is necesary to authorize and maintain child
protective services or to appropriate necessary and sufficient funds if
these protective social services are to meet the needs of abused and
neglected children.
Two states have taken this next step as a direct outgrowth of
reporting legislation. The Illinois and Michigan legislatures have
demonstrated the importance of better services by providing ade-
quate funds.
In the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act, Congress
required provision of child protective services by the new definition
of Public Child Welfare Services. Without equivocation, the defini-
tion clearly requires that child protective services be part of all public
child welfare programs. However, at the same time, congressional
appropriations did not keep pace with the actual need. If existing
public child welfare services are to expand to include the new pro-
gram, additional funds must be made available. Congress can play a
leading role in providing funds to meet the needs of the child abuse
problem. It must make available sufficient new child welfare funds
59 THE AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCiATION, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES '(1956).
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to stimulate, and underwrite, in part, the development of more ade-
quate child protective services.
But with or without federal aid, states and communities must
promote the creation or expansion of child protective services so that
all neglected and abused children may be protected from parental





By HUBERT D. HENRY*
Mr. Henry demonstrates his expertise in the area of adminis-
trative law in Colorado as he urges reform in the State Administra-
tive Procedure Act. After discussing the development of the APA,
the author points out its shortcomings by examples of agencies which
are not governed by the act. The lack of uniformity and multifarious
procedural differences among administrative agencies warrant con-
sideration of the reforms posed by the revised State Administrative
Procedure Act which The Colorado Legislature failed to enact in
1963. He then discusses how the revised act would resolve many of
the problems not covered by the present act. Moreover he recom-
mends that all agency material which is required by law to be pub-
lished be compiled in a state register. Presently, this material may be
published separately by each agency. Mr. Henry urges that the re-
vised act be reconsidered by the legislature as soon as possible to
attain procedural uniformity in administrative agencies.
INTRODUCTION
T HE State Administrative Procedure Act of Colorado (APA) was
born of necessity- or at least expediency verging on necessity.
A uniform and explicit statement of the law regulating procedures
of Colorado's many administrative agencies was sought by the pro-
ponents of the act. At the time of the statute's drafting in 1959,
there was an increasing demand for the creation of new state agencies
and for the revision of acts governing existing agencies.' Propo-
nents of such legislation urged that it include greater detail con-
cerning procedure and review. It was evident, however, that the
inclusion of such details in the acts regulating individual agencies
would undesirably increase the bulk of the statutes. But experience
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act had shown that
many of these details could be incorporated into a single statute
relating to a large number of agencies; statutes pertaining to indi-
vidual agencies could thereby be shortened, and the desired uni-
formity achieved.
The Administrative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation undertook the task of writing such a statute. Its proposed
Member Colorado Bar, Chairman, Colorado Bar Association Administrative Law Com-
mittee, 1957-63.
1 Henry, Bar Briefs The 1959 Session of the Colorado General Assembly, 36 DICTA, 257,
264 (1959).
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bill was presented to the Colorado General Assembly and enacted
into law in 1959.2 It was amended slightly in 19613 at the sugges-
tion of the Administrative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association, and is now Article 16, of Chapter 3, of the Colorado
Revised Statutes of 1963. The act is generally referred to as the
State Administrative Procedure Act, although it is not officially
designated as such by the statute.
The basic guide used by the Colorado Bar Committee in draft-
ing this act was the 1957 final draft of the proposed federal code
of administrative procedure.4 Since its adoption in 1946,' the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act has never been substantially
amended. However, during the years subsequent to the adoption
of the federal act, committees of the American Bar Association have
attempted unsuccessfully to secure a major revision that would in-
corporate clarifications found desirable after actual experience under
that act; the 1957 proposed code was the fruit of one committee's
efforts.
The drafters also referred to the revised Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to assist them in preparing the Colorado
Statute. The Model Act was first adopted by the National Con.
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1946; it was
meant to parallel the federal act, but for state administrative pro-
cedure. The initial draft underwent a subsequent period of revision
which culminated in the revised Model Act of 1961.6
The drafters of the federal act and the model state act began
with the same basic propositions and ideas in mind. Although
development of the acts by separate committees caused some varia-
tion in language and arrangement, their major provisions remained
substantially the same. The Colorado Bar Committee drew from
both acts the provisions that it felt would be desirable in adminis-
trative practice in Colorado, rejecting only those which seemed in-
appropriate to specific attitudes and practices which had developed
through the years in the state's administrative procedure. As a re-
sult, the APA varies in language and to some extent in arrangement
of content from the federal and revised model state act, but does
not vary significantly in substance.
2 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3-16-1 to -6 (1963).
3 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 44, at 138.
4The American Bar Association Code was introduced as S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964), and the Senate watered it down to S. 1663, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See
generally 1 DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 (Supp. 1966).
S60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
6 Reprinted and criticised in DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cases-Text-PROBLEMS




In spite of the lack of substantial amendment to the Colorado
act since its enactment in 1959, the present law has not been com-
pletely satisfactory. In 1963 the Administrative Law Committee of
the Colorado Bar Association presented to the General Assembly
a complete revision of the law.' However, because of an amendment
to the bill in the House of Representatives which apparently would
have permitted non-lawyers to represent others" before administra-
tive agencies, the Colorado Bar Association withdrew its support of
the bill, and it died in the Senate.9
The APA does not achieve the commendable goal of uniformity
sought by its proponents. One of its greatest inadequacies is the
following provision: "Where a specific statutory provision applies
to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall control
as to such agency."1  This clause has left many areas of procedure
where the APA is consequently inapplicable. By discussing the scope
of this law and other statutory provisions applicable to agencies,
major areas of conflict are discernable. At that point recommended
reforms to rectify these conflicts can be discussed.
I. THE PRESENT STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The present APA in addition to the definitions section" and
the applicability provision,' has the following four main parts:
Rule-making, procedure: Licensing; Hearings; and Judicial review.
A. Rule-making'"
Before making a rule [regulation] an agency must hold a pub-
lic rule-making proceeding.'4 At least twenty days before the hear-
ing, the agency must give public notice, stating the time, place and
nature of the proceeding, the authority under which the rule is pro-
7IH.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1963). Although there are no official
copies of unenacted bills, the Legislative Reference Office maintains files of copies as
introduced unofficially. (Hereinafter the revised Administrative Procedure Act, as in-
troduced and unenacted will be referred to as H.B. 69. Within the sections of the bill
are the sections of the act, and citations to specific portions of the bill will be by ref-
erence to the statutory section of the appropriate section of the bill).
8 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(3) of § 1 at 9: "Shall be entitled
to the benefit of legal counsel of his own choosing" was amended by striking the word
"legal" before "counsel" and adding the words "or other person" after "counsel" and
by adding a poviso that "A person other than a counsel representing a party at a hearing
may question or cross-examine witnesses or present argument." It would seem that the
effect of the proviso would be to prohibit a "counsel" from questioning or cross-exam-
ining witnesses or presenting argument. H. JOURNAL, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. at 597 (1963).
9 The bill was not reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee by the end of the ses-
sion and died under state procedure.
10 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-6 (1963).
11 COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-1 (1963).
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16 (1963).
13 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2 (1963).
14 COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-2 (1963).
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posed, and either the substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved.1"
The agency must afford interested persons an opportunity to
submit written data, views, or arguments concerning proposed rules.
Unless the agency deems it unnecessary, such views can be presented
orally at the hearing. In any case, the agency must consider all
submissions."6
A rule becomes effective on the date prescribed in the rule, but
this effective date may not be less than twenty days after publication
of the rule's adoption.
17
A temporary or emergency rule may be adopted without the
holding of a hearing and without notice where the agency finds
that "immediate adoption of the rule is imperatively necessary for
the preservation of public health, safety or welfare, and compliance
with the requirements [for notice and postponement of effective
date] ...would be contrary to the public interest."'"
Any interested person has the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule. These petitions are open to public
inspection. The agency does not have to act on every petition, but
once it has undertaken rule-making on a certain subject, all petitions
relevant to the subject matter must be considered and acted upon.'
An agency is required to maintain a register of (1) its currently
effective rules, (2) the current status of each published proposal for
rules, and (3) minutes of all its actions upon rules.20 Copies of any
rule then in effect or of any notice of a proposed rule-making pro-
ceeding in which action has not been completed must be made
available to the public; the agency must deliver a copy to anyone
requesting it and paying the cost of copying. Unless it has been
published and made available to the public, no rule can be relied
upon or cited by the agency against any person.2'
Each agency is required to maintain a mailing list, which must
include the attorney general and every other person who has re-
quested that he be placed on the list and paid the fee set to cover
the mailing cost. 2 The prescribed method of publication or giving
of any notice, either of a proposed rule-making proceeding, or of
the adoption of a rule, is by mailing a copy to each person on the
15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(3) (1963).
1
6 
COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-2(4) (1963).
'7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2'(5) (1963).
18
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(6) (1963).
1 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(7) (1963).
2COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(4) (1963).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2'(10) (1963).
22 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(11) (1963).
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mailing list, and by placing and keeping a copy on permanent file
in the agency's office available for public inspection.
23
Investigation of the practice of a number of specific agencies
indicates a wide variation in the practical application of the above
provisions. The State Department of Public Welfare charges $12
a year for placing a name on its mailing list. Usually, twenty days
before each monthly board meeting, the Department sends a notice
of all matters to be considered at the meeting, and after each meet-
ing, it sends another notice of the actions taken. The Colorado
State Department of Public Health puts names on its mailing list
without charging a fee. However, it has not in all cases followed
the law requiring the giving of notice of adoption of regulations;
some of its regulations therefore may not be in effect.24 The Colo-
rado State Board of Pharmacy charges $2 for placement on its mail-
ing list, within the fee renewable upon request from the board.
Rule-making proceedings before the pharmacy board are infrequent,
and consequently there is no need for frequent mailing of notices.
The author's request to be placed on the mailing list of other
agencies brought these results: from the State Civil Service Com-
mission, notices of all the examinations to be held; from the Colo-
rado State Department of Employment, nothing; from the Depart-
ment of Revenue, notices about the new income tax regulations.
B. Licensing
25
A proceeding for the revocation, suspension, annulment, limi-
tation, or modification of a license is not to be commenced until
the agency has given the licensee notice in writing of facts or con-
duct that may warrant such action and has afforded him an oppor-
tunity to submit written data, views, and arguments with respect
to such facts or conduct. 26 Except in cases of deliberate and willful
violation, the licensee must be given reasonable opportunity to com-
ply with all lawful requirements. Such a proceeding is commenced
by the filing of a written and signed complaint stating the name
of the licensee complained against and the grounds for the requested
action. No previously issued license shall be revoked, suspended,
annulled, or modified until after a hearing.2"
23 In addition, "each state agency which regulates a public activitiy or which requires
forms to be filed by either private or public groups, agencies or businesses . . ." is re-
quired to file copies of all rules, regulations and forms with the Legislative Council
before the convening of the 1967 General Assembly. HousE JOINT REs. 1024, 45th
Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., para. (2) (F) (1965), recorded in Colo. Sess. Laws 1965,
at 1503, 1506.
24 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(10) (1963).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3'(1963).
2S COL.. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963).
2 CO.O. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(6) (1963).
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Notwithstanding these requirements, where "the agency has
reasonable grounds to believe and finds that the licensee has been
guilty of deliberate and willful violation, or that the public health,
safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action, and in-
corporates such findings in its order .. .,,28 it may summarily sus-
pend the license without notice.
A licensee who seeks renewal of a license, or who seeks a new
license for previously licensed continuing activity, must make timely
and sufficient application to the agency. If he does so, his license
does not expire until his application is finally acted upon. 9 If the
application is denied or the terms of the new license limited, his
license does not expire until judicial review has been sought or the





A person entitled to notice of a hearing must be given timely
notice of the time, place, nature thereof, the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which it is to be held, and the matters of fact and
law asserted.
3 2
The present law provides that the agency shall preside at the
taking of evidence. However, if so provided by law, a member or
members of the body which constitute the agency or a hearing com-
missioner, may preside in lieu of the agency as a body.33 Whoever
the presiding officer is, he must conduct his functions in an im-
partial manner. He may withdraw if he deems himself disquali-
fied. If any party files an affidavit charging that the presiding
officer is personally biased or otherwise disqualified, the presiding
officer must determine the issue as a matter of record in the case.3
The presiding or deciding officer must be independent of super-
vision or direction by any officer, employee, or agent engaged in
the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions for the
agency.
30
The presiding officer has generally the same authority over
the conduct of the hearing as does a judge in the district court.37
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963).
2 9 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(7) (1963).
30 Ibid.
31 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4 (1963).
32 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(2) (1963).
33 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(3) (1963).
4 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(6) (1963).
37 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(4) (1963).
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He may administer oaths and affirmations, issue subpoenas, rule
upon the offers of proof, receive evidence, hear and dispose of mo-
tions, and otherwise regulate the course of the hearing. 8  Subpoenas
must be issued without discrimination at the request of either public
or private parties. 9 Proceedings to enforce a subpoena may be
brought in the district court." The court must sustain the subpoena
if it is found to be in accordance with law and must issue an order
requiring the appearance of witnesses or the production of data
under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious
failure to comply with the order of the court. 1
The rules of evidence, requirements of proof, and procedures
before the agency are generally the same as those in civil nonjury
cases in the district courts.4 Usually the proponent of an order has
the burden of proof.48 An agency may take notice of general, tech-
nical, or scientific facts within its knowledge, but the fact so noticed
must be specified in the record or brought to the attention of the
parties before final decision, with opportunity in every party to
controvert the fact so noticed.4 4 "Every party and every person
compelled to testify or to submit data or evidence ... shall be entitled
to the benefit of counsel and to retain, or on payment of reasonable





Actions of the agency may be judicially reviewed in two ways:
(1) in a civil or criminal action brought by the agency to enforce
its action; or (2) in a district court action for review filed by an
aggrieved or adversely affected person in accordance with the Colo-
rado Rules of Civil Procedure. Any person affected adversely or
aggrieved by reviewable agency action has standing to seek judicial
review, whether or not he was a party to the agency action.47 The
action for review may be brought against the agency, individuals
comprising the agency, or a person representing the agency or acting
38 Ibid.
39 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(5) (1963).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 COLO. REV. STAT. '§ 3-16-4(4) (1963).
43 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(7) (1963).
44 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(8) (1963).
4
5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(9) (1963).
46 COLO. RiV. STAT. '§ 3-16-5 ('1963).
47 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(3) (1963).
VOL. 44
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed. When an agency
record has been made, review is on its record.41 It is, therefore,
extremely important that a complete and detailed record be made
before the agency. If a record was not made before the agency, or
if the alleged procedural errors or irregularities do not appear in
the agency record, a record for appellate review is made by trial in
the reviewing court.4"
If the reviewing court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency
action. If it finds error, the court must hold unlawful and set aside
the agency action, restrain the enforcement of the order or rule
under review, compel the agency to take any action which it has
unlawfully withheld or unduly delayed, remand the case for further
proceedings, or afford such other relief as may be appropriate. 0
Any of the following may be grounds for setting aside agency ac-
tion: (1) arbitrary or capricious action; (2) denial of statutory right;
(3) action contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity; (4) action in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
purposes, or limitations; (5) action not in accord with the pro-
cedures or procedural limitation of the administrative procedure
act or otherwise required by law; (6) abuse or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion; (7) action based upon findings of fact that
are clearly erroneous on the whole record; (8) action unsupported
by the evidence; or (9) otherwise contrary to law.51 The decision
of the district court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon
writ of error.
52
Upon a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result,
the agency must postpone the effective date of the agency action
pending judicial review. 3 The reviewing court, whether or not an
application for postponement has been denied by the agency, shall,
upon a finding of irreparable injury, or to preserve the rights of
the parties pending conclusion of the review proceedings, postpone
the effective date of agency action, and may enjoin, upon a showing of
irreparable injury, the conduct of any agency proceeding in which
the proceeding itself or the action proposed to be taken therein is
clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority
of the agency. "4 If the court finds that any proceeding contesting
4 8 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(2) (1963).
49 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(6) (1963).




COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(5) (1963).
54 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(8) '(1963).
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the jurisdiction or authority of the agency is frivolous or brought
for the purpose of delay, it shall assess against the plaintiff costs
and a reasonable sum for attorney's fees [or an equivalent sum in
lieu thereof].55
II. EXCEPTIONS To THE APA
Although most of the recently enacted statutes relating to ad-
ministrative agencies have adopted most or all of the provisions of
the APA by reference,5" many provisions remain, particularly in
statutes enacted prior to the APA that do conflict with the APA.
The number of conflicts can and should be held to a minimum by
strictly and narrowly construing the crucial provision that "where
a specific statutory provision applies to a specific agency, such spe-
cific statutory provision shall control as to such agency." 7 Only if
there is an actual conflict between the APA and the statute applying
to any specific agency, does the latter control, and then only to the
extent of the specific conflict.
Nevertheless, many areas of major conflict remain. Even a
shade of difference between provisions in individual statutes and
those in the APA may make an important difference in a particular
situation. Statutes relating to some agencies, particularly the Indus-
trial Commission, create great divergence in agency procedures. It
would be impractical to enumerate here all the conflicting provisions,
but an attempt will be made to set forth the major ones.
A. Problems of Review
The most noticeable differences between specific controlling
statutes and the APA provisions arise in the area of judicial review.
The APA does not specify the county in which judicial review shall
commence. However, individual controlling statutes variously pro-
vide that review shall commence in the City and County of Denver, 8
in the county of residence or place of business of the appellant or
55 Ibid.
5
6E.g., Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 5(1)'(f) at 203; Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 45, §
7(5)(c) at 219.
5 7 COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-6 (1963).
58 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-7 (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair practices);
32-2-7 '(1963) (Board of Cosmetology, price regulation) ; 72-1-11 (1963) (Insurance
Department, revocation of certificate of authority) ; 72-5-3 (1963) (Insurance Depart-
ment, mutual insurance) ; 72-9-6 (1963) (Insurance Department, mutual benefit asso-
ciations) ; 72-10-20 (1963) (Insurance Department, sickness and accident insurance) ;
72-14-8(1) (1963) (Insurance Department, unfair competition) ; 72-14-10 (1963)
(Insurance Department, unfair competition-intervenors) ; 73-3-18 '(1963) (Bank
Commissioner, consumer finance-small loans law) ; 125-1-22 (1963) (Commissioner
of Securities, licensing and practice act).
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in which a particular act took place,"9 in any district court in Colo-
rado, 0 or in the federal courts.6 Some statutes provide that the
action in the district court shall be de novo,6 ' and one provides that
the appellant may have a jury trial.6"
Nowhere is the confusion greater than in denominating the
review action. The APA says, "Any other case of review of agency
action shall be commenced by the filing of an action for review in
the district court in accordance with the rules of civil procedure."6 4
Some statutes provide, however, that the review shall be by cer-
tiorari, 65 certiorari or other proper method, 66 certiorari or other-
59 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9(1) (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing
and regulation) ; 14-17-9(6) (Supp. 1965) (Banking Department, industrial banks) ;
32-1-21 (1963) (Board of Cosmetology, registration) ; 51-1-6(9) (Supp. 1965)
(Board of Registration for Professional Engineers) ; 61-1-25 (1963) (Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers) ; 68-2-6 (1963) (restaurant licensing, issuance of license) ;
68-2-9 (1963) (restaurant licensing, revocation of license) ; 69-7-7 (2) ( 1963 ) (Anti-
discrimination Commission, fair housing act) ; 72-1-21 (1963) (Insurance Department,
insurance brokers); 72-9-29 (1963) (Insurance Department, mutual benefit associa-
tions) ; 75-1-7 (1963) (liquor licensing, low alcohol content) ; 75-2-8(2) (1963)
(liquor licensing, high alcohol content) ; 80-4-8(8) (1963) (Industrial Commission,
Labor Peace Act); 80-10-10 '(1963) (Industrial Commission, theatrical employment
agencies) ; 80-21-8 (1963) (Industrial Commission, antidiscrimination) ; 112-8-8
( 1963) (State Engineer, floating logs on streams) ; 116-10-13 (1963) (Public Utilities
Commission, railroad safety appliances) ; 116-13-11 (1963) (Public Utilities Commis-
sion, railroad employees) ; 125-7-14 (1963) (Bank Commissioner, money order act) ;
129-3-3(24) (1963) (Secretary of State, bingo and raffles law) ; 138-5-3(5) (1963)
(Director of Revenue, sales and use tax) ; 138-9-4(2) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Rev-
enue, income ton mile, sales and use tax, cigarette and motor fuel taxes) ; 145-1-2(5)
(c) (1963) (Board of Veterinary Medicine) ; 148-5-12 (Supp. 1965) (State Engi-
neer, reservoir storage rights) ; 148-11-17'(1963) (State Engineer, water flow and di-
versions for irrigation) ; 148-18-14 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, ground water man-
agement act).
60 COLO. REv. STAT. § 125-2-4 (1963) (Commissioner of Securities, investment con-
tracts).
61 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 100-6-11 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, con-
servation act: "if it [the district court] otherwise has jurisdiction .. ") ; 125-2-4
(1963) (Commissioner of Securities, investment contracts: "in proper case, to the fed-
eral courts."). See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-61 (1948) (jurisdiction of the district
courts) ; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1948). The jurisdiction
stated in the Colorado Revised Statutes sections mentioned above is in addition to con-
current jurisdiction in the state courts.
62 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9 (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing and
regulation) ; 13-16-3 (1963) (Bank Commissioner, licensing of retail instalment sales
of motor vehicles companies) ; 61-1-25 (1963) (Board of Funeral Directors and Em-
balmers) ; 72-1-11 ( 1963) (Insurance Department, revocation of certificate of authority
of insurance companies) ; 72-1-21(4) (1963) (Insurance Department, insurance brok-
ers) ; 100-6-13 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, conservation act);
125-2-4 (1963) (Cormmissioner of Securities, investment contracts); 138-9-4(2) (b)
(Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, income, ton mile, motor fuel, cigarette, sales and
use taxes) ; 148-18-14(4) (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, ground water management
act).
63 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-1-21(4) (1963) (Insurance Department, insurance brokers).
64 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(4) (1963).
65 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 62-6-15(3) (1963) (Game and Fish Commission, fur-bearing
animals, fur dealers licenses) ; 91-5-10 (1963) (Board of Examiners in the Basic Sci-
ences, licensing to practice the "healing art").




wise," appeal or writ of certiorari,6 8 writ of certiorari or review, 69
certiorari as is provided in the APA,70 and mandamus or otherwise.'
Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has said that there is a statu-
tory review provided for by the APA which is not necessarily a
review under Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.72 These
differences in language and interpretation may suggest the possi-
bility of conflicts even though the ramifications of such possibility
remain unclear.
Prescribed procedures for initiating review are varied. The
statute concerning liquidation of banks provides that "Notice of
review in the district court shall be filed with said bank commis-
sioner within thirty days after his decision is announced, whereupon
the state bank commissioner shall report the facts to the court with
a petition that said court pass upon the validity of the claim. 73
A taxpayer may take an appeal from action of the Director of Reve-
nue by filing with the clerk of the court a copy of the notice of final
determination received by the taxpayer together with a written
notice stating that the taxpayer appeals to the district court and
alleging the pertinent facts upon which such appeal is grounded.74
Appeals from the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers are
made by filing notice in writing of such appeal with the clerk of
the district court and mailing a copy of such notice of appeal to the
secretary of the board.75
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure an agency would have
twenty days to file its answer. Statutes applicable to the Board of
Examiners of Barbers and to the Commissioner of Securities require
the agency to file its answer in ten days.
7 6
Although the APA does not require the furnishing of security
on judicial review, some statutes require the appellant to put up a
bond, usually for costs.77 A public utility appealing a decision of
67 COLO. REV. STAT. § 75-2-8(2) (1963) (liquor licensing, high alcohol content).
68 COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-14-7(2) (1963) (Insurance Department, unfair competition).
69 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 115-6-15(1) to -16(1) (1963) (Public Utilities Commission,
conduct of hearings and investigations).
70 COLO. RaV. STAT. § 138-3-12 (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, cigarette tax).
71 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 68-2-6 (1963) (Department of Health, issuance of restaurant
license) ; 68-2-9 (1963) (Department of Health, revocation of restaurant license).
72 Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961).
73 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-14-11 (1963) (Banking Department, liquidation of banks).
74 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-9-4(3) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, ton mile, motor
fuel, cigarette, income, sales and uses taxes).
75 COLO. REV. STAT. § 61-1-25 (2) (1963) (Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers).
76 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-7 (2) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices); 125-2-4(1) (1963) (Commissioner of Securities).
77 COLO REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9(1) (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing
and regulation); 13-11-17 (1963) (Motor Vehicle Dealers' Administrator and Ad-
visory Board, dealers' licenses); 112-8-8 (1963) (State Engineer, floating logs on




the state tax commission must pay the full amount of all taxes levied
upon the valuation for assessment of its property and plant prior
to taking its appeal."' One very obnoxious and unfair provision of
doubtful constitutionality is the provision that before taking an
appeal a taxpayer must file with the district court a bond in twice
the amount of the taxes, interest, and other charges stated in the
final determination by the director of revenue or at his option de-
posit the stated amount of taxes with the director of revenue in
lieu of posting bond." The fact that in one district court case80
the state did not raise the issue of the failure of the taxpayer to comply
with either of these provisions may indicate that the agency also
doubts the validity of the provisions.
Another statute provides that no suit shall be maintained in
any court to restrain or prevent the collection of the motor fuel tax,
but an aggrieved distributor shall pay the tax, penalty, and interest
under protest and may institute suit within ninety days to recover
such taxes and penalty."
Under the APA, the filing of an action for review does not
automatically stay the decision of the agency. However, the APA
does provides that the agency or the court may postpone the effec-
tive date of agency action, upon a finding that irreparable injury
would otherwise result, or to preserve the rights of the parties pend-
ing conclusion of the review proceedings.8 2 Some statutes provide
that the filing of an action for judicial review shall automatically
78 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 137-4-9(2) (Supp. 1965) (State Board of Equalization, ad va-
lorem general property tax). The provision has doubtful constitutionality.
79 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 138-9-4(4) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, income, ton mile,
passenger mile, motor fuel, cigarette, sales and use taxes). The constitutional objection
is that a person should not be required to file an appeal bond in a penal sum, particularly
in a sum double the taxes, interest "and other charges" when the taxpayer has never been
in court about the validity of the sum alleged. If the taxpayer has already been in court,
and is taking an appeal to a higher court from a lower court, there is a distinguishable
fact, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-6-11 (1963) (Repealed, Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch.
45, § 73, at 436, replaced by § 54, at 428) provided that appeals from county court
were conditioned on bond double the amount of a money judgment. See also COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 139-36-8 to -10 (1963), for appeals from a municipal court. In Mardi,
Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 151 Colo. 28, 375 P.2d 682, noted in 40 DEN.
L.C.J. 149 (1962), the supreme court considered the provision of the ad valorem tax
law that required payment of taxes before taking appeal, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 137-3-38
(1963). The court did not address itself to the question of whether the bond or pay-
ment of taxes was invalid in all instances but held that it was invalid as it applied to
Mardi. The taxes normally do not have to be paid until March, and therefore, the fact
that a taxpayer appeals before March does not accelerate his duty to pay taxes before
filing the appeal. The basic question, whether any taxpayer must pay remains unan-
swered. However, referring to other cases, the court said that appeals from administra-
tive determinations should be subject to liberal rules of statutory construction, "when,
as here, the appealing parties have acted in good faith and with reasonable promptness."
151 Colo. at 34, 375 P.2d at 685.
80 Henry v. Theobald, Civil No. B-39283, D. Colo., 1957. Compare Liebhardt v, Depart-
ment of Revenue, 123 Colo. 369, 229 P.2d 655 (1951), on tax questions involved
in a prior estate.
81 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-2-16 (1963) (Director of Revenue, motor fuel tax).
82 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(5) (1963).
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postpone the effective date of the agency action.8" Other statutes
provide that the effective date of the agency action shall not be
stayed except upon notice to the agency and the furnishing of a
bond, 4 or without the furnishing of a bond,85 or without notice
and hearing. 6 Two statutes provide that the determination of the
agency is final until final determination of the court review.87
Grounds for setting aside agency action are as varied in spe-
cific agency statutes as the hues of the rainbow. However, many of
such statutes, even though at some variance with the APA are not
sufficiently different from the APA to justify separate or detailed
consideration. Briefly enumerated, particular statutory grounds in-
clude a finding or determination that: the agency abused its discre-
tion or exceeded its jurisdiction; 88 the action was unlawful or un-
reasonable, 9 was without good cause,90 was arbitrary and without
good cause,9 was arbitrary and without just cause,92 or arbitrary,9
was unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary or capricious or violated any
constitutional right of the party; 94 the agency acted without or in
excess of its power; the finding, order or award was procured by
fraud; that the award does not do substantial justice to the parties ;95
or that the agency was guilty of gross negligence or an abuse of
83 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9 (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing and
regulation); 7-4-10 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, commission and brokerage
marketing) ; 7-12-8(2) (1963) (Department of Agriculture, frozen food provisioner's
law) ; 61-1-25 (2) (1963) (Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers) ; 72-10-20
(1963) (Insurance Department, sickness and accident insurance) ; 80-4-8(10) (1963)
(Industrial Commission, labor peace act) ; 80-21-8(10) (1963) (Industrial Commis-
sion, antidiscrimination) ; 112-8-9 (1963) (State Engineer, floating logs on streams).
84 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-7(3) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices) ; 32-2-7(4) (1963) (Board of Cosmetology, price regulation) ; 129-3-3(24)
(d) (1963) (Secretary of State, bingo and raffles).
85 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 72-1-11(3) (1963) (Insurance Department, revocation of certifi-
cate of authority of insurance companies) ; 100-6-12 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission, conservation act); 115-6-16(3) (1963) (Public Utilities Commission,
hearings and investigations).
86 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 80-1-38 (1963) (Industrial Commission, powers and duties).
87 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-11-17 (1963) (Motor Vehicle Dealers' Administrator and
Advisory Board) ; 148-5-12 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, reservoir storage rights).
88COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-17-2(6) (Supp. 1965) (Banking Department, industrial
banks).
89 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-2-7(2) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices).
90 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 68-2-6 (1963) (Department of Health, issuance of restaurant
license) ; 68-2-9 '(1963) (Department of Health, revocation of restaurant license).
91 COLO. REV. STAT. § 75-1-7(6) (1963) (liquor licensing authorities, fermented malt
beverage, low alcohol content).
92 COLO. REv. STAT. § 138-1-84 (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, income tax).
93 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 75-2-8(2) (1963) (liquor licensing authorities, hard liquor).
9 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 100-6-13 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, con-
servation act).
9 CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 80-1-40(1)(e) (1963) (Industrial Commission, powers and
duties) ; 81-14-12 (1963) (Industrial Commission, workmen's compensation proce-
dure).
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discretion." In the case of one agency specific grounds for setting
aside its action on review are not enumerated, but rather the "court
shall make such decree . . . as to the court may seem just and
proper."'
9 7
B. Problems with rule-making
The APA varies greatly from particular statutory provisions
concerning rule-making. Some statutes provide for a different time
of notice of rule-making than that prescribed by the APA9" and
others for a different lapse of time between adoption and effective
date.")9 The statute controlling the Oil and Gas Conservation Com-
mission provides that a temporary rule shall not be effective for
more than fifteen days. 100
In some instances, notice of rule-making proceedings or of the
adoption of a rule, or both, is to be given by newspaper publica-
tion.' One statute permits newspaper publication of a notice of
rule-making proceeding in lieu of personal service.'0 2 Some agencies
are required to give notice of the adoption of rules by posting on
96 COLO. REV. STAT. § 128-1-10 (1963) (Board of Appeals of Soil Conservation Board,
soil conservation districts).
97 COLO. REv. STAT. § 51-2-10(7) (1963) (Board of Registration for Professional Engi-
neers, surveyors ).
98 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-13-12 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, commercial ferti-
lizers, 10 days); 66-15-5(3) (b) (1963) (Department of Public Health, enriched
flour and bread, 10 days); 66-21-5(1) (a) (1963) '(Department of Public Health,
hazardous household substances labeling act, 30 days) ; 100-6-7(2) (1963) (Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission, conservation act, 10 days).
99 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-3-12 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, marketing orders,
5 days) ; 62-2-13(1) (1963) (Game, Fish and Parks Commission, 2 days) ; 66-15-5
(3) (b) (1963) (Department of Public Health, enrichment of flour and bread act, 30
days) ; 66-20-19(3) (1963) (Department of Public Health, pure food and drug law,
60 days unless in case of emergency) ; 66-21-5 (1) (a) (1963) (Department of Public
Health, hazardous household substances labeling act, 60 days) ; 73-3-11 (1) (1963)
(Bank Commissioner, consumer finance law-small loans, 30 days) ; 80-1-9(7) (1963)
(Industrial Commission, rules and regulations, 10 days) ; 80-1-10(1) (1963) (Indus-
trial Commission, orders, 10 days) ; 80-4-3(4) (Supp. 1965) (Industrial Commission,
labor peace act, 10 days) ; 80-7-10(2) (1963) (Industrial Commission, minimum wage
for women and children, Wage Board, 30 days) ; 81-7-8 (1963) (Industrial Commis-
sion, workmen's compensation, 10 days) ; 82-3-2 (1963) (Department of Employment,
employment security, 10 days).
100 COLO. REV. STAT. § 100-6-7 (15) (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission).
101 CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 7-3-12 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, marketing act of
1939, adoption); 7-5-6 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, fruits and vegetables,
adoption) ; 7-5-7 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, fruits and vegetables, adop-
tion); 62-2-13 (1963) (Game, Fish and Parks Commission, adoption); 66-15-5(5)
(1963) (Department of Public Health, enrichment of flour and bread act, both) ; 66-
21-5(1) (a) (1963) (Department of Public Health, hazardous household substances
labeling act, both) ; 80-7-10(1) (1963) (Industrial Commission, Wage Board, mini-
mum wage for women and children, adoption) ; 82-3-2 (1963) (Department of Em-
ployment, employment security, adoption).
102 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 148-18-11 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, Ground Water Com-
mission, ground water management act) ; 148-18-30 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer,
Ground Water Commission, board of directors of ground water management district,
ground water management act). One statute allows newspaper publication as an alter-




a bulletin board in the office of the agency ;103 other agencies must
file adopted rules with the secretary of state."' Some statutes pro-
vide that notice of rule-making proceedings or notice of the adop-
tion of rules, or both, shall be sent to all licensees or all persons
known to be interested, or all persons of a particular class.' "' Finally,
one statute specifically provides that the provisions of the APA
are not applicable to rule-making proceedings. °6
C. Problems in licensing
The APA requires a complaint for the suspension or revocation
of a license to be in writing and signed by the complainant. The
more strict requirement of several statutes is that such a complaint
be either under oath or verified." 7 The statute pertaining to the
Industrial Commission provides that a complaint of violation of the
law regarding wage equality between the sexes must be verified.'0 8
Some statutes provide that a license shall be suspended or re-
voked by operation of law,' °9 and one of these provides that the
certificate shall be revoked by operation of law without hearing.10
Certainly these phrases cannot be taken literally, because the li-
censee would be entitled to a hearing at least on the question of
whether or not "operation of law" has set in.
The APA provides for the emergency suspension of a license
without notice and without a hearing, where "the agency has rea-
103 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-5(1) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices) ; 32-2-5(1) (1963) (Board of Cosmetology, price regulation); 80-1-9(7)
(1963) (Industrial Commission) ; 81-15-26 (1963) (Industrial Commission, work-
men's compensation insurance rates).
'0CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 10-1-4(4) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Architects) ; 82-3-2
(1963) (Department of Employment, employment security).
10
5 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-1-20 (1963) (Board of Accountancy) ; 7-3-5(3) (1963) (De-
partment of Agriculture, marketing act of 1939) ; 7-5-7 (1963) (Department of Agri-
culture, fruits and vegetables act, interested persons) ; 73-3-11 (1963) (Bank Com-
missioner, consumer finance-small loan law) ; 80-7-10(2) (1963) (Industrial Com-
mission, Wage Board, minimum wage for women and children); 81-7-8 (1963) (In-
dustrial Commission, workmen's compensation) ; 148-18-30 (Supp. 1965) (State En-
gineer, board of directors of ground water management district).
106 "The provisions of article 16 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963, shall not be applicable, except
that 3-16-5, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 shall apply" Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 7, §




COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-3-8(2) (Supp. 1965) (Bank Commissioner, debt adjust-
ment) ; 51-1-6(6) (Supp. 1965) (Board of Registration for Professional Engineers)
51-2-10(2) (1963) (Board of Registration for Professional Engineers, surveyors)
97-1-22 ( 1) (1963) (Board of Nursing, professional nursing practice act).
108 COLO. REv. STAT. § 80-3-3 (1963) (Industrial Commission, wage equality between
sexes act).
109COLO. REV. STAT. § 123-17-21(3) (1963) (Department of Education, teachers' certi-
ficates, suspended without a hearing) ; Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 39, §§ 4(9), at 183
(agent's permit) ; 5(6) (a) at 185 (proprietary school certificate) ; 10(2) at 189
(revocation of permits and certificates). (Proprietary School Act of 1966 to be codi-
fied to COLO. REV. STAT. § 146-3-1).




sonable grounds to believe and finds that the licensee has been
guilty of deliberate and willful violation, or that the public health,
safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action .. -111
A number of statutes place a limitation of time on the period during
which such emergency suspension shall be in effect. 112 One statute
provides for 3 days' written notice and a hearing before even making
an emergency suspension.'
i
D. Other problem areas
The APA is very explicit that ex parte testimony cannot be
taken. However, one statute provides that the agency with or without
notice to either party, "may cause testimony to be taken .... All
ex parte testimony taken by the commission shall be reduced to
writing and either party shall have opportunity to examine and
rebut the same on final hearing."11 4
Under the APA the "rules of evidence and requirements of
proof shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in civil
nonjury cases in the district courts." ' 5 However, several statutes
provide that the specific agency is not bound by technical rules of
evidence or strict rules of procedure." 6
There is some confusion in the statutes concerning the enforce-
ment of an agency subpoena. The APA recognizes the ordinary
method of proceeding -application to the court for a court order
requiring obedience to the subpoena, with punishment by the court
for contempt of its order in case there is refusal to comply." 7 Some
statutes make it a misdemeanor to willfully ignore an agency sub-
1' COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963).
112 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-14-4(6) (1963) (Department of Agriculture, application of
agricultural chemicals, 10 days) ; 14-19-12(1) (1963) (Banking Department, funeral
contract trust funds, 30 days) ; 62-6-16(4) (1963) (Game, Fish and Parks Commis-
sion, fur dealers, 6 months) ; 68-2-9 (1963) (Department of Health, hotel or restaurant
license, 6 months) ; 75-2-11(2) (1963) (liquor licensing authorities, summary sus-
pension for 15 days, suspension for 6 months) ; 100-6-7(3) (1963) (Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, 15 days) ; 129-3-3(2) '(1963) Secretary of State, bingo and
raffles law, 30 days) ; 129-3-3 (7) (1963) (Secretary of State, bingo and raffles law,
may stop game pending a hearing not later than 10 days).
113CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-19-12(1) (1963) (Banking Department, funeral contract
trust funds).
14COLO. REV. STAT. § 80-1-35(3) (1963) (Industrial Commission). Compare COLO.
REV. STAT. § 81-14-3(3) (1963) (Industrial Commission, workmen's compensation).
11
5 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(7) (1963).
116 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-1-21(6) (1963) (Board of Accountancy) ; 10-1-21(2) (1963)
(Board of Examiners of Architects) ; 23-1-16(2) (1963) (Board of Chiropractic Ex-
aminers) ; 69-7-6(11) (1963) (Antidiscrimination Commission, fair housing) ; 72-
14-6(3) (1963) (Insurance Department, unfair competition) ; 80-1-22 (1963) (In-
dustrial Commission) ; 80-1-28'(1963) (Industrial Commission) ; 80-7-7 (1963) (In-
dustrial Commission, Wage Board, minimum wage of women and children) ; 80-21-7
(11) (1963) (Industrial Commission, antidiscrimination) ; 82-5-7(1) (1963) (De-
partment of Employment, employment security-unemployment compensation); 91-
6-16(2) (1963) (Board of Physical Therapy) ; 97-1-22(2) (1963) (Board of Nurs-
ing) ; 115-6-1 (1963) (Public Utilities Commission).
117 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(5) (1963).
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
poena 1 8 - a provision of doubtful constitutionality. Perhaps the
most illustrative example of this confusion is the procedure for en-
forcement provided by the legislature if a taxpayer fails or refuses
to respond to a subpoena. In such a case the judge, upon applica-
tion, "may cause arrest of such person, and upon hearing, said judge
shall have, for the purpose of enforcing obedience to the require-
ments of said subpoena, power to make such order as, in his dis-
cretion, he deems consistent with the law for punishment of con-
tempts." 119 This provision was adopted in 1965 despite court de-
cisions indicating that such procedure is undoubtedly unconstitutional
and could not be upheld by a court. The bill drafters and legislators
who should have been enlightened by and benefited from such de-
cisions nevertheless ignored them in approving this clause.
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The best method to overcome the major shortcomings of the
APA would be the adoption of the revised State Administrative
Procedure Act (hereinafter revised act) presented by the Adminis-
trative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association to the
Colorado General Assembly in 1963.12° The 1963 bill would have
done away with many of the conflicts between the APA and other
statutes by specifically repeating sections in those statutes which
deviated from the APA.' 2' The proposed revisions to the APA it-
self included a number of changes of considerable materiality,
along with improvements in language which clarified, but did not
substantially change, the meaning of certain provisions. 122 The
changes of greatest materiality will be discussed here.
The revised act offically designates the act as the "State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,' '123 the name it has had unofficially from
the beginning.
A. Hearing officers
The greatest single change is the provision for the appointment
of hearing officers and the conducting of hearings by such offi-
cers. 124 The bill provides that "at a hearing only one of the follow-
118 COLo. Ray. STAT. §§ 80-8-13 (1963) (Industrial Commission, wage law) ; 81-14-21
(1963) (Industrial Commission, workmen's compensation) ; 82-3-8 (2) (1963) (De-
partment of Employment, employment security) ; 117-1-15 (1963) (Real Estate Brok-
ers Board).
119 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-9-11 (2) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue).
120 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1963).
121 Ibid.
1221 Ibid.
123 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-7 of § 1, at 21 (1963).
124 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4 of § 1, at 8-17 (1963).
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ing may preside: The agency; a hearing officer appointed in accord-
ance with subsection [9] of this section, or if otherwise authorized
by law a hearing officer, who, if authorized by law may be a mem-
ber of the body which comprises the agency."
12 5
Although a number of agencies have their own hearing offi-
cers, 12 it was necessary the revised act provide for a panel of
hearing officers for those agencies that do not have their own. Under
the above provision an agency could conduct a hearing through its
own hearing officer, or through a hearing officer selected from the
panel.
Subsection [9]127 provides that in order to maintain an ade-
quate panel of qualified hearing officers, the governor shall ap-
point a sufficient number of hearing officers, each of whom shall
continue as a member of the panel for a period of six years unless
removed for cause by the governor. All hearing officers must be
attorneys at law duly admitted to practice before the Supreme
Court of Colorado, must have been practicing attorneys in Colorado
for at least three years, and must be familiar with the conduct of
administrative proceedings. The officers on the panel would not
all be members of the same political party. They would not be under
civil service. A member of the panel would be designated as chief
hearing officer and would receive a salary of $100 a month in
addition to other compensation provided for. When an agency
wished to delegate the holding of a hearing to an officer appointed
in accordance with this sub-section, it would so advise the chief
hearing officer, who would then select an officer to hold the hear-
ing. Hearings would be apportioned, so far as practicable, equally
among the respective hearing officers. Notwithstanding this, the
chief hearing officer would consider the potential hearing officer's
knowledge of the field of law involved, his place of residence, the
place where the hearing would be held, and all other factors. The
hearing officer would receive from the agency $50 for each one-
half day, or $100 for each full day engaged in the conduct of hear-
ings or matters directly connected therewith; and if the hearing
were held outside the place of residence of the hearing officer, he
would receive mileage at the statutory rate and necessary subsistence
expenses. The bill provides that the hearing officer may employ a
court reporter, who shall be paid by the agency, to attend the hear-
in, and record the proceedings or he may cause the proceedings to
12 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4 of subsection 8, at 11. Compare
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 3-16-4 (1963).
126 E.g., State Water Pollution Control Commission, Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 44, §
5(1) (h) at 203; Air Pollution Variance Board, Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 45, §
7(5) (c) at 219.
127 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(9) of § 1, at 12 (1963).
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be recorded by electronic recording device. When required, the
hearing officer shall cause the proceedings to be transcribed, the
cost to be paid by the agency or the party ordering the transcription.
If the agency acquires a copy of the transcription, its copy must be
made available to any party at reasonable times for inspection and
study.
The record made by the hearing officer or agency conducting
a hearing includes all pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits,
other papers presented or considered, matters officially noticed,
rulings upon exceptions, any findings of fact and conclusions of
law proposed by any party, and any written brief filed.' Oral
argument may be permitted.129 No ex parte material or representa-
tion of any kind may be received or considered. The agency or
hearing officer with the consent of all parties may eliminate or
summarize any part of the record where this may be done without
affecting the decision.'30
When a hearing officer has conducted the hearing, he must
prepare and file an initial decision which the agency shall serve
upon each party, unless all parties with the consent of the agency
have expressly waived their right to have an initial decision rendered
by such hearing officer.' Each initial decision must include a
statement of findings and conclusions upon all the material issues
of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record, and the appro-
priate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.112 In the ab-
sence of an appeal to the agency or a review upon motion of the
agency itself within thirty days after service of the initial decision,
the initial decision of the hearing officer shall become the decision
of the agency.
33
For the the purpose of review by the agency of the initial de-
cision of the hearing officer, either upon appeal or upon the agency's
own motion, the record includes - in addition to the findings,
conclusions and rulings stated in the initial decision - any excep-
tions and briefs filed. The agency may permit oral argument on
review, but no other material may be considered. 34 The findings
of evidentiary fact as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of
fact made by the hearing officer in his initial decision shall not be
set aside by the agency, unless such findings of evidentiary fact are
128 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(14) (1963).
129 Ibid.
130 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assern., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(13) of § 1, at 15 (1963).
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assen., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(13) of § 1, at 16 (1963).
134 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assemn., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(14) (1963).
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contrary to the weight of the evidence."8 5 The agency may remand
the case to the hearing officer for further proceedings; or it may
affirm, set aside, or modify his order so that the sanction or relief
entered therein will conform with the facts and the law. s6
The initial decision of the hearing officer, or if the agency
conducts the hearing, its decions, shall be served on each party by
personal service or first class mail and shall be effective as to such




Relief from the strict rules of evidence is provided by the addi-
tion in the revised act of the following provision: "However, when
necessary to do so in order to ascertain facts affecting the substantial
rights of the parties to the proceeding, the person so conducting
the hearing may receive and consider evidence not admissible under
such rules, provided it possesses probative value commonly accepted
by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." 131
The revised act also provides that documentary evidence may be
received in the form of a copy or excerpt if the original is not readily
available, provided that upon request the opposing party shall be
given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original. Also,
an agency may utilize its experience, technical competence, and




The revised act restates more dearly the proposition in the
present act that two methods of judicial review of agency action
are available to an adversely affected or aggrieved party. He may
defend a court action brought by the agency to seek enforcement,
or he may commence a separate action against the agency in the
district court in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. 40
Two important qualifications are added by the revised act, how-
ever. Firstly, contrary to the APA, which does not limit the time
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(15) of § 1, at 17 (1963).
138 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(11) of § 1, at 15 (1963). See
note 116 Supra and accompanying text.
13Ibid. Compare CoLo. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(8) (1963).
140 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5 (1963), with H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem.,
1st Sess. § 3-16-5 of §1, at 17-18, and with Revised Model State Administrative Pro-




within which review may be sought, the revised act provides that
the independent action for review must be brought within sixty
days after the agency action becomes effective.14' And secondly,
while under the present act any person may commence an action
for judicial review, under the revised act only a party to the agency
action has standing to commence such an action for judicial re-
view. "'42
Judicial review is also affected by the following changes in
the revised act. A court may require a party who seeks an order
of court postponing agency action to comply with terms and to
provide security before the court enters such an order. Parties to
a review action may reduce the record by stipulation. The revised
act provides that, before seeking review of a district court action
in the Supreme Court, a party must file with the district court a
notice of intent to seek such review. 43 If no notice of intent to
seek Supreme Court review is filed with the trial court within such
thirty days, the trial court shall immediately return the agency's
record to it. When the Supreme Court disposes of a case, it returns
the agency record to the trial court if further proceedings are re-
quired in the trial court; if no further proceedings are necessary,
it either returns the record directly to the agency or the trial court,
which must then forward the record to the agency. Both the district
court and the Supreme Court shall advance on the docket any case
which in the discretion of the court requires acceleration.' 44
D. Additional Improvements
The word "rule" is used throughout the present APA, and the
word "regulation" is ignored. The revised act provides that the
"words 'rule' and 'regulation' are synonymous and may be used in-
terchangeably."'145
The present law requires the rule to state the effective date in
the rule, which shall not be earlier than twenty days after adoption.
The revised act provides that a rule goes into effect twenty days
after publication unless a later effective date is stated in the rule.
14 6
The revised act eliminates the provision that the agency must
issue a concise statement of the matters considered in adopting or
1
4 1 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-5(4) (1963).
1 42 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-5(3) (1963).
143 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assern., 1st Sess. § 3-16-5 (9) (1963).
14 4 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., lst Sess. § 3-16-5'(10) (1963).
145 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-1(1) (d) of § 1, at 1-2. Compare
COLo. REV. STAT. § 3-16-1(1) (d) (1963), with Model Act § 1(7).
146 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-2(4) of § 1, at 4 (1963). Compare
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(5) '(1963), with Model Act § 4(b).
VOL. 44
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
rejecting a rule and the reasons therefore.' 47 This provision has not
been effectively followed to date. 1
48
The revised act eliminates the provision that "no revocation,
suspension, annulment, limitation or modification by any agency
of a license shall be lawful unless, before institution of agency
proceedings therefor, the agency shall have given the licensee notice
in writing of facts or conduct that may warrant such action, afforded
the licensee opportunity to submit written data, views, and argu-
ments with respect to such facts or conduct, and except in cases
of deliberate and willful violation, given the licensee a reasonable
opportunity to comply with all lawful requirements."' 49 Under the
revised act, an agency must act promptly on an application for li-
cense and immediately after the taking of action give written notice
of the action to the applicant.'5 °
An agency upon its own motion may commence proceedings
for the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation or modifica-
tion of a previously issued license, but if a complaint is filed by
someone else, the complaint must be signed and sworn to.15'
The revised act does not affect statutory powers of an agency
to issue an emergency order where the agency finds and states of
record that immediate issuance of the order is imperatively necessary
for the preservation of public health, safety, or welfare and ob-
servance of the requirements of notice of hearing would be con-
trary to the public interest. Any person against whom an emergency
order is issued is entitled upon request to an immediate hearing.'52
The revised act provides that witnesses at agency hearings are
entitled to the same fees and mileage provided for witnesses in a
court of record.1s
Each agency must proceed with reasonable dispatch to con-
clude any matter presented to it, giving prompt notice of refusal
to accept for filing or denial in whole or in part of any written
application or other request. Upon a showing to a court that there
has been undue delay in connection with any such proceeding or
147 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-2 (4) of § 1 at 4 (1963). Compare
Model Act § 3 (a) (2), which also requires a concise statement of reasons.
148 See p. 19 supra.
149 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(3) (1963) ; Compare, H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem.,
1st Sess. § 3-16-3 of § 1, at 6-8 (1963) ; Model Act § 14(c).
1
50 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-3(3) of § 1, at 6-7 (1963). Com-
pare note 147 supra.
151 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-3(8) of § 1, at 8 (1963). Compare
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(5) (1963).
152 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-3(7) of § 1, at 7. Compare CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963) ; Model Act § 14(c).
153 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(4) of §1, at 10 (1963).
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action, the court may direct the agency to decide the matter
promptly.,
5 4
Every agency must provide by rule for the discretionary enter-
taining and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory orders
terminating controversies or removing uncertainties. Orders dispos-
ing of such petitions shall constitute agency action subject to judicial
review.' 55
One very desirable addition to the revised act which was not
incorporated in the version presented to the General Assembly in
1963 is a provision for the establishment of a Colorado Regulations
Register.' 56 Everything required by the APA to be published should
be published in a register to be issued by the secretary of state or
other state officer. All persons should be entitled to be on a mailing
list to receive all or part of the publications made in the register.
The officer making publication should determine the fee to be
charged for making mailings, and copies of the register should be
readily available at stated places, for example in the Supreme
Court Library and the office of the clerk of each district court.
There should also be a provision requiring each agency to deliver
to a designated officer a copy of each regulation of the agency
in effect on a given date and requiring the agency to publish all
such regulations in the regulations register.
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Administrative Procedure Act arose out of need or
expediency demanding coordination and an explicit statement of
the statutory provisions regulating procedures of the state's many
administrative agencies. Hopefully such action would achieve uni-
form procedures for all agencies within the state. Although the
APA has performed a major function in regulating those pro-
cedures since its enactment, it does not achieve the uniformity of
procedure which is highly desirable for our rapidly growing struc-
ture of agencies.
Procedures of individual agencies are still too much governed
by specific statutes applicable only to specific agencies. Confusion
is particularly apparent in the area of judicial review, where the
statutes state myriad provisions for initiating appeal and grounds
154 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(6) of § 1, at 11 (1963).
15 5 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., ist Sess. § 3-16-4(7) of § 1, at 11 (1963).
156 An amendment which would have provided for such a register was drafted. Memoran-
dum to Senator Paul Wenke from Hubert D. Henry, Feb. 15, 1963. The amendment
was proposed in the Senate Judiciary Committee, but as was stated, note 5 supra, the
bill was never reported out of committee and the amendment never was printed in the
Journal. The amendment would have added the provision for the register in H.B. 69,
44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-2(10) of § 1, at 5-6 (1963), substituting it
for the printed subsection '(10).
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for setting aside agency action. Vast inconsistencies also exist in
provisions for the adoption of rules, for the revocation of licenses,
and for the taking of evidence in agency hearings.
The adoption of the revised Administrative Procedure Act
which was first presented to the General Assembly in 1963 would
remedy the major deficiencies of the present APA. By repeal of
conflicting provisions in specific statutes, the revised act would
eliminate areas of conflict and make the APA uniformly applicable
to all state agencies. The revised act's major substantive change
would create a central panel of hearing officers, who could be
delegated to conduct hearings for any agency in accord with pro-
cedural requirements of the APA. Judicial review procedures would
be more exactly defined in the revised version.
In addition to the changes proposed in 1963, a revised APA
should incorporate a provision for a Colorado Regulations Register,
which would publish all rules and notices required by the APA
to be published.
To eliminate the confusion and uncertainty caused by the
present diversity of regulations, the revised Administrative Pro-
cedure Act should be re-presented to the General Assembly at the







judge Rubin and Mr. Shaffer engage in an intriguing analysis
of the juvenile court system today. Their discussion focuses on the
challenge posed by the injection of constitutional safeguards into
that system. The authors demonstrate by analysis the lack of due
process in the present system and the resultant failure of the primary
purposes of the juvenile court. To maintain the integrity of the
juvenile court, it is necessary to consider methods of acquiring consti-
tutional protections for the juvenile. The authors conclude that adop-
tion of basic safeguards into the present juvenile system will realize
great rewards for the system and the child. These rewards far out-
weigh the practical difficulties that would be encountered in the
adoption of the recommended constitutional protections.
INTRODUCTION
T HE revolutionary introduction in 1899 of the juvenile court into
a previously two-pronged civil and criminal judicial system was
accompanied by the magnificent hopes of its creators. One such
hope was that individualized justice for the child would henceforth
be a reality.
Today we are in the midst of a second transformation: pro-
cedural safeguards traditionally reserved for the criminal system
are being injected into the juvenile system. The authors propose to
examine the historical development of the juvenile court system, the
current practices within the system, and the necessity for completing
this transformation now in progress.
Beginning in the 1870's, the judicial system was severely criti-
cized, in part, for its inability to adapt to new legal problems which
accompanied urbanization.' The increased crime rate, domestic prob-
lems, small claims of individuals, and youthful offenders of the
law2 were of mounting concern to reformers. It was against this
background that the juvenile court was born. Specialization of the
courts was hopefully a panacea for the ills of the former system.
Hence, in addition to the creation of small claims courts, municipal
* Judge, Denver Juvenile Court, Denver, Colorado; B.A., Penn. State Univ., 1948;
M.S.S.A. Western Reserve Univ., 1960; J.D., De Paul Univ., 1956.
* * B.A., Dickinson Univ., 1964; J.D., Univ. of Denver, 1966.
1 See HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, ch. 8 (1950); Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 19 A.B.A. REP. 395
(1906).
2 HURST, op. cit. supra note 1.
PROTECTIONS FOR THE JUVENILE
courts for traffic offenders, and domestic relations courts, the juve-
nile court arose.8
Noble intentions accompanied the development of the juvenile
court. The court "avoids the stigma' 4 which attaches to criminal
court charges. It "made the child visible"5 in a proceeding con-
ducive to individualized justice. The court would provide care which
would "approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given
by its parents.''6 "[T]he judge and all concerned were merely trying
to find out what could be done on his behalf."' As one writer stated,
"[E]mphasis is laid, not on the act done by the child, but on the
social facts and circumstances that are really the inducing causes of
the child's appearance in court. The particular offense which was
the immediate and proximate cause of the proceedings is considered
only as one of the many other factors surrounding the child. The
purpose of the proceeding here is not punishment but correction of
conditions, protection of the child, and care and prevention of a recur-
rence through the constructive work of the court. Conservation of
the 'child' as a valuable asset of the community, is the dominant
note."8 Unfortunately not all of these goals have been attained.'
I. THE JUVENILE COURT TODAY
A. Comparison with the Adult System
To place the juvenile proceeding in perspective, a brief com-
parison between the juvenile system and the adult criminal system
will be made. When contrasted with the juvenile system, the crim-
inal system has two distinct characteristics: the proceeding is formal
and punishment is a primary purpose. The criminal action is gen-
erally brought against the defendant by the district attorney repre-
senting the people. The defendant is usually represented by counsel
either of his own selection or by court appointment. The trial
is an adversary proceeding. The parens patriae philosophy of the
juvenile court"° is absent in the criminal court. In the latter, the
3 Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Court, 1 J. FAM. L. 151
(1961).
4 Schramm, Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, 261 Annals 101 (1949).
5 Lathrop, quoted in LUNDBERG, UNTO THE LEAST OF THESE, 119 (1947).
6 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 701 (Supp. 1965).
7 Addams, quoted in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 14 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
8 FLEXNER & BALDWIN, JUVENILE COURTS AND PROBATION, 6-7 (1916).
9 See generally Sloane, Juvenile Court. An Uneasy Partnership of Law and Social
Work, 5 J. FAM. L. 170 (1965), which suggests that the conflict between legal and
social norms is at the root of the fundamental problems of the juvenile courts.
10 A typical definition of the doctrine is:
The term parens patriae is defined as the father or parent of his country;
in England, the King; in America, the people; the government is thus
spoken of in relation to its duty to protect and control minor children
and guard their interests.
Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 305, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950).
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prevailing attitude is that if the defendant has violated the law he
should be punished.
Due process safeguards are more prominent in criminal pro-
ceedings; the requirement of these protections has been specifically
set forth by appellate court decisions." These decisions have ex-
pressly enunciated the application of the fifth, fourteenth and other
amendments to the procedures related to the adult system of crim-
inal justice. But the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
only once on a juvenile delinquency case,' 2 and there have been
comparatively few appellate court decisions regarding delinquency.
Accordingly, there is no pervading constitutional application of due
process to juvenile proceedings. In its absence the juvenile correc-
tional system has inconsistently and on a piecemeal basis interpolated
criminal due process safeguards to the juvenile.' 3 As a result juve-
nile courts have applied ad hoc a procedural yardstick of funda-
mental fairness.'
4
The criminal system adheres more stringently to the common
law requisites of a crime, i.e., mens rea and actus reus. The juvenile
system on the other hand is premised on the principle that a child
has only an incomplete ability to formulate the criminal intent neces-
sary to violate a law. Less severe sanctions are therefore utilized in
the juvenile system, partly because of the incomplete mens rea."
Traditionally, the rehabilitation of the child was more impor-
tant to the juvenile court than the adjudicative determination of a
law violation, and probation counselors were employed to aid in
this objective.
In many juvenile courts the probation staffs are still hired by
the judge. This situation may diminish the working independence
of the staff in that its work conforms to the views of the judge.
This situation exists even when juvenile probation staffs are not
hired directly by the judge. In the adult system there is less dialogue
between judge and probation staff, and frequently even less between
probation staff and probationers. Although case loads are higher
than desirable in most juvenile courts, case loads are generally far
11 In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952) ; People v. Fitzgerald,
244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
12 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; In re Williams, 49
Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 '(1966).
14 See Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re
Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1966); Welch, Delinquency Pro-
ceedings- Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum,
50 MINN. L. REV. 653, 664-694 (1966).
'5See Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. L. 121 (1965), which
emphasizes that the traditional concept of mens rea is not applicable to juvenile pro-
ceedings. It should be used only as an objective criteria which must be satisfied
before a violation can be found.
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heavier in the adult system. As a result probation counseling is far
more standardized and less intensive than in the juvenile system.
Most adult probation workers seem to be less adequately trained
than juvenile court staffs. Even so, untrained staff members in both
systems have often performed effectively. The limited professional-
ism in the juvenile probation and parole system has been partially
counteracted by the employment of psychological and psychiatric
personnel affiliated with the courts and by rather close liaison with
child guidance and mental health clinics. Mental health profes-
sionals are still primarily used in the juvenile system for diagnostic
recommendations and occasional treatment, but are increasingly
being used as staff trainers and consultants. The adult system has
not utilized mental health personnel nearly as much, confining them
primarily to diagnostic procedures in determining whether or not
an adult offender is criminally insane.
Juvenile probation officers are involved with the child and his
family very early in the process, obtaining a social history and be-
ginning the rehabilitative relationship. Adult officers, on the other
hand, because of a less flexible system, wait and approach their
task more formally.
Juvenile courts utilize detention home care for children pend-
ing official disposition, although detention facilities are grossly
inadequate throughout the country. Certain courts have developed
this temporary detention into a constructive experience for the child,
in contrast to the usually sterile experience in the city or county jail
for the adult offender.
Attorneys who practice in criminal courts frequently have diffi-
culty making the transition to a juvenile court case. They are not
accustomed to a non-adversary proceeding, and their understanding
of the juvenile system is hampered by a general lack of orientation
to this court during law school training.16 Despite this, they do tend
to give more total consideration to the effect of this proceeding
upon the child. For example, a lawyer in juvenile court may recom-
mend that the youthful client admit responsibility to a petition in
order to help the child develop an improved concept of responsi-
bility and honesty. In the adult court, a lawyer more frequently
sees his duty as providing an adequate defense rather than encourag-
ing his client to admit to guilt in clear cases of guilt. One reason
for this difference may be the more severe sanctions possible for
the offender in the criminal court.
The right to be represented by counsel has not been clearly
defined for juvenile courts, although it appears likely that counsel




will be provided in some situations to the youthful offender.' Juve-
nile court procedures are not as well-defined by statute or court
decision as those in the adult system. Children far more frequently
admit to the petition than do adults to the information or indictment.
The adult receives greater notice of his rights and the procedures
affecting him than does the child. Moreover, juvenile judges not
infrequently lack legal training, whereas such training is a prerequi-
site to being a judge in the criminal system.
B. Instituting the Juvenile Proceeding
Turning specifically to the juvenile system, the juvenile court
proceeding is characterized as civil in nature. 8 The action is com-
menced by the state through a delinquency petition, not against the
juvenile offender, but rather on his behalf. Once the petition has
been filed, the court must either sustain or dismiss the petition.
While the quantum of proof requisite for conviction, "beyond a
reasonable doubt," has never been in doubt for the adult system,
no specific standard has yet been established to adjudicate delin-
quency in juvenile courts. The juvenile court has alternative stand-
ards of proof available to adjudicate delinquency. Since the pro-
ceeding is civil, the court may apply either a preponderance of the
evidence"s or a clear and convincing standard;2° it may also elect
to apply the higher criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt."'" Judges are not uniform in the application of any of these
criterion. For example, at a meeting of judges in Colorado in 1966,
three judges indicated that they each utilized a different quantum
of proof. It is clear that inconsistencies and unequal justice may
17 For legislation providing a right to assigned counsel for indigent juvenile offenders,
see CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 507 (1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 728
(1963). See Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585
(1965) (foresees assumption by legal profession of responsibility to represent children
in juvenile court) ; Skoler & Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court,
4 J. FAM. L. 77 (1964) (predicting other states will enact legislation providing
right to counsel).
18 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp.
214 (N.D. Ala. 1957) ; Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) ; Re
Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932) ; State v. Thomasson, 275 S.W.2d
463 (Tex. 1955); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Ct., 139 Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409
(1926); McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 MINN L. REV.
843 (1961).
19 See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709
(1932) ; State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Robinson v. State,
204 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Ct., 139
Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409 (1926).
20 See, e.g., Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Ind. Co., 186 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Jensen
v. Housley, 297 Ark. 742, 182 S.W.2d 758 (1944) ; Lynch v. Lichtenthaler, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 193 P.2d 77 (1948) ; In re Mazanec's Estate, 204 Minn. 406, 283
N.W. 745 (1939); Coddington v. Jenner, 57 N.J. Eq. 528, 41 At. 874 (1898);
First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691 (1923 ).
21In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y. Supp. 765 (1931) (juvenile court case).
But see In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (juvenile court case).
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occur when judges within the same state apply a different standard
of proof. A case now pending before the United States Supreme
Court2 2 hopefully will determine the appropriate measure.
Following the adjudication of delinquency, the court must make
its finding and order. The court customarily hears a report from
the probation counselor before making its final order. This report
is usually oral and concerns the environmental factors surrounding
the child. The court will then enter its order, which is read in open
court to the child and his parents.
C. Sentencing the Juvenile
Numerous alternatives for disposition are available to the judge,
ranging from institutionalization of the juvenile to placing him on
probation. Currently in some states the court may maintain jurisdic-
tion over a child for as long as eleven years.23 Juvenile courts fre-
quently impose indeterminate sentences on the child. In this man-
ner the juvenile proceedings often result in longer periods of restric-
tion or incarceration for juveniles than the courts are allowed to
impose on an adult found guilty of a similar crime.25
Since there is a reluctance on the part of a juvenile court judge
to take the child away from his parents and his home, the child is
frequently placed on probation. In the federal system, for example,
During the year ending June 30, 1960, 10,391 (38.9 percent)
adult offenders of a total of 26,728 sentenced and convicted in
federal courts were placed on probation, and 690 (48.3 percent)
of a total of 1,428 convicted and sentenced juvenile offenders were
granted the same privilege.
26
Probation is granted even more frequently in state juvenile courts.
Probation has long been employed to keep the family together
and to facilitate the child's adjustment in his familial environment.
While the juvenile is on probation legal authorities maintain careful
watch and control over the individual to assist the probationer in
his new start in life. Probation also serves as a control imposed
upon the wrongdoer to protect society from the recurrence of his
wrongful conduct. The court continues jurisdiction over the child
22Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965); appeal docketed, 34
U.S.L. WEEK 3409 (U.S. May 31, 1966) (No. 1273) ; prob. juris. noted, 34 U.S.L.
WEEK 3428 (U.S. June 21, 1966) (No. 1273) (No. 1273, 1966 Term; renumbered
No. 116, 1967 Term).
23 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-8-11 (1963).
AlIbid.
5Siler, Jr., The Need for Defense Counsel in the Juvenile Court, in 11 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 45, 56 (1965).
26 Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29
U. CL. L. REv. 483, 487 '(1962), citing The 1960 Ann. Rep. Administrative Office
of the United States Courts 304-09 (1961).
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during the probation period. Thus the court is enabled to supervise
the program of rehabilitation and reintegration of the juvenile.
Two major problems arise when considering probation in juve-
nile cases. The first is the nature of the rules and conditions imposed
on the probationer; the second concerns the procedure adopted for
the revocation of probation.
In juvenile as well as criminal cases, probation has traditionally
been treated as a matter of judicial "grace" and not a matter of
right. 7 Hence, certain conditions of probation have withstood chal-
lenges28 of being cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment. They have also been held not violative of the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 29 However,
a condition requiring the probationer to attend Sunday School was
declared unconstitutional under the first amendment.30 The court
stated, "no civil authority has the right to require anyone to accept
or reject any religious belief or to contribute any support thereto."' 3
One condition which is utilized is the suspension of the juve-
nile's drivers license. Despite the fact that many juvenile courts do
not have jurisdiction over traffic offenses, this condition may be
imposed." Moreover, this condition may be applied even when
offenses are not related to automobiles. The probation counselor
may feel that it is easier to control the individual if he does not
have extensive mobility.
Other conditions commonly applied include requiring school
attendance, restricting the probationer's associations, prohibiting the
frequenting of taverns,33 and ordering the probationer to obey his
parents. The requirement of attending school is a condition prob-
ably beneficial in most cases. However, if the probationer is above
the compulsory attendance age, the condition may be a method of
keeping him off the streets and under constant surveillance. Such
use may be of dubious value; the compulsory attendance statute is
designed to assist a child in attaining an education. If the child's
presence in court is caused by a problematic situation at school, such
a condition may not aid him in achieving an education, but may
only aggravate his problem. The condition should not be used when
this result seems likely.
2 Cf. Rubin, Sol, Probation and Due Process of Law, in 11 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
30 (1965).
2 8 Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945).
2People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957).
3 0 Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
31 Id. at 344-345, 38 S.E.2d at 448.
32 Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, AND WELFARE 37 (1966).
3 Some states permit the sale of beverages with 3.2% alcohol content to minors after
they reach age eighteen.
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Utah has adopted a statutory provision enabling the juvenile
court judge to place the child on probation, but conditional upon
the child's parents undergoing medical, psychological, or psychiatric
treatment.8 4 This provision is not typical and would seem to infringe
upon the rights of the parents - especially since they are before
the court as guardians and not as violators of the law. On the other
hand, a condition requiring parental cooperation in a mental health
study of the child would not be subject to the foregoing objection.
Historically a mental health evaluation of the child has been
a common practice. Since the 1909 inauguration of the Chicago
Juvenile Court - related Juvenile Psychopathic Institute and the
Judge Baker Foundation in Boston in 1917, juvenile courts have
directly provided clinical evaluation of children or have arranged
for the examination at nearby child guidance or mental health
clinics. Even though the psychiatrists and psychologists could make
a greater overall contribution to a larger number of court-acquainted
children as staff trainers and consultants, their diagnostic and treat-
ment plan recommendations in an advisory capacity can be extremely
valuable to judge and staff.
If the court decides to place the child on probation, but away
from his parents, restrictions may be placed upon parental visitation
rights. In such a case the child may be placed in a foster home,
through public or private child placing agencies, or in public or
private group care facilities, or in the juvenile detention home.
There is considerable reluctance to assign a child to the juvenile hall
for any extended period of time; usually it is a receiving center pend-
ing hearing. Because of the lack of other facilities, the detention
hall has also become the setting for enforced school attendance pro-
grams, headquarters for work programs, and a temporary placement
facility for children who have violated probation or who are await-
ing placement away from home.
The court may decide to place the child on probation, but in
the home of a friend or relative. This condition enables the juvenile
to be in familiar surroundings, associating with people he knows.
Under these circumstances, conflicts may arise between the parents
and the persons caring for the child. With proper counseling, place-
ment review, and work with the parents, however, these animosities
can be minimized.
Courts are increasingly developing work camps or day or week-
end work programs as rehabilitation devices and as alternatives to
the delinquency institution. These are generally well accepted by
the public and offer ample opportunities for creative change in the
3UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-84 (1953). See Winters, The Utah Juvenile Court Act
of 1965, 9 UTAH L. REv. 509 (1965).
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child. But if poorly administered and arbitrarily used, these pro-
grams could pose difficulties in attaining the rehabilitative goal.
They may interfere with the normal schooling of the child, require
excessive or dangerous work, be programmed without corresponding
counseling, continue for unreasonable periods of time, or be essen-
tially punitive in nature. Serious problems of due process would
arise with an ill-executed work program.
When juvenile courts exhaust available local sources and resort
to state facilities for institutionalization the preferable method is
for centralized commitment to the Youth Authority or to the appro-
priate state department administering the different state delinquency
programs. The state department should then determine which of
its facilities is most appropriate for the rehabilitation of the particu-
lar child. Transfers between state institutions - as from basic delin-
quency institution to the forestry camp - can thus be facilitated.
Although a judge may know particular juveniles and all state
facilities well enough to determine which facility will best meet the
individual's needs, the state department is in a better overall posi-
tion to finally decide which facility should be utilized. Currently,
statutes vary on the method of commitment. As more states fulfill
their obligation to provide an array of alternatives, however, it is
hoped that more statutes will provide for this centralized commitment.
The correctional institutions in some states are stratified on the
basis of age. It is possible in a number of jurisdictions for both
criminal and juvenile courts to sentence offenders to the same re-
formatory. Since the criminal offender may be convicted under a
higher standard of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, than that
which was applied in the juvenile court, the juvenile offender may
be denied equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Further,
no juvenile should be committed to a state penitentiary from the
juvenile court since the state penitentiary is clearly intended for
adjudicated criminals and a child cannot be adjudicated a criminal
in juvenile court.
D. Appeal by the Juvenile
Once the court has passed sentence on the offender, the juve-
nile has the right to appeal the court's decision. Presently this right
is rarely exercised. Reasons for failure to appeal may be the lack
of counsel in juvenile proceedings, inadequacy of notice of the right
to appeal, or inadequacy of notice of the right to appointive counsel
on appeal if indigent. Moreover, some juvenile courts fail to keep
or maintain adequate records which are insufficient transcripts on
which to base an appeal. Regardless of why there are few appeals,
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when they do occur, the record is protected to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the name of the child.
If the juvenile has been placed on probation and violates the
conditions thereof, probation may be revoked by court. Notice and




At the onset of the juvenile proceeding or when an adjudicated
delinquent commits another offense, a serious problem of jurisdic-
tion arises. In many states, the juvenile court and adult criminal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over felonies committed by six-
teen and seventeen year old juveniles; hence, the juvenile court may
waive jurisdiction to the adult court. Such a determination may
depend upon the court in which the district attorney has brought
the action"0 or it may be made by the juvenile judge."7 The pro-
cedure followed in such cases may raise constitutional questions of
due process. 8
Juvenile court judges today may hesitate to apply the consti-
tutional protection of the fourteenth amendment due to an incom-
plete understanding of "due process." Portions of the fifth and
sixth amendments specifically refer to criminal proceedings. 39 How-
ever, neither the fourth nor the fourteenth amendment is limited
to the criminal context. Because the juvenile proceeding is "civil"
in nature, the court may feel the protections afforded by these
amendments do not apply to juvenile hearings. But "due process
of law" is a broader concept which applies to civil as well as crim-
inal hearings. Especially when the juvenile court is confronted with
a violator who may be subjected to punitive penalties, the distinction
between "civil" and "criminal" actions seems unrealistic. Hopefully
the courts are not basing their non-application of certain elements
of due process, such as the right to counsel, which have been delin-
eated in a criminal context, on this fictitious distinction.
35 Sheridan, supra note 32 at 90. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.4, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954 and Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
36 People ex rel. Marks v. District Court of Adams County, 420 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1966).
37 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
38 Ibid.
39 "no person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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II. CRITIQUE OF PRESENT SYSTEM
Re-evaluation of the juvenile court has been stimulated by cer-
tain developments in the area of criminal law. Procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the United States Constitution have been de-
lineated more precisely than in the past. For example, protection
against unreasonable search and seizure,
40 against prolonged deten-
tion, 41 against involuntary confessions,42 from arbitrary police prac-
tices,4 3 and of right to counsel44 have recently been litigated in the
Supreme Court of the United States. By its decisions, the Court has
strengthened these protections and once again drawn attention to
the due process rights of criminal defendants.
Another factor contributing to this investigation of the juvenile
system has been the increasing incidence of juvenile crime. Congress,
recognizing this rapid increase, responded by passing the U.S. Juve-
nile Delinquency Control Act in 1961." As a result, comprehensive
community counterattacks on the causes of delinquency were launched
and were subsequently merged with anti-poverty programs, and
training centers for delinquency personnel were initiated. Man-
power needs in this field were critical.
The critique which accompanied judicial attention to due process
in criminal cases and legislative enactments to control delinquency
was basically centered on two issues: the juvenile proceeding itself
and the staff and facilities of the juvenile system.
The juvenile proceeding poses numerous procedural problems
of due process. The juvenile court when created was not intended
to deny fundamental fairness to its participants. One purpose of
the system was to provide a fair hearing in an informal and flexible
atmosphere. But under the doctrine of parens patriae the system has
substituted a paternalistic standard for fairness which may not always
equal the due process standard.4
In the system today many juveniles confess to offenses. These
offenders are interrogated by the police before being charged. Under
the philosophy of the court, the rehabilitation of the child is more
easily ascertained when all the facts, no matter how discovered, are
before the court. But due process may require more; Miranda v.
40 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
42 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
44 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45 Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act, 75 Stat. 572 (1961), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2541-48 (1961).
oSee note 10 supra for a definition of the parens patriae doctrine. See The Parens
Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers,
27 U. PrTT. L. REV. 894 (1966).
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Arizona47 and Gideon v. Wainwright48 may require that such interro-
gation only be in the presence of counsel or parent and that the
court appoint counsel to assist the indigent. Because of these de-
cisions the parents and child may have to have notice of the hearings
and of their legal rights- including the right to remain silent.
Other constitutional problems are present. Must the juvenile be
granted a hearing at which he is represented by counsel for revoca-
tion of probation or parole, or when the juvenile court seeks to
waive jurisdiction?4" Must he be provided with counsel at the initial
proceeding and on appeal? What type notice must he have of his
legal rights? Are confessions, statements, and the evidence discov-
ered from the information given in a confession or statement ad-
missible into evidence at the hearing? Must the juvenile be granted
a hearing when he is transferred from the delinquency institution
to a reformatory - especially in light of the fact that the latter
usually requires a higher standard of proof for conviction and com-
mitment than the former would? Finally, the problem remains of
whether the indeterminate sentence is valid and the continuing juris-
diction of the court constitutional- must these sentences be re-
viewed periodically?
Numerous other problems, in addition to the lack of constitu-
tional safeguards, exist. Despite state statutes prohibiting the jailing
of children, 5° numerous juveniles are incarcerated in jails annually.
Children may be punished or their freedom restricted when they
have not committed a crime, e.g., for truancy or incorrigibility.
51
"Arithmetical justice" is frequently meted out to juveniles; for the
first offense, probation; for the second offense, suspended sentence
to a delinquency institution; for the third offense, institutionalization.
Overly restrictive conditions of probation are frequently imposed.
The present system frequently fails to adequately achieve re-
integration of the child into society or to attain his rehabilitation.
In some cases non-court social or rehabilitative services would better
meet the needs of the child than the court proceeding. A mentally
retarded child, for example, generally needs specialized services,
not a court. The neglected or dependent child may be advanta-
geously helped by social services rather than probation. Currently,
diverting such cases into these services is difficult prior to official
court consideration. New York is one state which adopted an intake
practice in juvenile courts to enable the court to authorize such
47 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5See, e.g COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-8-6 (1963); CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE
§ 57 1T975).51 See e.g., N.Y. FMILY CTr. At'r, §§ 711, 712, 754, 756 (1963).
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outside remedial measures before a petition is filed. That state also
allows court surveillance of a case without filing a petition.52 Such
a practice enables the number of delinquency petitions to be de-
creased and yet achieves rehabilitation of the child. Moreover the
court can focus attention on the more serious offenses.
In seeking rehabilitation of a child the present system does not
enable the child to fully appreciate the correctional process. An
indeterminate sentence may cause the juvenile to question the system
and consider it as harrassing him - he may not understand its re-
habilitative goals. The purpose of the continuing jurisdiction of the
court during probation, of the parole authority, or of the correctional
institution should be fully and carefully explained to the child. The
jurisdiction should be subject to review at a given time to see if it is
still necessary. The necessity for periodic review becomes more
evident in light of the fact that a sequence of probation, institu-
tionalization, and parole may extend over many years.
Probation poses other dilemmas such as the reasonableness of
the conditions. It would seem that overly strict conditions which
are unrelated to the offense charged would be so arbitrary and un-
reasonable as to violate due process. The present system fails either
to recognize this problem or resolve it.
Moreover, if probation is revoked for violation of condition,
several due process questions arise. Must the juvenile have a hear-
ing on his probation revocation? Does he have a right to counsel?
To appeal? Also, an equal protection problem may be present. Are
the probationers being treated equally when probation is revoked
summarily for violation of a probation condition, when the condi-
tions imposed are neither uniform nor in conformity with any ra-
tional policy?
The current practice of providing a waiver proceeding allows
the more severe juvenile crimes to be treated more strictly in the
criminal courts and with the possibility of very severe penalty. Pres-
ently, the procedures surrounding the waiver hearing have come
under criticism as being a denial of due process. The legislature or
court, in allowing such a practice, seems to be protecting itself from
public criticism in the more severe cases. "The community, in gen-
eral not yet convinced of the value of the experiments [juvenile
courts], is unwilling or unable to give up totally the satisfaction of
punishing wrongdoers in exchange for the dubious advantage of
rehabilitating them."' 53 Increased substantive protections are needed
before waiver should be allowed. And doesn't the waiver provision
52 N. Y. FAMILY CT. ACT, §§ 713,727, 759 (1963).
53 Gordon & Sargent, Waiver of Jurisdiction, in 9 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 121, 126
(1963).
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represent our society's failure to provide adequate and effective
juvenile rehabilitative facilities? If we programmed sufficiently for
youth, we might eliminate the waiver procedure entirely.
The final criticism of the present system focuses on the transfer
of the adjudicated delinquent from one institution to another. If he
is transferred from a delinquency institution to the reformatory,
he is being penalized in the same manner as the criminal offender.
But the latter has been committed to the reformatory by a higher
standard of proof than would occur in the usual juvenile hearing.
Serious constitutional questions may arise. Typically a transfer is
without a hearing or representation by counsel. It is an administra-
tive act based on various considerations. Nonetheless, it would seem
that the child should be allowed to have counsel, express himself
and understand what is happening to him.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to rectify and adjust the juvenile system to the legal
standards which it avoids, many alterations are necessary. Probably
a more significant one is to grant the juvenile court exclusive juris-
diction over cases involving minors. This change is needed to carry
out the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court, and to avoid
the arbitrariness of the current standard for waiver, i.e., waiving
jurisdiction depending on the age of the juvenile and severity of
the offense charged. Concomitant with this alteration, the juvenile
system will need better staffed institutions and more and better
trained personnel. Then the staff could strive to rehabilitate the
child and reintegrate him into society.
At the time of the delinquency petition, the child must be in-
formed of his constitutional rights. These should include his right
to counsel, to remain silent, and to a full hearing. Once counsel
has been employed or appointed, interrogation and investigation of
the child could go on within a fairer context.
Because the court may institutionalize the offender or may
otherwise restrict his freedom, the authors feel that a uniform cri-
terion for delinquency adjudication should be applied. This stand-
ard should be higher than that required in civil cases. A consistent
standard would avoid certain inequalities which may now occur in
juvenile courts.
After the adjudication of delinquency, the child and his parents
should be notified in writing of the right to appeal and to counsel
on appeal. If counsel has been provided throughout the proceeding,
the parents and child will have the court's order and finding ex-
plained to them; they will understand its impact and ramifications.
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Before sentence is rendered, the child, his parents, or counsel
should have the right to examine a copy of the probation counselor's
report prior to the disposition hearing. He can thus be in a position
to contest it or question its accuracy. This would enable the court
to know the facts more precisely. Moreover, the child should be
allowed to challenge the conditions for probation if they are arbi-
trary or unreasonable. He has a right to have them given to him
in writing and to have them explained to him. In this manner he
can begin to "know himself" if he understands the purpose of the
condition and why it was imposed.
The foregoing remarks apply with equal force to conditions
of parole. There should be written conditions for the continuation
of parole. Upon breach of a condition, parole or probation should
be revoked only after a hearing at which the child is represented
by counsel. Arbitrary revocation must be discontinued; the revoca-
tion hearing serves as a control on such activity. In addition to the
above, the child should have been given written notice of the revo-
cation hearing and its cause, and of his right to counsel. In short,
the juvenile must have due process safeguards at any revocation
proceeding.
The need for continuing jurisdiction of the court by use of
probation must be reviewed by the court at periodic intervals. The
probationer should be brought before the court and the parolee be-
fore the parole authority and if the need for probation or parole
no longer exists, it should be removed. By the suggested review,
the juveniles will be treated fairly, but the jurisdiction of the court
or parole authority will last only as long as necessary- it will not
be a means of harassment or of arbitrary punishment at the whim
of an administrative official.
The principles underlying rules of probation or parole should
be reasonableness, relatedness to the offense, and expectation of
successful compliance. The child should be encouraged to comply
with and benefit from the terms of probation or parole. He should
not be confronted with conditions so unrelated as to be unreason-
able or so harsh as to be impossible of compliance.
Changes must be implemented in the staff, facilities, and serv-
ices of the juvenile court and the entire juvenile correctional system.
As the constitutional standards are provided juveniles, and as evalua-
tive research reflects the inadequacies of the services provided, more
personnel will be required. These persons will require better train-
ing and orientation to the juvenile system.
An increased staff of social workers, skilled both in one-to-one
and group counseling, as well as better intake practices will be
required. Rather than coming before the court under a delinquency
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petition, more juveniles should be channeled into the mental health
clinic or other agency service which he may need more than the
services of a court. The court, itself, as these other services become
more available, may focus attention on the more serious offenders
who come before it. In the interim, courts should experiment with
shorter term probation for low risk cases.
Before a juvenile is transferred from a delinquency institution
to a reformatory, a hearing before the Youth Authority should be
held. Only in cases where the act committed by the youth, if done
by an adult would be a crime or where the youth has committed
a second offense which would be a crime, should transfer occur.
Review by the court of the administrative determination should be
afforded the juvenile.
Before the youth is transferred to a mental hospital or institu-
tion for the mentally retarded, a hearing must be held to ascertain
whether the evidence warrants such action. Once the statutory man-
dates are met, the transfer would be proper. However, the child
must be allowed to present evidence and litigate the transfer. The
alleged facts must be subject to challenges of inaccuracy and of
propriety of the action as to the individual being transferred. In
such cases a qualified guardian ad litem may appear for the child
to further clarify and represent the child's position, and to interpret
the proceeding, the reasons for, and hopefully the merits of transfer
to the child.
A. Youth Authority
Legislative policy determines whether the juvenile parole de-
cision vests in the superintendent of the institution, a juvenile parole
board, or a division of a Youth Authority. Despite problems inherent
in each method, the authors recommend the Youth Authority model
as offering the greatest opportunity for program and administrative
efficiency and for consistency in the treatment of the delinquent
throughout the institutional and parole phases. 4 Due process and
good rehabilitative practice both require that the parole authority
systematically review the eligibility of each institutionalized child
for parole within a reasonable period of time following commit-
ment. Such a system interposes a check on both the open-endedness
of the indeterminate sentence and on the institutional personnel who
would need to explain why the program has not successfully pre-
pared a child for return to society.
The parole authority, which would be a division of the Youth
Authority, should establish standards for the granting of parole.
These standards for parole should be held out as a goal to each
54 See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INS'INS CODE §§ 1700-1803 (1966).
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institutionalized child. It should be clear that parole after a defined
institutional period is not a matter of right, but is a goal which can
be attained by each child. Broad discretionary powers should remain
with the parole authority, but standards would be beneficial to the
child and to the authority in the exercise of its discretion.
If the child has retained counsel, the parole authority should
grant the attorney the opportunity to participate fully in the parole
hearing. Such a practice will permit a thorough discussion of all
possible legal and sociological factors and enable the juvenile's case
to be accurately presented. In the absence of private counsel, an
attorney or guardian might be appointed. In either case the pro-
ceedings should be recorded. The opportunity to appeal to a court
should be granted in instances of an alleged abuse of discretion by
the parole authority or a contested fact issue.
B. Waiver Procedures
We should move to abolish waiver proceedings. A juvenile
court should serve all delinquent children and not just those who
are in their early teens or who have committed less serious offenses.
The key to the elimination of this proceeding is the accelerated
development of more extensive alternatives available to the court
or provided by state juvenile authorities. Improved services to the
sixteen and seventeen year old on both local and state levels would
eliminate the need for waiver and carry out the duty of the juvenile
court to provide rehabilitative care to all juveniles who commit
delinquent acts.
If waiver is not repealed, its consideration should be limited
to the sixteen and seventeen year old who commits a felony and
for whom no suitable program is available through juvenile services.
IV. IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON THE PRESENT SYSTEM
The ramifications of incorporating the foregoing suggestions
into the present system would be numerous. A major need would
be massive educational efforts with specialists having contact with
juveniles and with the public at large. To achieve full value from
the proposed changes, the court, its staff, and the staff of related
services, e.g., the parole authority, must understand the aims under-
lying due process in the juvenile system.
High on the list of priorities would be the expanded training
of judges holding juvenile jurisdiction. These judges require addi-
tional education in the legal and constitutional aspects of their
specialized function, but legal training by itself is insufficient back-
ground. Graduate training and experience in social work, psychol-
ogy, or sociology will be necessary for the most effective function-
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ing by the juvenile judge. Since such combined formal training is
rarely held by these judges, workshops and seminars to provide
clinical orientation and sensitivity training are crucial. The National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges has made an impressive start in
this direction with its institute series which has reached more than
1,000 judges in recent years. Such workshops and seminars also
place heavy emphasis on the legal aspects of juvenile court pro-
ceedings. State councils of juvenile judges are aiding the educational
movement to secure justice for the child.
Police officers, especially those with specialized juvenile func-
tions, will require related training in the legal issues connected with
juveniles, particularly as it relates to their handling of a child.
Similar training is crucial for juvenile probation and parole officers,
and for those individuals who constitute the juvenile parole authori-
ties in each state.
Law schools must expand their curriculum to include courses
dealing with children and to include materials on the youthful
offender and the law. Law students also need the practical experi-
ence of representing children who are respondents in juvenile court
cases. Local, state, and the American Bar Associations should en-
courage participation by their members in juvenile proceedings and
should sponsor seminars on the practice and philosophy of juvenile
courts.
Legislative revisions are critical as part of the educational strat-
egies to achieve justice for the child. Legislators and citizen groups
concerned with children must take cognizance of these problems
surrounding the delinquent child and seek statutory reforms to over-
come them.
The state-wide juvenile correctional systems should be inte-
grated into a single state-wide juvenile authority which can imple-
ment consistent administrative methods and checks to provide due
process throughout the experience of the child in a state institution.
Well trained professionals, knowledgeable in the legal as well as
rehabilitation aspects of juvenile delinquency, must supervise the
state institutions, youth camps, parole programs, and the transfer
procedures between these state facilities.
Private attorneys will need to be appointed and paid from tax
funds to facilitate legal protection to juvenile offenders in some
communities. Increasingly, publicly employed legal counsel will be
necessary to provide legal representation to the growing numbers
of juveniles coming before the courts. Substantial amounts of time
will be required from law guardians, juvenile defenders, and public
and private agencies rendering legal services to the poor. Such
counsel should be available daily in juvenile courts and should be
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knowledgeable in law, legal procedures related to juveniles, and the
goals of rehabilitation.
A state-wide public defender may be necessary on the state
level to implement constitutional norms in appeals to higher courts.
This official may also be the easiest means to incorporate those
protections into parole granting and revocation hearings.
With more lawyers present in the pre-trial and adjudicative
stages of the juvenile court proceeding, more appeals from these
hearings can be expected. The appeals should be directed toward
clarification of delinquency statutes or delinquency procedures. By
the appeal, deficiencies in the rehabilitation practice and procedure
may also be challenged.
Judicial reorganization in many states is essential to the pro-
posal. Juvenile judges should be attorneys to be qualified to serve
as judges. By this provision, the caliber of the bench will be im-
proved commensurate with the improvement of attorneys appearing
before it.
To achieve the desired reintegration of the child into society,
considerable legislation and administrative changes will be necessary.
The radical differences between institutionalized life and community
life must be reduced. The institutionalized youth should relate to
the communtiy through recreational and cultural activities, school
and social activities, vocational training, and employment. Parental
relationships should concurrently be improved through professional
counseling and maintained by furlough visits.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court experiment, when it began in 1899, was
never envisaged as being an instrument which would deny to the
child the basic principles of fairness. A major purpose of the juve-
nile court was to provide a fair hearing with all of the protections
due a child. Due process is one purpose of the juvenile court. This
purpose has not been met.5"
The juvenile court cannot continue in its present form and
achieve its primary purpose.56 Individualized justice for the child
encompasses rehabilitation of the child and reintegration of the child
into society. The present system, which shuns the adversary system
and prefers flexible and informal deliberations, denies consistent
legal protections to the child. As a result, the child does not under-
55 See generally Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76
(1966).
56 See Moylan, Sr., Comments on the Juvenile Court, 25 MD. L. REV. 310 (1965),
which asserts that the early goals can be reached through a juvenile statute requiring
procedural safeguards and due process for the child.
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stand himself or the system. By incorporating constitutional safe-
guards into this system, individualized justice can become a reality.
Many problems arise in conjunction with these suggestions.
Police officers will dislike consistently involving an alleged delin-
quent's parents in notice of arrest, presence during questioning, and
clearer notification of legal rights, including the right to say nothing.
Probation officers will complain that the child and his parents will
not understand the legal rights explanation; they believe that the
child simply wants to admit to the complaint and not be confused
or delayed by interpretations of legal rights. Court clerks would
prefer to sabotage the production and service of new forms. County
commissioners would rather not spend greater public funds to pro-
vide for counsel for the indigent child. An overburdened juvenile
court judge will not be happy with any substantial increase in the
number of time-consuming contested matters.
By providing more lawyers in juvenile court, there will be more
cases where the lawyer asserts his expertise developed in criminal
courts. In some cases the lawyers may fail to consider that the child
may prefer to admit to a wrongful act rather than undergo the
anxiety of heavily argued and frequently continued motions and
trials. A successful dismissal on a procedural technicality may accel-
erate a child's belief than he can continue a delinquent pattern and
keep asking for a lawyer to beat future "raps."57 Marginal income
families may expend badly needed money for private legal services
which bring the same result for their child as would have been
obtained without counsel. This situation could cause deteriorations
of the familial relationship and further rejection of the child.
Admittedly all of these problems may arise. However, they
can be minimized through expanded law school course offerings on
juvenile courts and delinquency. Practicing lawyers can be educated
through orientation and seminars. More important, if the court and
its staff as well as the state and community programs for juveniles
improve and are successful in the context of newly offered legal
protections, the result should be the maturation of the juvenile court
and the juvenile correction system.
Benefits from expanded legal services to children brought be-
fore the court would be numerous. 51 More lawyers will become
more interested in the goals and problems of the court and in court
and community service needs. More legislative reforms affecting
57 McLaughlin & McGee, Juvenile Court Procedure, 17 ALA. L. REV. 226 (1965).
58 See Skoler & Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAM. L.
77 (1954), for an analysis of the roles of counsel in juvenile court as reflected in
the 1963 survey of juvenile court judges by the National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges.
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children's laws will be achieved; out-moded laws may be removed
from the books and clarification of existing laws would be possible.
Appeals to higher courts will be facilitated. In this way current
juvenile laws and procedures will be clarified, validated, or invali-
dated. Procedural fairness will be guaranteed the child at every
stage of the proceeding from pre-trial to post-trial phases.
Juvenile court proceedings should be conducted to achieve the
highest degree of child and parent participation in the process.
Although formal courtroom hearings emphasizing the court's au-
thority and control may be most effective with certain children
selectively chosen for this type handling, usually greater success in
the majority of the cases will be achieved in the informal chamber
setting. The active involvement of the child and family in dialogue
with judge and staff should facilitate rehabilitative goals. The less
formal hearing seems more effective, in general, to the child's
greater comprehension of himself and his decision to achieve re-
habilitation.
Police handling and questioning of juveniles will need to be
tailored to a new cloth. The Miranda precedent5" would void many
juvenile court cases if the issues determined by that case were raised
in a typical juvenile delinquency matter. It is doubtful that the
average policeman on the street makes a clear statement to the child
as to his legal and constitutional rights before interrogating him.
It is even more dubious whether a child has the legal status to waive
his right to counsel and other rights without his parents being
present at the time of the alleged waiver.
Police and the courts have relied upon the child's admission
to the offense, especially with the numerous delinquencies which
are unwitnessed. Defense attorneys, whetted by Miranda, will obtain
suppressions of admissions and ultimate freedom for their child-
client, even though the child may in fact have committed the delin-
quent act. To this degree due process may impede the purpose of
the court to bring a child to accountability and to rehabilitate him.
However, due process in this context can serve the heightened pur-
pose of helping police officers and others who interrogate a child
to effectuate higher standards of fair handling.6 °
Due process will mean more lawyers; more lawyers will mean
more trials and more delays in dealing with the court docket; more
lawyers will mean more private and public costs; more lawyers will
mean more appeals; more lawyers will also mean more children
59 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7 (1965), for a recommendation that adversary pro-
cedures be introduced at the administrative level (screening by police and probation
officers) with judicial supervision.
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removed from detention to their homes pending trial; more lawyers
will mean more "guilty" children found innocent because of in-
sufficient evidence produced at a trial; more lawyers will mean an
insistence on fair procedures at each step of the correctional system.
Again, although inconvenience and an occasional "injustice" may
occur because of this change, the gains should far outweigh the
disadvantages, and the goals for the juvenile court should come
closer toward achievement.
Due process as it is utilized more completely in revocation of
probation proceedings will slow down and sometimes prevent a
court's desire to banish a child to a state institution as quickly as
it can. But here, as elsewhere, the child's growing recognition of
his rights should help many children toward greater self assertion
in their daily lives, and, in generalized form, toward more successful
lives. This is one of the major purposes of the juvenile court system.
An increased number of hearings would also take place in the
juvenile parole granting and revocation sequences. In many states
this procedure is incompletely defined by statute, and personal hear-
ings with the child have been discouraged or denied.61 Due process,
introduced to parole, would mean evidentiary consideration for
granting or non-granting of parole and its suspension or revocation.
Again, this will cause certain inconvenience and require more per-
sonnel, but the presence of due process should not impede, but in
fact should strengthen the system of juvenile parole.
Transfers between state institutions would be slowed and more
management problems could well be created if courts were required
to approve transfers instead of the common present procedure of
transfer by administrative decision. But sharply improved correc-
tional institutions should reduce the need to transfer children be-
tween institutions when a child cannot now be handled in the orig-
inal setting. For example, more disturbed children could be effec-
tively handled in delinquency institutions without their transfer to
a mental hospital.
62
In summary, consistent due process in juvenile proceedings will
cause inconvenience, will cost considerable money and will, in iso-
lated cases, hamper the most effective consideration of the needs
of a child. But the massive gains inherent in the application of this
concept can only result in the greater fulfillment of the purpose of
the juvenile court and its related agencies. A new model for the
juvenile court should develop and with it the heightened implemen-
tation of all goals in behalf of children.
61 The chairman of Colorado's Juvenile Parole Board, Mr. Goodrich Walton, told the
writers in August, 1966, that no child has appeared directly before the Board during
his six years as a member.
62 See GLASER, REALITY THERAPY (1965).
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THE LAWYER'S CHANGING ROLE
IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING SOCIETY
By SIDNEY J. GOLMAN*
Mr. Golman presents a thought-provoking discussion on the
status of the attorney in personal injury and workmen's compensa-
tion cases. He presents a critical-and controversial -analysis
of current society and its evolution. He next discusses the individ-
ual's personal injury from the viewpoint of society and of the
victim. He admonishes the attorney in this field that his role hoth
in and out of the courtroom must adapt to the demands of society
and his client. He concludes hy discussing the application of the
rehahilative principles set forth and the means to achieve the fullest
resortation of the client as an individual.
T HE practicing attorney in the field of personal injury and work-
men's compensation, either as a representative of the plaintiff
or defendant, has presented to him a challenging opportunity to be
of greater and more rewarding service to his client. He can and
must become involved in restoring his client to the highest potential
of physical, socio-cultural, psychological, and economic attainment
of which the client is capable.
To meet this challenge it is imperative that the attorney be
willing to stand back and objectively reappraise his role in society
as well as the role of those whom he represents and of those who
oppose him. He must, I believe, come to recognize that there is a
fundamental change, very much accelerated in the years since World
War II, that demands of the practicing attorney a broadening of
the scope of his duties and responsibilities. Being a good adversary
is no longer enough.
Should the attorney be unwilling to recognize the need for the
reappraisal and reorientation and persist to continue in the role of
a hard adversary with his sole legal objective being that of obtain-
ing for his client the highest possible monetary award (or in the
case of the defendant the lowest possible money payment) without
considering the dominance of other objectives to his client, he, to-
gether with those of the legal profession involved, will within the
next quarter century be excluded from a practice in his chosen field.
This result will occur not because the attorney is not needed, but
rather that he has failed, as did the dinosaur, to accommodate to
change in and requirements of the times.
*Member California Bar Association; L.L.B., Golden Gate College, 1953. His prac-
tice is specialized in the medical-legal field and in the management of restoration of
the seriously injured arising out of third party and workmen's compensation cases
within the United States and abroad.
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What are the causes and conditions which would lead one to
make such dire prophecy? Is there a solution which will permit the
attorney to function in the liability and compensation field on a
continuing basis where the value of his services to the client and
society can continue to be justified? I, for one, think that there is
a solution which will not merely continue to support the need for
the attorney in the specialty field, but will enhance it.
In approaching the suggested solution to the attorney's new
role, the reappraisal, re-evaluation, and reorientation can only occur
if le is willing to accept the following hypotheses:
That, while zoormorphic conception of man enables us to
assign his place in the physical universe, the infinite dissimilarity
between man in general and the individual in particular requires
imperative recognition and equally imperative understanding of
meaningful differences between individuals.
That, in the evolution of man and sophistication of highly de-
veloped society, the individual plays an increasingly secondary role.
His individual goals are persistently in conflict with those of the
purpose of society as respects his duty to society and his responsibili-
ties to himself and those immediately dependent upon him, as well
as reciprocal rights arising in the relationship.
That, because of this change in the duty and responsibility im-
pressed upon the individual and his relationship to other individuals
in the mass of society, the lawyer has been placed in the position
where he must continue to justify his service to the individual whom
he represents. He must extract for his client, in anachronistic values,
as much from society as possible without recognition of the long
term consequences of this action.
That the lawyer, while apparently preserving the rights and
duties of the individual, is in reality assisting in accelerating the
emasculation of the individual by application of modalities and
promotionary goals inconsistent with the objectives and direction
of society. The lawyer has continued to maintain the strongly adver-
sary tactics of the past in a society which is accelerating toward a
goal of absolute responsibility of society to the individual, with the
consequence that all individuals within the society shall be entitled,
as a matter of right, to care, maintenance, and compensation without
regard to historic legal liability of one individual to another.
That the means by which political organizations of society can
be inhibited from investing themselves through the administrations
of the continued erosion of the individual is to accept the principle
that the individual owes duties and reciprocal rights with respect to
other individuals and social organizations that cannot be ignored.
These duties can best be developed and administered without re-
course to the judiciary, administrative bodies, or legislative enact-
ments, with the consequent standardization of criteria for adminis-
tration and consequent inapplicability to the needs of the individual,
provided that, among the many concerned, the lawyer takes the lead
in effectuating this self-administration of the rights and duties of
individuals within the present framework of the law.
I would ask you to recall briefly the salient development of
man and the role of the individual in society. Most of us, in our
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educative process, have been exposed to courses in anthropology,
history, philosophy, and the social sciences, but have in the press
of life for existence neglected to be conscious of the meaning of
what we have learned and, further, what is occurring at the very
instant of our existence.
To demonstrate that which we have neglected to realize let us
examine man in general and the individual in particular within the
context of his environment and the history of his development.
At the inception, man had only himself: his survival and his end
were his own. Later followed the concept of family and the indi-
vidual's obligation to it and thus the first impairment of total reli-
ance and responsibility on oneself.
The evolution of the family into the community created greater
interdependence and a diminishing need for security within oneself.
Finally, but more slowly, man organized into broad developing
geo-political units in which the individual had greater dependence
on the social order. Individual anonymity was now possible. In this
situation, he was either greater, the same, or lesser in status (what-
ever the values). In the early state organization, outside of common
defense, the individual still retained considerable responsibility to
provide for himself and his family while the community contributed
little. If he was unfortunate, he made the best of his situation, and
excepting charity, survived or failed on his own. Society's structure
permitted and condoned this state of affairs.
With the industrial revolution came the growth of the impor-
tance of money as a symbol of exchange and a means of restitution
and compensation for wrongs done to a person. The advent of the
industrial revolution and the demand for more specialized work
effort forced the individual to face the first real inroads upon his
independence when he exchanged security for protection from mis-
fortune. This exchange accompanied increasing transfers from one
social stratum to another. Moreover, it came with the concurrent
concern of the intellectuals for the impersonal exploitation of the
workers; with the increasing urbanization and associated loss of
opportunity to feed, clothe and house his family as he did when
agrarian demand of society provided for at least a base existence.
This process has but accelerated.
Even at this juncture in socio-cultural and economic revolution,
considerable succor was provided by individual charity as well as
by a growing body of welfare benefits provided by society. These
latter were prolonged sufficiently to help the disadvantaged through
a catastrophic situation, but withdrawn unceremoniously as it ap-
peared the recipient was exploiting his disability. The individual
facing a loss of social support was compelled to exercise what effort
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he could to attain optimum activity and restoration. A work-oriented
society was still unwilling to accept the philosophy that able people
who did not or would not work were its responsibility in a total sense.
Toward the end of the industrial revolution and at the begin-
ning of a rapidly changing technological society, values changed
again. Values, mores, and ethics of the preceding culture which
upheld the dignity of the individual and as well his responsibility
for himself, were still those espoused in the transitional social or-
ganization, but were now corrupted in practice. The guilt of society
was expressed in compassion and its desire to expiate for its past
inequities. While expressing the need for the individual to be self-
responsible, society commenced to provide security for all who, for
whatever reason, found themselves at competitive disadvantage.
Man, consequently, through his evolution, has lost contact with his
heritage. His values which were changed slowly enough to be
assimilated and which were considered constant are now changing
so rapidly that he is confused as to the validity of his early indoc-
trination and present understanding of his place in society. He is
accepting without recognition sets of values that subvert him as man.
Individual man now finds himself in the role in which he is
constantly threatened as to his being needed. He is concerned about
his job - the replacement of the type of skill which he has - what
will happen to his status from external criteria and the consequent
threat to his material comforts. The condition of the world, its
conflicts, the threat of its people to him, war, and its total indis-
criminate destruction create anxieties in him which become a part
of his daily life and which he realizes he is unable to control. These
threats, coupled with the loss of previously relatively constant values
to which he could relate, make it no small wonder that when the
opportunity presents itself to be materially protected from any one
or more of the threats to his status, as it is or as he wants it to be,
the individual will seize at the opportunity. In fact, it becomes more
predictable that the person may seize dependency as the individual
becomes more marginal or unrelated in his understanding of his
relationship in the social organization. The motivational factor is
now negatively oriented.
Dependency is now sanctioned and even promoted by society
in its growing concern for the unfortunate, economically-socio-
cu!tura!ly disadvantaged, as well as the disabled person. Society
aggressively provides the benefits to make continuation of the
contracoup of its expressed purpose of restoration impossible. By
the standards evident in administration of the welfare system, the
individual does maintain some external semblance of dignity and
self in the community. Society makes it a matter of right so that
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he is not permitted to be ashamed; rather, he is told that he has
dignity even though, in fact, he knows that he does not. He has
become motivationally a drone and a parasite for he is relieved of
all the obligations of life other than to maintain the inability or
disability which society has led him to believe will support his exist-
ence at a level which he is willing to accept.
Where the physical injury or lack of ability to be competitive
is in itself not sufficiently disabling to justify society's support, the
psychological consequences supported by the physical, temporal, and
spiritual standards of society, however arrived at, support the indi-
vidual in social acceptance when he is able to involve emotional
and contramotivational reaction within himself so as to produce the
determinative factor which will gain society's support. This state
of affairs feeds upon itself to solidify the state of disability and
inability and often to increase it beyond all bounds of the actual
incapacity.
The emotional reaction factors have for reason of convenience,
time, and administrative facilities been assigned nomenclature such
as conversion hysteria, anxiety neurosis, or depressive reaction, etc.
These manifestations are rationalized psychiatrically as arising out
of the injury or hopelessness of the social condition giving support
to the inability to be realistic and adjusted to the loss of existing
status, thus negating restorative motivation in the individual. Is it
not that when the external symbols of compensation are adequate
to meet the individual's standard that he will more likely seek the
dependent state? Then, is it not reasonable to examine the role of
the individual in our society and to conclude that a fortuitous event
occurring in the form of physical injury or lowering of socio-cultural-
economic status is not necessarily a tragedy but, on the other hand,
is itself viewed by the individual as a benefit releasing him from
further responsibility of competition in life, if only the degree of
disability or inability occasioned by the injury or status can be suffi-
cient to be accepted by society?
The individual finds himself in a situation where he is told that
because of the fortuitous event he can expect to receive rewards that
are meaningful to him. He is told that he can seek relief against
the wrongdoing third party, which in quantum alone will compen-
sate him for loss of income, for medical care and maintenance, and
for the very subjective pain and suffering which he has had imposed
upon him. These are all related to him in dollar amounts and the
impression is left with him that the greater his real or simulated
disability can be made, the larger his rewards will be. He is led to
expect that, in addition to those rewards, he will receive assistance
from the community, state and nation as the degree of disability
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warrants. The criteria are set forth for these rewards which will
relieve him wholly or in part from the necessity of competing in
society - a desire which each of us has to varying degrees. He, then,
can only draw the inference that if he does not meet the criteria,
he will be forced back into the competitive and intolerable situation
from which he had been trying to escape.
The individual who in varying degrees seeks, consciously or
unconsciously, this state of being has been in an emotionally in-
tolerable situation prior to the injury. Most probably as early as
his childhood he saw himself as one in a disadvantaged socio-cultural
situation. He expressed his anxieties in various forms such as re-
bellion, school dropout, and low level of attainment. His apparent
ability to function was marginal. He did function externally because
he had no legitimate excuse to himself, to his family, or to society
which would permit him to withdraw from the competition in the
situation intolerable to him. The excuse to withdraw comes with
the injury, regardless of its severity, or it comes with the growing
desire in the social welfare field to provide for the disadvantaged.
His ego image is protected for, while professing to want to compete
and to do those things expected of him competitively by society,
he is now able to avoid them because of his "condition."
The cost to society and to each of us in promoting motivation
of disability and inability is incalculable; not just in an economic
sense, but in the fact that it deprives the entire social unit of the
contributions that can be made by all within that social unit at every
level of demand. This negative motivational force feeds upon itself
in that it subverts and seduces the concept of the image of what
man is and stimulates the withdrawal of the rewarded individual.
And at the same time the negative motivation requires increasing
output of the remaining sectors of society to continue to provide
for the growing number who contribute nothing, yet who are
capable of producing at varying levels.
This trend, so evident today, is imposing upon the entire society
the obligation of meeting the demands of an increasing number of
disabled and disadvantaged people claiming support. Meeting the
obligation has become judicially and administratively overwhelming.
Society is unable to individualize assistance and has fallen back on
the formula of an arbitrary legislative and administrative criteria
with consequent increased agency personnel and abrogated authority
and power to meet the challenge. This complex organizational
structure poses a threat to the continued existence of the lawyer as
well as the individual client in his historic rights under the law for
justice in adequate historical remedy.
The encroachment is now reaching the proportion wherein we
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can expect that regardless of the infinite dissimilarities in the status
of the individual he will be standardized as to his rights, obligations,
and needs, but his rewards and remedies will be noncontestable.
These standards will have little or no application to him as an indi-
vidual. Whatever little dignity or difference individual man now
has remaining, will be emasculated and the prophecy of George
Orwell in his book 1984 will be realized in that all man will, with
the exception of a chosen few, be left in the same status of a lesser
animal. He will be fed, clothed, housed, and called upon to serve
society as the select choose and will be granted these benefits only
because his existence is necessary to the need of the select adminis-
trators and governors in whom he invested the power originally.
It is, indeed, a strange society which on one hand purports to be
concerned about the individual, and on the other hand attempts to
destroy him and his capacity for creative development and contribu-
tion within his abilities.
All this is not to say that we should not help man through his
catastrophe; but, we should do it in such a manner as to make it
rewarding for him to remain a man and be restored to a position
where he needs to compete, to contribute, and develop within his
capacities. Among those concerned with the preservation of the
individual and his need for personal enhancements and contributory
growth, the lawyer plays an important role and can make his con-
tribution in providing the guidelines to motivation and the "accept-
able substitute" which his client will willingly accept.
The attorney must play the role of the manager rather than
the advocate in the initial approach to the problems presented by
his client. I see it as his duty to first understand not alone the legal
rights of his client and the obligation of others to him, but to under-
stand his client as a psychological as well as physiological being.
The attorney must attempt in the initial stages to develop the socio-
cultural picture of his client to include family background, family
situation, environment, and culture as well as attempt to get an im-
pression of the real goals and relationship of the client toward
himself and society. In accomplishing this, his objective should not
be to maximize the client's disability but rather to minimize it. The
goal should always be how best can rehabilitation of the client in
a total sense be accomplished even to the extent of returning the
client to a status superior to that which he enjoyed prior to his
physical injury though the result may be in a lower monetary award.
The attorney should at all times, in the management of his case,
attempt to enlist the opposing counsel and opposing interest in re-
solving the apparent conflict engendered in the adversary situation
and to accept the reality of the proposition that the interest of all
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concerned is the common goal of restoration of the disabled, leaving
the economic equity to be resolved by knowledgeable agreement
arrived at during and after successful rehabilitation.
If the interest and cooperation of the opposing interest can be
obtained, then the implementation of techniques toward the total
rehabilitation goal should be programmed even though the end
result will be to lessen the monetary damage to the client and con-
sequent reduction of the counsel's fees.
The tools, techniques, and modalities available to the attorney
are many: First, and most important, as previously discussed, is the
client himself. If you have done your job well in understanding
and evaluating your client, you will be able to manipulate him in
such a manner as to produce a positive motivational force directing
the client toward maximum physical, psychological, and socio-cultural
restoration. Remember that only the client rehabilitates himself,
but he requires direction, available technology, and astute manipu-
lation to reach those goals.
Next, the attorney must start out with the consent of the client
for flexible objectives and develop the program by utilization of
medical restoration for the physiological problem and as well subtle
and concurrent manipulation of the client in psychological motiva-
tion; these are concurrently involved, but must be utilized to avoid
fragmentation of the client through compartmentalization of appli-
cation of techniques. The utilization of the finest medical specialists
who are oriented to the philosophy that, in addition to their tech-
nical capabilities, their most important function is to comprehend
the goals of their patient and to show evidence of a willingness to
subtly work with the claimant in obtaining these goals. The medical
practitioner becomes a tool, albeit a very important one, in the suc-
cessful programming of the rehabilitation process.
Concurrently with the medical restoration must be developed
a program of realistic vocational goals for the individual wherever
feasible. These must be related to his capabilities and to the remain-
ing physical function and abilities he can demonstrate. The earliest
possible acceptance and institution of the program in this direction
is one of the imperatives and must be developed without hiatus
usually found between those of physical and vocational rehabilitation
programs. Available to the attorney is the service of competent
counselors (before the selection of the counselor, the attorney should
assure himself of the competence of the counsel and the acceptance
by the counselor of the concert of objective and his function therein).
There are both state and private agencies willing to provide these
services and in many cases they are entirely without charge. Again,
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while these services are utilized, the attorney must oversee and direct
them in relation to the total program.
The attorney should next attempt to obtain for his client eco-
nomic benefits available from state and federal agencies. But in
obtaining them, he should never let his client forget that these are
to be utilized only for the interim period between injury and ulti-
mate restoration as a productive member of society; that they are
merely to carry him through the catastrophe, and are not to be looked
upon as permanent benefits which the client can transfer into a
meaningful life oriented to the maintenance of inability and dis-
ability. The present levels of some of these tax-free benefits makes
dependency most attractive to many people, and can be detrimental
to the goal of independence and responsibility.
In third party liability cases of serious physical injury where
there is likely to be a substantial period of temporary disability and
long term and expensive medical treatment, the attorney should
attempt to obtain from the more sophisticated insurers economic
assistance with respect to medical bills and possibly even short term
aid to compensate for wage loss. This can better be obtained, of
course, when legal liability is clear than when it is in doubt. How-
ever, the severity of the injury itself makes the cooperation self-
serving to the interest of the insurer.
Concurrent with the foregoing the attorney should carefully
evaluate his case, as should the defendants, and attempt at an appro-
priate time to bring about a disposition of the case on an equitable
basis. The attorney should not permit the case to drift along without
resolution to the situation of trial, for in permitting that to occur
the passage of time alone can only have an adverse effect on his
client. The client in order to protect what he has, i.e., his claim,
must maintain as high a degree of disability as possible and the
restorative effort undertaken is then wasted to a considerable degree.
I realize that this concept of total management and manipula-
tion by the lawyer of his client in the direction of mitigation of
injury has received approval in lip service from many areas of our
society. However, as a practice, with some rare exceptions, this imple-
mentation of approach to the problem has been avoided. The reason
for this avoidance, I believe, results from the historical development
of the role of the attorney as an advocate and a contestant and from
the unwillingness of all interests concerned to become involved in
pioneering a concept with which they are not familiar.
Historically, the attorney is an advocate who pleads for his
client in court attempting to maximize his client's injuries and mini-
mize his ability to absorb the resulting damage, with the defendant,
too, resorting to the court and to the jury to demonstrate that the
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client is a fraud or is exaggerating his injury. The client in these
situations has become a mere catalyst for the services of the lawyers,
doctors and others involved in the prosecution and defense of the
case in adversary proceedings.
What is proposed herein is not theoretical, but is demonstrated
in over five hundred third party and workmen's compensation
cases in which I have represented either the plaintiff or defendant.
The result with respect to the individual has been astounding. With
some rare exceptions, the injured party has become a whole human
being with respect to his socio-cultural and economic restoration in
the community, even though he remains substantially physically
disabled. He has come to use his remaining abilities to their utmost,
adjusted within tolerances psychologically and motivationally, and
in many instances, far exceeded his preinjury goals in life. I am sure
that many attorneys have, from their own experience and observa-
tions, seen what they consider amazing results with respect to the
restoration of individuals. These, of course, have occurred rather
infrequently and principally because the individual who suffered
the injury was highly motivated, with developed skills, intelligence,
and education or potential for education that were above average.
Most of the clients with whom I have been involved are predomi-
nantly average or below average in the foregoing qualifications prior
to injury. In undertaking leadership in manipulation of the moti-
vational forces within the client toward total rehabilitation, you as
the attorney will have done more in promoting the welfare of the
client, of yourself and society, than will any other professional or
nonprofessional group involved in the case. You sit in the position
with respect to your client, more so than anyone else, to influence,
control and manipulate his objectives toward that which is most
beneficial in the long run to him and to society. He is looking to
you as his total advisor.
The attorney can not absolve himself from the responsibility
imposed upon him by the nature of his profession, as the temporal
advisor of man, by permitting the ultimate decision as to how his
client will be rewarded, to be decided by a judge or a jury, when-
ever, by his own efforts, he could have obtained the optimum restora-
tion of his client with minimization of his disability, by meeting the
real needs of his client, and by providing the client with greater
benefits in worth than he would otherwise obtain.
In the management of the case you as the attorney will be re-
quired to become deeply involved with your client and with those
who are called upon to serve him. You can never delegate this
responsibility, but must at all times provide continued guidance
for others necessarily involved with him and must exercise judgment
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with respect to recommendations made by other professionals serv-
ing the client. You are the captain and will make the ultimate deci-
sions with respect to the interest of your client and his treatment
and management.
We have now had an opportunity to demonstrate these tech-
niques and this practice in the United States, we have also had an
opportunity to observe legal and medical practice in Europe, and
in several countries subject to the Common Law and to explore the
opportunity for application of the concepts expressed above. In most
of the countries, the state through its Social Security System plays a
much more active and larger role in liability and compensation than
is found in the United States. The lawyer maintains rigidity with
respect to his function, as he has done here, in that he is a total
advocate and adversary. He does nothing to resolve the real need
of the client as he is only concerned with the law. He is content
that ultimately the judge or judge and jury will determine the rights
and obligations of the parties. He does not attempt to influence the
medical course of the case, nor does he involve himself with the
motivational needs of his client nor in the restoration and rehabilita-
tion of his client. He leaves that entirely to the doctors, para-medical
groups, social workers, and the state. These groups, on the other
hand, compartmentalize their attention and their services to the
patient and do not involve themselves in what they consider to be
the historical duties of the other services. There is little or no com-
munication among the services rendered to the client.
The result has been that the real needs of the patient as a total
human being have not been recognized or understood and have been
ignored with respect to his treatment. His restoration to the optimum
level of his capacity, considering that his motivational forces have
not been awakened, has produced a longer period in the hospital
and institutionalization with consequent deterioration in the person;
a process so destructive that, when the legal decision as to his rights
has finally been made, the individual for the most part grossly
over-handicapped and, regardless of his award, is a detriment and
negative factor to his family, community, and society in general.
Attempts to effect change in this historical pattern of dichotomy
in function of services and in responsibility and involvement are
coming to fruition both here and abroad. After fifteen years of effort
to educate clients involved in the total management of liability or
compensation cases including innumerable trips throughout the United
States and overseas for conferences and speeches, we have progressed
to a limited acceptance of the concept and its application within
this country and are now on the threshold of its development in
Europe where we have been asked to make a feasability study in
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France and Switzerland on a number of cases in appropriate settings
encountered in attempting to break down the historic traditions and
relationships. But this is not an impossibility for we believe that the
concerned interests will become aware by demonstration in sched-
uled cases that the result effected will be a benefit rather than a
detriment to the client. It will mean, of course, that in accepting
the concept of total management and its application, the lawyer as
well as others involved must accept the destruction of the dichotomy
of traditional roles and substitute that of interrelationship of osten-
sibly separated professions and services.
The obstacles have been considerable but I have found that the
thinking man in the various professions involved, once he has found
that there is no attempt to subject his integrity nor to deprive his
client of meaningful awards, has been willing to permit the applica-
tion of these modalities and techniques and has even gone so far
as to permit me to undertake the direction and management of the
case even though I am in a position of representing an adverse party
with the real interest in common.
The success or failure of this program depends upon how well
the attorney has achieved sophistication. He must be aware that the
manipulation toward rehabilitative goals requires a highly individual
and integrated service to his client. He must always evaluate those
whom he chooses to assist in the program. These include medical,
para-medical, sociological, vocational, and psychological personnel
involved or likely to be involved in the care, treatment, and rehabili-
tation of the client. It is not sufficient that he undertake rehabili-
tation by sending an individual to a rehabilitation center and then
permitting the ancillary services to take over. He must evaluate the
quality of this service and understand that there are differences
between and among the rehabilitation services available as to quality
and motivation as there are between attorneys, doctors, or any other
group professing a service and competing for clients.
Rehabilitation is popular and institutions and organizations
purporting to provide medical, sociological, vocational, and psy-
chiatric services have sprung up all over the United States. Nearly
every larger hospital has its rehabilitation wing. For the most part
this amounts to physiotherapy, muscle evaluation, vocational evalua-
tion, and other gimmicks involved in physical restoration. In a serious
case, for the most part these services are worthless. In addition there
are physical rehabilitation centers associated with teaching institu-
tions and while the quality of their service is superior to those in
the general hospital they are primarily teaching oriented and the
severely injured client is likely to become a clinical subject with
consequent delayed restoration. There are rehabilitation hospitals
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not associated with universities or general hospitals for the severely
injured which specialize in types of injury or closely allied types of
injury. In the main these are probably better facilities for our pur-
pose of early restoration. However, in selection of this type of an
institution one should not be as much concerned with the appear-
ance of the plant or with slick catalogues and brochures as with the
quality, dedication and involvement of personnel who are involved
with the client. As a rule, the larger the institution the more likely
the patient is treated not as an individual, but as just another patient
who is being processed in a program that is not tailored to his par-
ticular need. There is a tendancy in the larger institution to pass
the patient around among the various services and personnel with
the medical director only periodically being involved with the patient.
Under these circumstances the patient in fact becomes quite frag-
mented with respect to treatment and is seldom able to relate to an
individual for a sufficiently long period of time to effectively deal
with the real problems of his rehabilitation which are his psycho-
logical and motivational attitudes toward his injury. You will find
that the techniques applied in all these institutions are essentially
the same with respect to the technical aspects of his care, but great
differences appear in the involvement of the staff, intimately, in the
patient's problems.
There are both private and public rehabilitation organizations
concerned with vocational rehabilitation. The Federal Government
supervises a vast program concerned with vocational rehabilitation
on a national scale in support of the various state agencies. Most
are sub-agencies of the State Department of Education but there is
a trend away from this and to separate departments. The expressed
purpose of these is to provide vocational counselling, education and
economic assistance for the client in attaining vocational goals.
Unfortunately most of these agencies are so involved in pro-
ducing mass rehabilitation, in making studies of needs of further
and expanded services, in developing statistics, and in other minor
distractions that they avoid, with some exceptions and these excep-
tions depend upon the dedication and motivation of the individual
counselor, great involvement with the very seriously injured and
handicapped. Notwithstanding this tendency of avoidance in the
difficult and serious case, the agency can be made to diligently and
effectively direct its effort to provide successful vocational rehabili-
tation services to the client if the attorney stays involved and acts
as an observer of the activity and a goal when the interest or the
program of the agency seems to lag.
It is realized that what is proposed in this article has been
sketchily outlined and each area only superficially explored. The
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purpose of this paper was to bring to the attention of the legal pro-
fession and to other professional and non-professional groups con-
cerned with the field of personal injury and workmen's compen-
sation the need for a more enlightened understanding of the rela-
tionship of the injured.
To set out for consideration what I deem to be the goal of
restoration of the individual to the highest level of independence
and contribution, as the only valid and acceptable objective for all
involved, as opposed to the validity of quantum of reward as the
objective and to propose in attaining what I consider the only valid
goal, that the attorney using modalities and techniques suggested
here, adopt the role of the manager and become involved in the
medical, cultural, socio-economic and spiritual problems presented
in his client to attain maximum restoration.
In summary: There is a continuing and accelerated trend in
society to designate the individual and to set standards and criteria
for judgment for reasons of administrative convenience that do not
recognize the dissimilarities among people. There is in the evalua-
tion of the social organization an abrogation of the responsibility
of the individual, with society taking over the responsibility of pro-
riding compensation for inability and disability with security and
freedom from competition greater for most than could be earned
in being returned to competition and required contribution of effort
of the individual. There is a demonstrated solution to this unfavor-
able trend (of promoting inability and disability) in which the
attorney can play a key role in motivation of his client.
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AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT
CHILDREN - A STUDY OF WELFARE
ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
U NTIL the Depression in 1929, welfare assistance was within the
domain of private organizations. Although a few local or state-
wide programs did exist,' they were exceptions to the general rule.
The advent of the Depression focused attention on this private as-
sistance and demonstrated its inadequacy. As the Depression con-
tinued, it became more and more clear that the needs of the people
could no longer be met without coordinated help. In response to the
continuing depressed character of the national economy, President
Roosevelt, on June 8, 1934, promised legislation on the subject of
social security. He said:
Our task of reconstruction does not require the creation of
new and strange values. It is rather the finding of the way once more
to known, but to some degree forgotten, ideals and values....
Among our objectives I place the security of the men, women,
and children of the Nation first.
This security for the individual and for the family concerns
itself primarily with three factors. People want decent homes to live
in; they want to locate them where they can engage in productive
work; and they want some safeguard against misfortunes which
cannot be wholly eliminated .... 2
Subsequent to this statement, President Roosevelt, by executive
order, created a committee whose task was to study the problems of
economic deprivation and to propose legislation designed to alleviate
and prevent similar conditions in the future. The President, endors-
ing the committee's recommendations for legislation, submitted the
committee's report to Congress stating:
The establishment of sound means toward a greater future
economic security of the American people is dictated by a prudent
consideration of the hazards involved in our national life. No one
can guarantee this country against the dangers of future depressions
but we can reduce these dangers. We can eliminate many of the
factors that cause economic depressions, and we can provide the
I U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, Foreword to A CONSTRUCTiVF
PUBLIC WELFARE PROGRAM at iii (1965).
2 H.R. REp. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
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means of mitigating their results. This plan for economic security is
at once a measure of prevention and a method of alleviation. 8
Thus it is clear that the Depression was the catalyst for a searching
exploration of the economic ills of the nation; the result of this
exploration was the Social Security Act of 1935. 4 This act was the
first permanent legislation authorizing commitment of federal funds
to states for public welfare programs.' It is interesting to note that
the United States was the last major country to consider a compre-
hensive program of social security. 6
In consideration of the act as enacted, a Senate Committee delin-
eated the scope and purpose of the bill in the following way:
The pressing need for social security legislation at this time is
apparent on every hand. For the last 5 years we have been paying a
frightful cost of insecurity in the toll of human suffering, weakened
morale of our people, and mounting public expenditures for public
charity. So far in the depression we have taken emergency steps,
designed to relieve distress, and to take care of the immediate situa-
tion. The time has come for a comprehensive, constructive program
to avoid the repetition of such a disaster in the future. The founda-
tion for such a program is laid in this bill.
7
In relating the broad impact of the Social Security Act to the welfare
of children, a Senate Report stated:
The heart of any program for social security must be the child.
All parts of the Social Security Act are in a very real sense measures
for the security of children. Unemployment compensation, for
instance, will benefit many children in the homes of unemployed
workers; and even old-age pensions and old-age benefits will in
many cases indirectly aid children in families whose resources have
been drained for the support of aged grandparents.
In addition ... there is great need for special safeguards for
many underprivileged children. Children are in many respects the
worst victims of the depression.8
Since its enactment in 1935, few years have passed without
amendment or addition to the act.9 In virtually every instance of
revision, the scope of the original legislation has been enlarged or
the provisions strengthened.' 0
The federal legislation was initially designed to encourage state
adoption of active public relief programs. By offering states reim-
bursement for their welfare expenditures if the state program con-
3 H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 '(1935).
4 Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
5 Foreword to A CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC WELFARE PROGRAM, op. cit. supra note 1,
at iii.
6 H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935).
7S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
8S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935).
9 WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1962 PUBLIC WELFARE AMENDMENTS 1 (1964).
10 BUREAU OF FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1 (1966).
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formed to federal guidelines, the states were strongly induced to
begin a program of relief. In this regard, it should be noted that the
federal statutes are, in effect, only permissive, insofar as any state is
free to participate or not participate with the federal government in
a given welfare program.
At the time of the conception of the act, nearly every state
adopted a related welfare program. Today, "four out of every 100
American children depend upon the federally supported State pro-
grams of aid to families with dependent children .... .." These
children are members of 1,102,449 families,12 which encompass
3,465,554 children's and 1,129,711 adults who are either parents or
guardians. 4 The federal expenditure totalled $161,474,677 in April
of 1966,'" an expenditure increase of 4.4o over the previous April.
Relating these statistics to the state of Colorado, during the month of
May 1966, this state was providing welfare aid to 12,418 families,
which included 37,367 children and 11,102 parents or guardians, at
a federal expense of $1,938,934.16
The preceding statistics demonstrate: (1) that the Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children program 7 encompasses a substantial
part of the nation's population; and (2) that vast amounts of the
nation's natural and developed wealth are committed to the support
of these families and their children.
That persons needing a subsistence allowance do exist, and that
without such aid such persons would be unable to provide themselves
with the necessities of life, will be assumed throughout the course of
this paper. In discussing AFDC, the response of the State of Colo-
rado will be analyzed in terms of its goals and its fulfillment of
specific requirements which result in receipt of matching funds from
the federal government. Following this analysis, the operational
effectiveness of the state program will be examined. During the
11 BUREAU OF FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 1 (1961).
12 BUREAU OF FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE.
Advance Release of Statistics on Public Assistance, April 1966, Table 1. It should be
noted that these statistics indicate an increasing welfare burden because in 1961, only
910,000 families were receiving this aid. DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 2.
13 Advance Release of Statistics on Public Assistance, April 1966, op. cit. supra note 12,
Table 1. Here, too, an increase has occurred; 2,733,000 children received assistance in
1961. DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 2.
14 Advance Release of Statistics on Public Assistance, April 1966, op. Cit. supra note 12,
Table 1.
15 Advance Release of Statistics on Public Assistance, April 1966, op. cit. supra note 12,
Table 2. This same release reported that one year earlier, in April of 1965, cost to
the federal government was $154,713,449.
16 Id. Table 7.
17 Hereinafter, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children welfare program will be
referred to as AFDC, even though Colorado still refers to its program as ADC. The
federal designation is AFDC. 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1964).
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foregoing study, suggestions as to how the program may be altered
to re-integrate the welfare claimant into society, and thus lessen the
long-range burden, will be discussed.
I. THE STATE PLAN
The state plan, required by the federal law, is designed to pro-
vide services and to meet the needs of that state's needy families and
their dependent children.' 8 In the interest of uniformity and a com-
prehensive welfare program, a series of requirements must be met
before the state qualifies for federal financial assistance. The Bureau
of Family Services, a federal agency, is charged with approving or
disapproving submitted state plans. It is therefore important that
each state, Colorado in this instance, carefully prepare its plan.
In Colorado, a satisfactory state plan is largely the responsibility
of the Colorado State Department of Public Welfare. 9 The DPW
is charged with keeping abreast of current changes in federal legisla-
tion and revising their rules and regulations accordingly. When
federal revisions require state legislative action, the DPW works
closely with state legislative committees by making recommendations
to the state legislature, which, when enacted, will assure continued
federal assistance. 21 It can be seen that the DPW shoulders sub-
stantial responsibility for a smoothly functioning and continuous
welfare program.
The duties of the DPW are several, and every duty has a basic
relationship to federal law. The Social Security Act provides each
state with an administrative option, i.e., a state may establish a single
state agency to administer the state plan, or it may establish a single
state agency to supervise administration of the state plan.2 Colorado
has chosen the supervisory alternative.22 Perhaps the most important
duty delegated to the DPW is the promulgation of rules and regula-
tions binding upon each Colorado county, which are "necessary or
desirable for carrying out the provisions" 2 of Colorado legislation, 4
which are in turn, essential to continued federal financial assistance.
In many instances, the federal requirements are met by direct
legislative action. In other instances, these requirements are met
1879 Stat. 423 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. 1, 1965).
19 Hereinafter, the Colorado State Department of Public Welfare will be referred to as
the DPW.
20 Interview With Mr. John H. Jones, Principal Public Assistance Consultant, Colorado
State Department of Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Sept. 9, 1966.
2149 Stat. 627 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 602'(a)(3).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-2(1)(b) (1963). See generally 7 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC
WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 7015, pt. IV (B) at 19'(1963).
23 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-2(1)(c) (1963).
24 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-2(1)'(e) (1963).
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solely by the rules and regulations promulgated by the DPW. The
latter situation prevails when federal law is revised and the Colorado
legislature is not in session at the time. But, regardless of which
procedure is used, the revisions must be incorporated into the state's
welfare program and must be binding on all political subdivisions of
the state in order that it remain eligible for federal assistance. In
the event the DPW acts alone, it has the authority to make and
enforce the required revisions of the state welfare program. At a
later date, when the legislature is in session, it may or may not
incorporate the revisions into statutory form.
Revisions in the state program are not always in response to
federal amendments. They may be made on the state's initiative.
An example is the situation where a welfare worker finds a current
practice too outmoded or inadequate to provide needed assistance.
Such a worker explains the problem to his supervisor who then
presents it to his administrator. The administrator reports the sug-
gested revision to a county-state liaison worker who conveys the
information to the DPW. In the event the DPW considers the sug-
gestion valid and worthy of incorporation into the welfare program,
the suggestion is drafted into final form and submitted to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare where it is studied
and approved or disapproved by the Bureau of Family Services. 5
Whether the revision originates at the federal, state, or opera-
tional level, it is still a change in the welfare program. As such, it
must always be submitted for examination and judgment.2 6 This
technique of examination, which occurs on every revision, permits
HEW 27 to maintain surveillance over every state welfare program
by continual determination and re-determination of whether any
particular state is entitled to federal aid.
II. FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS: A STATE'S RESPONSE
In this section, attention shall be given to those federal require-
ments which are most important or most controversial. As each
requirement is considered, Colorado's compliance with and operation
under it will be examined. At the same time, an analysis of the
effectiveness of the state operation will be made where appropriate.
25 Interview With Mr. John H. Jones, Principal Public Assistance Consultant, Colorado
State Department of Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Sept. 9, 1966.
26 As might be expected, the method employed for reporting all revisions is a form
(Form FS-553), accompanied by a final draft of the actual revision. Because revi-
sions are so frequent, the amount of paperwork involved is tremendous. This results
in somewhat of a bottleneck, causing the needed approval to be delayed in the average
situation.
27 Hereinafter, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare will be




An approved state plan must "provide that it shall be in effect
in all political subdivisions of the state, and ... be mandatory upon
them ....28 By this requirement, it is intended that the whole geo-
graphical area of the state be provided with welfare assistance, rather
than isolated portions thereof. Thus, provided that the state is totally
served by such assistance, the political subdivision chosen by a given
state, to administer the welfare, is discretionary with that state. In
Colorado, the various counties have been charged with administering
public welfare.
B. State Financial Participation
The federal government does not assume all expenses of every
aspect of welfare aid, even though it is willing to provide very sig-
nificant financial assistance. Thus it is that federal legislation calls
for a plan of "financial participation by the State ....129
The amount of financial assistance provided by the federal gov-
ernment depends in part on the particular program involved and the
size of the state appropriation for that program. Because of these
variables, even when a state's plan is fully approved, there is no pre-
determined amount of federal aid available.
C. Opportunity for a Fair Hearing
In recognition of the right of every individual to equal treat-
ment under the laws, the state plan must "provide for granting an
opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individ-
ual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children is denied
or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness ....30 The hearing
is intended to prevent arbitrary denial of an application, or delay in
its consideration, at the local level.
In Colorado, county departments of public welfare are required
to report their decisions rendered upon each application for aid, to
the DPW. In addition, the DPW may initiate a review of any
county's decision on requested aid, without regard to an applicant's
desire for appeal.3 ' Following appeal to, or review by, the DPW,
an applicant suffering an adverse decision can appeal to a state dis-
trict court. Despite this provision for court review, in Denver
2849 Stat. 627 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1). Colorado compliance with this re-
quirement found in COLO. REv. STAT. § 119-1-9 (1963).
249 Stat. 627 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2). Colorado compliance with this require-
ment found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 119-1-16 (1963).
30 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4). Colorado compliance with this require-
ment found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-9(1) (1963).
31 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-9(1) (1963).
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County no judicial appeal has occurred during the past ten years.32
The lack of judicial appeal indicates with equal force, either a strong
tendency on the part of the applicants to abide by the state agency's
decision or a lack of funds with which to finance such an appeal.
Appeals from the local agency to the state agency are also infre-
quent. Those appeals which are made, generally concern aid to
needy disabled persons where the factual issue is the extent or perma-
nence of the disability. One reason for the lack of appeals may be
the fact that few technical problems are involved in the application
process. The primary factual determination in AFDC cases centers on
the applicant's income or the return of the husband; in either case,
the issue is not complex.3 When appeal to the state agency is taken,
it must satisfy recognized due process requirements. These include
the appellant's right to present witnesses and to cross-examine the
welfare department's witnesses. In addition, court-room rules of
evidence are applicable.
D. Employment Incentives
Prior to 1962, federal law required all earnings of every member
of the AFDC family to be taken into account when computing the
assistance for the family. The normal AFDC grant for a given number
of family members would be reduced by exactly the amount earned.
This requirement was destructive of employment incentives insofar
as the recipients could refrain from all gainful employment and still
receive the same income at the first of each month. To make the
situation even worse, in some instances, the recipient who decided
to work despite this financial restriction would actually be less well
off after working because of incurring the expense of such items as
work clothes or transportation costs. In 1962, amendments to the
Social Security Act altered this situation by providing that the state
plan must account for income or resources of the children and their
relatives, but the income determination must also include an account-
ing of "any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any
such income.....a This allowance proved to be a limited im-
provement.
Recently, another amendment further liberalized consideration
of outside income, by providing that the state agency could disregard
the earned income of each dependent child under the age of eighteen.
The disregard of such earned income was limited to fifty dollars per
32 Address by Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Public Welfare De-
partment Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 8, 1966.
33 Interview With Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Department of
Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Aug. 31, 1966.
34 79 Stat. 423 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (Supp. I, 1965). Colorado compliance
with this requirement found in COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-11-5 (1963).
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month, per child, and never to exceed a total of $150 per month for
all of the children in the family.15 Colorado, apparently recognizing
the value of encouraging employment incentives, allows each child
in the AFDC family to earn up to sixty-five dollars per month and
each adult within the grant an amount not to exceed twenty-five
dollars per month.3 6 To the extent that the additional Colorado
allowance exceeds the federal allowance, it is not reimbursable by
the federal government.
To appreciate more fully the benefits provided by these allow-
ances, it should be noted that prior to 1965, a dependent child was not
allowed any gainful employment, under penalty of reducing the
amount of the AFDC grant. In some instances, the effect of this
restriction was indirectly to force the teenager out of the home so
that he could continue to work to receive money of his own without
increasing the burdens on his siblings covered by the grant.3 7 Allow-
ing the AFDC child to earn his own way, or perhaps to save money
for vocational or other education, as the amendments now allow,
seems to foster a sense of responsibility in the child which was pre-
viously quashed. Moreover, the family unity is preserved, i.e.,
premature separation is no longer necessary.
An anomaly is created by the above discussed revisions insofar
as the dependent child is given a significantly larger allowance than
his parent. The seriousness of this anomaly is open to question, but
it should be noted that the primary emphasis of the AFDC program
is the welfare of the child. This is not to say that the parent is
considered a lost cause. Rather, such a policy recognizes that the
child, being in a formative stage, will likely respond more readily
to responsibility. It is also a recognition of the difficulty in deciding
how large the adult allowance should be before one reaches the point
at which the adult recipient is provided with a double income, i.e.,
welfare assistance and outside income. If the adult allowance is too
large, inclusion on welfare rolls becomes too desirable. If it is too
small, employment incentives are destroyed. Although the current
allowance may be too small, it is a means of attaining the desired
emphasis on improving the standards of the child.
E. The Recipient's Right of Privacy
The right to privacy refers to the confidential nature of the
information provided by the applicant while seeking welfare assist-
ance. To this end, the state plan must contain "safeguards which
3579 Stat. 423 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (Supp. I, 1965).
36 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare




restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants
and recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration
of aid to families with dependent children .... " When invoked,
this restriction prevents the use of welfare records for commercial,
political or personal purposes.31
In providing this protection to Colorado applicants and recipi-
ents, the Colorado legislature has made violation of the statute a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500 nor more
than three months imprisonment, or both.
40
F. Right of Application
Every person wishing to do so must be given the opportunity to
apply for AFDC assistance and should the requested assistance be
granted, it must be provided with reasonable promptness.4' The
rationale for providing this right is found in the following reference
to the legislative history of the requirement:
Shortage of funds in aid to dependent children has sometimes
... resulted in a decision not to take more applications or to keep
eligible families on waiting lists until enough recipients could be
removed from the assistance rolls to make a place for them ....
[Tihis difference in treatment accorded to eligible people results
in undue hardship on needy persons and is inappropriate in a pro-
gram financed from Federal funds. 42
G. Desertion and Abandonment: Notice
Every state plan must provide for a method of notice to law-
enforcement officials in every situation in which aid is given and a
child included in the grant has been deserted or abandoned by a
parent.43 Although the statute, as worded, appears to include deser-
tion by either mother or father or both, Committee Reports on the
legislation seem to indicate otherwise:
It has come to [the] ... committee's attention that the number
of children receiving aid because of the desertion of the father is
increasing. The legal responsibility of a parent for the support of
his minor children is ... clearly established in the laws of every
State.
44
As if in reliance upon this legislative history, Colorado law restricts
376 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602'(a)(8). Colorado compliance with this re-
quirement found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-16 (1963).
39 Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946) (dictum).
40 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-16(4) (1963).
41 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (9). Colorado compliance with this require-
ment found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-4(2) (1963).
4 2 H.R. REp. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1949).
4376 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10). Colorado compliance with this re-
quirement found in 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.21
(1963).
44 H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
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prosecution for desertion to the father of a child, excluding the
child's mother.45 In application, Colorado's statute seems to indicate
a recognition that it is the primary responsibility of the father, rather
than the mother, to support their children.
From the viewpoint of the welfare agency, the Colorado statu-
tory focus on the deserting father does not exclude the deserting
mother from its concern. Rather, when the mother has deserted,
the emphasis is shifted from securing financial support46 to "provid-
ing appropriate casework services to assist applicants and recipients
to work out problems of family relationships and marital difficul-
ties . ... 41
1. Desertion in Detail
In Colorado, desertion and abandonment are considered es-
sentially the same offense and punishable as a felony. Intent to
desert is an essential element of the prosecutor's burden of proof;4
this is frequently proven by a showing that the father is continuously
absent from the home and has taken other employment in a different
geographical location. 49 From a technical standpoint, the DPW has
promulgated a series of requirements, all of which must be met when
applicable to the individual case, before desertion can exist. The
following factors must be verified:
[1.] The child of the deserting father is under the age of 16.
[2.] A marriage, including prima facie common-law marriage, 5 0]
has existed and the child is the issue of such marriage....
[3.] Unless the parents of the child are, or were, legally married,
the paternity of the child must be legally established....
[4.] The father has left the home in which the child is receiving
care, failing to provide for the child's support in that home or
elsewhere.
[5.] The circumstances of the absence are such that a reasonable
conclusion would be that the father is voluntarily and will-
fully absent without apparent intent to return....
[6.] The absence has existed for a continuous period of 30 days or
more, during which there has been complete lack of support
of the child by the absent father....
[7.] The absence of the father is the primary reason for the need
of the child for ADC.51
45 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-1-1 (1963).
46 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.21 (1963).
47 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.213 (1963).
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-1-1 (1963).
49 Interview With Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Department of
Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Aug. 31, 1966.
50 A common law marriage is quite easily established in Colorado. Both parties to the mar-
riage contract must be legally free to marry; both parties must consent, intend and agree
to the marriage, either expressly or by implication. When these elements are met, a
valid legal marriage exists which can be terminated only by legal action. See CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 90-1-1 (1963) (requirement of consent) ; Smith v. People, 64 Colo. 290, 170
Pac. 959 (1918) ; Estate of Klipfel v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 92 Pac. 26 (1907).
514 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.211 (1963).
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Upon proof of these factors, a finding of desertion is made. The
next step is to attempt to locate the father. To this end, information
concerning the father's desertion is to be employed by the various
county departments in an attempt to locate him, "whether his where-
abouts are known or believed to be unknown." The contact with the
deserting father is for the purpose of determining his attitude con-
cerning the family and the support of his child.5" For the most part,
location efforts are conducted either by a welfare worker or by an
investigation unit.53 This unit relies upon caseworker reports, family
members, organized public or private agencies, social organizations,
and correspondence with other counties and states.5"
After it has been reasonably determined that a desertion has
occurred,
a main condition of eligibility for ADC is that the applicant (in-
cluding new, reopened or reinstated cases) must sign a statement...
that she is willing to sign a complaint against the deserting father,
if requested to do so by the District Attorney. ADC is granted
promptly if the applicant signs the form; it is not granted if the
applicant refuses. 55
In some situations this condition of eligibility places a substantial
burden upon the applicant insofar as she has no particular desire to
see the father of her child prosecuted for the felony of desertion.
This required cooperation on the part of the applicant or recipient
is intended to force the father, when found, to fulfill his support
obligations when otherwise he probably would not.
The foregoing discussion clearly focuses upon the female appli-
cant and the pursuit of the father. In the reverse situation, i.e., where
the father applies for AFDC assistance after desertion by the mother,
the above condition of eligibility is somewhat modified by practical
necessity. All that is really required of any applicant is that he or
she cooperate with law enforcement authorities. Thus, when a father
applies for AFDC, there is no legal reason for requiring coopera-
tion, since Colorado has no provision for prosecuting a deserting
mother. As a practical matter, this question arises rarely, since a
father will apply for AFDC in the normal instance, only when he is
incapacitated and his wife is absent.
2. Legal Aspects of Support Actions
It will be recalled that desertion, when proven, is a felony,
punishable by imprisonment. The criminal complaint of desertion is
usually reserved for those cases where the location of the missing
524 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.212 (1966).
53Denver Dep't of Public Welfare, Administrative Order No. 23, 1962.
54 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.212 (1966).
*4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.214 (1963).
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father is unknown, or is known but he is outside the jurisdiction of
the state. When the father's location is known and he is within the
state's jurisdiction, a civil non-support action is employed. The civil
action is preferred whenever possible because this gives the defendant
father a further opportunity to avoid incarceration, providing he
makes the proper payments under court order. In this way, the state
hopes to avoid the expenses attendant to imprisonment of the father.
The county welfare department is able to select which remedy
to enforce by using the eligibility forms the applicant must sign.
This selection is possible because Colorado regulations provide for
the immediate and full payment of the AFDC grant to the appli-
cant when she signs a form indicating that she will cooperate with
officials who might decide to pursue the deserting father .5  The
grant is made without regard to whether or not the father will make
support payments. At the same time, by means of a pay-over form,
the applicant signs over to the county department her rights to any
support payments which might be forthcoming from the father. This
DPW regulation serves a dual purpose. When the applicant re-
linquishes her right to the support money from the father, the county
welfare department replaces the applicant as the real party in interest
for the recovery of support payments. As such, the welfare agency
can institute an action for support in its own name. The nature of
the civil action will depend upon whether or not there has been a
divorce. If there has been a divorce or legal separation which resulted
in a court support order, the welfare department will enter the dis-
trict court and move to have the order enforced and the department
named as recipient. If there has been no divorce or legal separation
and therefore no court support order, the welfare department will
initiate an action in Juvenile Court against the defendant father for
having contributed to the dependency of a minor, again with the de-
partment named as recipients of any payments.57 These civil suits,
because of the legal expenses involved, would likely go uninitiated
by the spouse but for the resources of the welfare department, espe-
cially since the Denver Legal Aid Society, as a general policy, refrains
from litigating divorce or delinquency actions.
The second purpose of this regulation is that federal require-
ments are immediately satisfied, allowing full payment of the AFDC
assistance money to the applicant with federal participation. In the
absence of fulfilling the federal requirement, the assistance could
still be given to the applicant, but the funds would have to come
from the General Assistance category, a category which is solely the
6 Ibid.
57 Address by Mr. Frank A. Eezi, Legal Services Division, Denver Public Welfare Depart-
ment Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 8, 1966.
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province of the county and therefore not reimbursable by the federal
government.
Aside from purely financial considerations, the immediate pay-
ment prevents extended hardships on the applicant which would be
the expected result if she were required to wait for court action and
then, after successful legal recourse, still have to depend upon the
usually infrequent and inadequate payments of the defendant
father.
58
3. Purpose of Support Actions59
As a practical matter, the type of action initiated is indicative
of its purpose. The criminal desertion action is employed when pun-
ishment is the desired end. Such actions hopefully will deter others
from attempting to escape their legal obligations. On the other hand,
a civil action in Juvenile Court is designed to recover support pay-
ments. To this end, an average of seventy-five such cases per month
are litigated with a resultant recovery of approximately $500,000
per year in Denver County.
4. Reciprocal Support Act
On occasion, the defendant father is absent from the county or
state in which his dependent child resides. In this event, one of the
first problems faced by the Legal Services Division of the welfare
department will be the establishment of jurisdiction over the person
of the father. To provide a remedy for this situation, all of the fifty
states60 have adopted reciprocal support legislation.6' In Colorado,
this act is applicable on both an interstate and intercounty basis62 and
is in addition to, rather than in place of, other remedies.68 It is the
responsibility of the district attorney to file an action under this act,
either on his own initiative or at the direction of the court.64 The
county welfare department is charged with providing information to
the district attorney's office as needed.
The Reciprocal Support Act is largely a response to the belief
that delinquent support payments are a major contributing factor to
the need for welfare assistance. But, because the act is universally
in force and delinquent support payments remain a problem, it has
been suggested that the act should be replaced or strengthened by
58 Ibid.
5 Interview With Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Department of
Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Aug. 31, 1966.
60 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.215 (1966).
61 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2-1 to -16 (1963).
62 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.215 (1966).
63 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-3 (1963).
644 STATE DEF'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.215 (1966).
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federal legislation. One suggestion is to make it a felony to cross
state lines while guilty of non-support. This would enlist the aid of
federal agencies in the pursuit of these individuals. There is some
merit to such a recommendation because some states are generally
uncooperative in terms of providing information which could lead
to the apprehension of deserting fathers.6" However, those advo-
cating federal legislation in this area seemingly overlook the fact
that such legislation would not significantly increase arrest percent-
ages since mere authorization of federal law enforcement agencies
to search for and arrest fugitives from support actions does not mean
a sudden increase in arrests because of existing manpower and
budgetary limitations.66 Assuming for the sake of argument that
arrest percentages would increase as a result of federal legislation,
nonetheless, a corresponding increase in actual support payments
would not necessarily occur. The welfare agencies would still be
confronted with the problem of getting the money from these men
even though they are in custody.67 Frequently, these men would
rather go to jail for contempt of court than make support payments
to their wives and children. 8 Also, many such men lack sufficient
education and training which would enable them to support the
families for which they are responsible. In short, these factors com-
bine to suggest that federal legislation would result in no significant
improvement over the current Uniform Reciprocal Support Act.
H. Services Provided to Recipients
All state plans must "provide a description of the services ...
which the State agency makes available to maintain and strengthen
family life for children ..6.9." In response, the DPW has promul-
gated the following statement:
Within the broad framework of the Federal Social Security Act and
specific Colorado statutory legislation, the purpose of public welfare
in Colorado is to promote the well-bing [sic] of the people of
Colorado by providing public assistance and social services to needy
and distressed citizens. Such assistance and services shall be ad-
ministered in such a way and manner as to encourage self-care,
self-support, self-respect, economic and personal independence and
65 A few states will not extradite a person, nor will they enter a court order under the act
if an order is already outstanding in another state. A few other states are notorious for
their refusal to return correspondence relating to the location of defendant fathers be-
lieved to be residing within their borders.
66 Interview With Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Department of
Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Aug. 31, 1966.
67 Address by Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Public Welfare Depart-
ment Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 8, 1966.
68 Ibid.
69 70 Stat. 849 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (12).
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the opportunity to participate in the life of the State as a good and
useful citizen.70
This policy statement can be summarized in a single word: self-de-
termination.
The emphasis on welfare services to families receiving AFDC
assistance is the result of the 1962 amendments to the Social Security
Act.71 The existence of these amendments and a given state's ac-
ceptance of the obligations required to place them in operation are
manifestations of growing concern over the deep-rooted causes of
economic and educational deprivation. Prior to these amendments,
welfare aid appeared to focus on financial assistance, rather than on
services in the form of education or rehabilitation. Such a focus was
unfortunate since money payments alone do little or nothing to com-
bat the circumstances which initially place a family on welfare.
However, financial assistance and services can play a vital role in
the reconstruction of the lives of people receiving welfare.
Since a service-oriented AFDC program is an essential phase of
an effective welfare plan, the term requires definition and the serv-
ices offered merit detailed consideration. The DPW has defined
services as,
[TJhose activities of social work staff and related specialists, which
are directed toward helping the individual client in one or more
areas of functioning (i.e., economic, personal, family and social) for
the purpose of achieving, to the extent possible, the objectives of
strengthening family life, social rehabilitation, self-care, and
economic independence for each individual or adult.
72
Services which are available are divided into two subject areas,
namely services to AFDC families and services to the "single person"
categories such as Aid to the Blind or Aid to the Needy Disabled.7"
Services to AFDC families are further subdivided into five special-
ized areas: (1) Illegitimacy; (2) Parental desertion; (3) Potential
for self-support; (4) Protection of children; and (5) Child medical
problems.7"
1. Unmarried Parents: Illegitimacy
Illegitimacy is not a particularly recent problem, but increasing
emphasis on welfare programs has also increased public awareness
and concern about AFDC grants to unwed mothers. Many people
resent this use of tax dollars and this resentment has, in some states,
resulted in legislative proposals requiring sterilization of the mother
70 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4833.01 (1963), The actual
services will be considered in detail. See notes 76-104 infra and accompanying text.
71 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. 1, 1965).
724 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4800.01 (1963).
7 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4810 (1966).
74 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL §§ 4811.1-.5 '(1966).
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of illegitimate children before they can be eligible for AFDC, 75 or
legislation which would simply exclude the second or subsequent
illegitimate child from an AFDC grant.7 These proposals appear to
be morally obnoxious or constitutionally objectionable, or both, but
the fact that such legislation has been seriously suggested seems to
indicate a deep public concern over illegitimate children receiving
welfare aid. Such concern is not misplaced, but it should not be
exaggerated out of proportion to the welfare problem. For example,
"over a 20-year period the increase in illegitimate births has been
from about 4 to about 5 in each 100 live births."' 77 These figures
refer to the population at large rather than strictly to illegitimate
births among AFDC recipients. In fact, "an estimated 21 percent
... of all illegitimate children in the Nation received assistance"
under the AFDC program in December of 1961.78 Thus, the num-
ber of illegitimate children receiving welfare is significant, but the
problem of illegitimacy is neither focused upon nor confined to the
nation's public assistance programs.
The above statistics are not intended to suggest that there is no
illegitimacy problem. In recognition of work to be done in this area,
the DPW has provided for the evaluation of problems which relate
to the legitimacy status of children, clarification of support status,
counseling for the unmarried mother, and investigation of conditions
which may lead to further illegitimacy.79 The DPW has further
provided that every county must provide services which aid in the
planning of the future of both mother and child.8 ° It may also provide
optional services in the areas of prenatal and postnatal care, or in
the "solution of environmental conditions seriously contributing to
illegitimacy." 8 1 It is submitted that solution of environmental prob-
lems resulting in illegitimacy should be mandatory upon each county
department, since elimination of conditons contributing to illegiti-
macy seems at least as important as providing medical care for a
mother and her child after the child's illegitimate status is already
an unpleasant fact.
In illegitimacy cases, the DPW is brought into contact with the
father only to clarify support status. Thus, the father is not included
75 BUREAU OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
ILLEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM 51
(1960).
76 ILLEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM, Op.
cit. supra note 75, at 52.
77 ILLEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM, op.
cit. supra note 75, at 2.
7 8 
BUREAU OF FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
ILLEGITIMACY AND DEPENDENCY Xxiv (Reprint 1963).
79 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.11 (1963).
80 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.12 (1963).
81 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.13 (1963).
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in the optional counseling which is sometimes available to the mother
of the illegitimate child. To the extent that the father is equally as
responsible for the illegitimate birth as is the mother, this appears
to be a shortcoming of the services offered in this area.
Lest one believe that the new emphasis on services in the area of
illegitimacy will lead to immediate improvement, it must be realized
that the causes of illegitimacy are complexly interrelated in the
country's social, economic and emotional structure. 2 The ultimate
solution of these problems requires the extensive and long-term
effort of private citizens, private welfare organizations, and public
welfare agencies. The final solution, if ever attained, must be mor-
ally sound, constitutional, and directed at the causes of illegitimacy.
2. Desertion or Impending Desertion
A caseworker confronted with a family disrupted by desertion
or impending desertion must evaluate problems concerned with re-
peated desertions indicating a desertion pattern. The caseworker
must also give attention to reconciliation attempts, potential support
from the absent parent, burdens on the remaining parent, and special
effort directed toward keeping the family intact when it is the
mother, rather than the father, who is absent from the home.83 The
caseworker may also serve as an intermediary between the feuding
mother and father in hopes of preventing an impending desertion.
Or, after desertion has occurred, the caseworker will aid in a more
efficient management of the disrupted home.
The mandatory services which are to be provided by every
Colorado county when appropriate, are to aid in seeking support from
the absent parent and to alleviate the dual responsibilities of the
remaining parent.8 4 Each county, as limited by its resources, may
provide services designed to effect a reconciliation with the deserting
parent, solve the problems related to desertion patterns, provide
general marriage counseling, and other services.8"
3. Potential for Self-Support: Education
Ideally, every welfare agency is concerned with a family's poten-
tial for self-support. To evaluate this potential, services are provided
which assess existing employment skills and opportunities.16 Option-
ally, medical services may be secured "which will enable the recipient
to engage in employment," training opportunities may be investi-
82 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare De-
partment Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 3, 1966.
83 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.21 (1963).
84 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.22 (1963).
84 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.23 (1963).
86 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.32 (1963).
VOL. 44
1967
gated, and assistance may be provided to secure child care while a
mother is working. 7
In Denver County opportunity for training for useful employ-
ment exists in the form of Denver's Opportunity School. This school
provides testing facilities designed to determine an applicant's apti-
tudes and also provides limited counseling services. The Denver
Welfare Department makes every effort to encourage, since they
cannot compel, AFDC recipients to make use of this service, but have
experienced only limited success.88
Several reasons can be suggested which might explain this
result. When a caseworker approaches an AFDC recipient about
the advantages of Opportunity School, the subject of aptitude tests is
always mentioned. The majority of recipients are frightened by the
prospect of having to take a test, even though only an aptitude test.
Therefore, their first reaction to further education is withdrawal
from the subject. It has been suggested that a caseworker broaching
this subject should never mention the word "test," but this solution is
partial at best, since common knowledge always associates formal
education with some form of examination.
A further explanation of the low proportion of recipients who
take advantage of employment training is the presence of young,
pre-school age children in the home requiring the constant care of
the mother. For the welfare agency to provide care for these children
while the mother is in school, and later while she is working, would
create more problems than would be solved. Initially, in addition to
the aid which would still be required during the training, child care
must be provided. Later, when the mother begins to work, she is
away from her children on a continuing basis and her absence may
be detrimental to them. For these reasons, mothers with children
needing regular care are not usually evaluated for potential self-
support.8 9
The lack of education is, in many instances, self-perpetuating
because those persons lacking education frequently are the ones who
fail to appreciate its advantages. Under these circumstances, the
serious welfare cycle, i.e., generation after generation on welfare,
comes into existence.
It is folly to underestimate the value of education. Many wel-
fare recipients lack even a high school education. Such persons are
87 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.33 (1963).
88 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare De-
partment Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 8, 1966. To illustrate, it is dis-
couraging to note that there are more than 5,000 families receiving AFDC assistance in
Denver County but only about 200 mothers have taken advantage of the training avail-
able at Opportunity School.
89 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.31 (1963).
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particularly vulnerable to overspending their income, to door-to-door
salesmen, to loan-sharks, and to domestic problems. It is suggested
that general education would make welfare recipients much less sus-
ceptible to these common occurrences, by teaching them the difference
between a wise and foolish investment, and by teaching a husband
and wife how to live together in at least semi-harmony. If education
is potentially able to solve some of these very basic deficiencies, it
becomes reasonable to ask why it is that education appears to be
slighted in the typical AFDC grant.
It is true that Denver County has provided an apparently ade-
quate rehabilitation program in the form of additional grants and
allowances for education costs, but what value is the program if
recipients cannot be "enticed" into it? Consider also the amount and
allocation of an AFDC grant for four persons living in private
housing in Denver, Colorado. Seventy-five dollars are allocated for
food; sixteen dollars and thirteen cents for clothing; ten dollars and
fifty-two cents for personal needs; thirteen dollars and twenty-eight
cents for utilities; two dollars and twenty-five cents for household
supplies; and one dollar and fifty cents for education."° This total
amount must last this family one month. The only possible addition
to this allowance is the expense of training for employment for the
AFDC adult recipient. 1 Assuming that three of the four persons
covered by this grant are children of school age, the above mentioned
one dollar and fifty cents must cover the fees of attending public
school, of buying pencils and paper, and of participating in various
school activities. It is clear that this amount of money is pathetically
inadequate. Almost as important is the fact that this sum of money
will allow no newspaper or magazine into the AFDC home, these
also being educational devices. This is not to say that there are no
newspapers in the home or that school fees are not paid or school
activities are not participated in. It is to say, however, that if these
"luxuries" are indulged in, the money must come from other areas of
the grant, e.g., from the food allowance. But, the food allowance is
already sorely taxed since that allowance is frequently invaded to
pay the rent, for which an additional, and also inadequate, amount of
sixty-one dollars and ninety cents is allocated for this family of four.
In fairness to existing welfare legislation, it must be pointed
out that even though there is little money expressly set aside in the
AFDC grant for education, there is still financial encouragement for
education in the form of eligibility requirements. According to DPW
9 Denver Public Welfare Department, ADC Monetary Allowances (1965) (insert).
(Emphasis added.)
91 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare
Department Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 8, 1966.
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regulations, children up to the age of sixteen are eligible for inclusion
in the AFDC grant. 2 After attaining this age, the child can remain
a part of the grant only as long as he is in
regular attendance at a public or private school, high school, trade
school, college or university, or under other special arrangements
adapted to the child's educational needs, if such other arrangements
lead to a diploma or certificate of vocational or technical training
designed to fit him for gainful employment. 93 [Textual footnotes
deleted.]
Private welfare agencies often provide financial assistance to poten-
tially good students while they seek further education after graduation
from high school. 4
Emphasis in the preceding discussion has been placed on formal
or organized education. Individualized training, e.g., a caseworker
tutoring in the recipient's home, is also possible. However, it is sug-
gested that the expense of such a program would be prohibitive due
to the number of persons who would be needed to make the program
work. For the most part, education, to be practical, must come from
existing facilities.
A final reason which might explain low Opportunity School
enrollment is apathy. It has been stated that a vital phase of the
AFDC program is the establishment of self-determination for each
recipient.95 This is a worthy endeavor and is certainly an essential
aspect of any "services" program, but in the face of apathy, the
mere availability of educational facilities may be for naught. On one
occasion, an AFDC recipient was asked if she had ever thought of
taking training and then seeking employment. The recipient's answer
was, "Who me? Work?" The recipient then stated that she was "too
nervous" to work.96 This recipient may, in fact, have been too
nervous to work. But this is not the point. What was illustrated was
the recipient's lack of desire to overcome difficulties and to become
self-sufficient. For her, it was seemingly easier to wait for the AFDC
check at the beginning of each month than to become self-sufficient.
Lack of motivation may explain this attitude and perhaps the case-
worker's task is to motivate. To some extent this is true, but encourage-
ment and persuasion are not always the only or a sufficient means of
motivation. Legislation or regulations concerning eligibility may also
92 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4233.1 (1965).
93 Ibid.
94Address by Mr. D. Waddell, Community Services Consultant, Denver Public Welfare
Department Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 4, 1966. The American
Friends Service Committee is one such private organization.
95 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare
Department Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 8, 1966.
96 This information was obtained during a caseworker's home visit to an AFDC recipient.
The author was an observer at this interview. Aug. 24, 1966.
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motivate. To achieve maximum efficacy from the services presently
offered, the pursuit of education and training should be made an
AFDC eligibility requirement.
It should be noted that application for and receipt of AFDC
assistance is voluntary, since the initial application for aid results
from the payee's own initiative, i.e., there is no state or federal law
compelling application. Thus, to the extent that an applicant applies
for aid, she must be prepared to submit to complete fulfillment of
AFDC eligibility requirements. The voluntary nature of the initial
application in effect gives the state and federal governments a license
to make these requirements as stringent as appear to be necessary to
meet the overall goals of an effective welfare program, including the
goal of reducing the fundamental need of welfare at the outset. It
would therefore seem, since standards already exist by which family
members are evaluated on the basis of their potential for self-sup-
port,9 7 that it could and should be provided that whenever a recipient
is found capable of being trained for useful employment, and neither
the training nor employment would adversely affect young children
in the home, said recipient must agree to submit to education and
training under "penalty" of being denied AFDC assistance. Should
aid be denied because of the applicant's refusal to submit to educa-
tion and training, the next concern centers upon the welfare of the
children left in the home. In this context, there are two possible
alternatives. The first and clearly most drastic alternative is to remove
the children from their parent's custody by court order, although such
procedure is usually considered an act of last resort. However, since
welfare rolls are increasing and welfare cycles already exist, and
these unpleasant facts are destined to become more serious with the
passage of time unless parents are trained and educated to their basic
responsibilities, perhaps drastic measures can be justified. The second
alternative would be to continue welfare aid at the same level, but to
subject the entire grant of money to absolute control by the welfare
department. Under existing procedures, welfare funds are turned
over to the recipients who then exercise their discretion with regard
to how the money is to be spent. Under this suggested alternative,
social workers would select and provide housing, and provide
groceries and personal necessities, in all instances denying the recipi-
ent access to actual cash. Although this would minimize development
of self-sufficiency in the recipient, it would serve to impress upon the
recipient the advantages of training and education insofar as an
agreement to further education would be "rewarded" by revesting
control of the funds in the recipient.
97 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.31 (1963).
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Consideration of these alternatives, or others like them, seems
merited in view of the fact that a lack of education tends to foster
ridicule of the value of education. Further, in some instances, an
uneducated parent might encourage illegitimacy so that daughters
can receive AFDC assistance, or the same parent's conduct might
illustrate hostility toward law enforcement officials and disrespect of
the laws. In short, where a lack of parental education exerts a
significantly harmful influence upon children under the care of such
uneducated parents, it is submitted that the existing welfare program
is inadequately equipped to cope with the resulting welfare cycle and
therefore drastic revisions are justifiable.
4. Children \Wrho Need Protection
In this service area, the caseworker must evaluate problems
related to children: (1) in danger of physical abuse and neglect;
(2) deprived because of continuing money mismanagement;
(3) without adequate supervision; and (4) with parents incapable
of functioning as adequate parents.9" Each county must "assist par-
ents to improve home conditions and assume responsibility for care
and guidance of the children, including the management of financial
resources."" Protective service cases may originate from a referral
to the agency by a non-family person, a doctor who is required by law
to report injuries he has treated which appear to have been inflicted
intentionally,1 °° or caseworkers observing mistreatment, lack of super-
vision or home mismanagement during a home visit.1"' Obvious
signs of grossly inadequate child care include malnutrition, ragged
clothing and filthy living conditions."0 2
Child neglect is most common in economically deprived families
because the demands of meeting basic needs seem to overshadow
proper child care. It is for this reason that protective services prop-
erly occupy an important place in the over-all services program.
5. Child Medical Problems
The final category of services focuses on children who have
special medical problems such as illness, being handicapped, emo-
tional instability, or generally poor physical condition.' 0" In the
solution of these problems, the county must assist "older teenagers
98 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.41 (1963).
99 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.42 (1963).
100 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-13-3 (1963) ; see generally 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WEL-
FARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4833.331 (1965).
101 Address by Mrs. M. Snead, Intake Division, Denver Public Welfare Department Orien-
tation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 5, 1966.
102 Ibid.
s 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.51 (1963).
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in evaluating their interests and potentials for self-support .... 104
I. Services Plan for Each Child
The concluding federal provision is the result of a 1962 amend-
ment to the Social Security Act. It requires each state plan to develop
and apply,
a program for such welfare and related services for each child who
received aid to families with dependent children as may be necessary
in the light of the particular home conditions and other needs of such
child.. . with a view toward providing welfare and related services
which will best promote the welfare of such child and his family.105
The DPW, rather than the Colorado legislature, has reacted to this
requirement by providing that:
county departments are required to make a plan for every child in
each ADC case and keep the plan up to date. In order to make a
plan it is necessary that each child be considered in relation to his
physical and emotional development and as to his home condi-
tions....
The purpose of the individual consideration of each child is to
determine whether problems exist .... 106
Providing individual and extensive care for each child has a
twofold effect. In addition to giving specific assistance to such child,
this particular service "must always include help to parents to restore
their capacity to care for children when that capacity has been
weakened by long hardships." ' 0 7 Thus, evaluation of the problems
of each child is indicative of the problems being faced by the parents
of each child. The DPW recommends that the following areas be
investigated and analyzed while formulating the required plan for
each child: (1) the child's health; (2) the child's social behavior;
(3) the child's attitude toward school and his performance in school;
(4) the child's legal status, e.g., establishment of legal paternity;
(5) lack of physical care and protection; (6) lack of supervision,
guidance and discipline; (7) exploitation of the child; and (8) the
presence of degrading conditions such as alcoholism, promiscuity, or
criminal activity.' 8
In order to facilitate an effective individual plan for each child,
the DPW has promulgated several regulations designed to allow a
greater time investment for each child. Effective on March 1, 1965,
all AFDC cases in Colorado were declared to be service cases. 109
To be practical, this declaration required a caseload reduction. Under
1044 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4811.52 (1963).
1076 Stat. 185 '(1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (13). (Emphasis added.)
106 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4235 (1964).
107 BUREAU OF FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
SERVICES UNDER AFDC FOR CHILDREN WHO NEED PROTECTION 6 *(1966).
08 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4235.1'(1964).
109 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4832.3 (1965).
VOL. 44
DEPENDENT CHILDREN
the new regulations, no caseworker is allowed to have more than
sixty service cases.'1 In addition to this, the supervisory load was
altered so that no supervisor is in charge of more than five case-
workers,'1 ' for a maximum total of 300 service cases. Finally, this
reduced caseload allows, and the DPW requires, a visit with the
AFDC recipient every three months"' rather than every six months
as it was prior to the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act.
The net result of this emphasis on service is increased contact
between caseworker and recipient, which, in turn, makes the worker
more familiar with the recipient's problems and allows the worker
more time to expend more effort in the solution of the problems.
Lest one believe that immediate and significant improvement is the
dividend of this relatively new emphasis, it must be pointed out that
patience is of the essence. The "services" amendments will undoubt-
edly lead to over-all improvement in the status of welfare recipients,
but only in the long-run application of the program. It must be
remembered that many recipients are "hard-core" and set in their
ways. To provide services is, in a very real sense, to provide educa-
tion, and the process of becoming educated, even at the practical
level of home management and child care, is a slow one. But, if the
needy are ever to become self-reliant, education, in every sense
of the word, is the solution.
To financially expedite this services program, the federal gov-
ernment has made funds available which will reimburse the state
and county funds to the extent of 75% of the administrative expenses
of an approved state plan."13 Administrative expenses, in this con-
text, include the training of personnel and the payment of salaries of
the additional number of caseworkers needed to put the services
program into effect. This generous contribution from the federal
treasury, although an extremely important factor in encouraging
states to adopt a services program, in no way increases the amount
of the AFDC grant given to a recipient.
III. AFDC AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Having devoted extensive discussion to an examination of fed-
eral and state legislation and regulation, this Note will now explore
the AFDC procedure from initial application to receipt of the
AFDC grant.
The first step in this process is called the "intake" procedure.
This phase is defined as "that period of time between the date of
110 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4832.1 (1964).
111 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4832.2 (1964).
112 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4832.3'(1965).
113 76 Stat. 174, 180 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (3) (1964).
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filing an application for public assistance and the date the county
director approves the action taken to approve or deny the applica-
tion . '. .."" The applicant is taken to a small cubicle for a ten to
fifteen minute screening interview. Very basic information is solic-
ited here, including a finding of the type of assistance being requested
and whether or not the applicant has received assistance in the
past." 5 At the close of this interview, a date is set for a second
interview and the two or three days between these interviews is used
to process the information gathered in the first interview. The second
interview seeks detailed information about the applicant and con-
stitutes a serious attempt to ascertain eligibility.
The child, to be included in the grant, must be living with an
eligible relative." 6 Relatives designated as "grand" or "great" are
eligible as AFDC payees, but "step-grand" relatives are ineligible.
The county department has the responsibility for ascertaining this
factor of eligibility and to this end, may examine birth certificates,
church and school records, marriage records, court records, and
others."'
The next determination concerns existing living arrangements.
The child must live in the home of the applying AFDC payee on a
permanent basis. Temporary absence of either the payee or the child
will not affect eligibility.""
The AFDC payee must also have resided within the state of
Colorado for one year prior to the date of application." 9 For the
most part, however, only the residence of the child is important.'
20
A dependent child is one "who has been deprived of parental
support or care . . .. '2 This deprivation may be the result of the
death of either parent, the continued absence from the home by
either parent, physical or mental incapacity of either parent, or the
unemployment of either parent.' 22 Continued absence from the home
may be due to desertion or abandonment,' 23 incarceration, military
service, and divorce or legal separation.1 4  With regard to the
114 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4810.1 (1966).
115 The author was permitted to observe several of these interviews while they were being
conducted. July 29, 1966.
116 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 22-11-4(c) (1963) ; 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF
MANUAL § 4232.1 (1966).
117 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4232.11 (1966).
118 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4232.3 (1965).
119 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-4 (1963).
120 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare
Department Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 4, 1966.
121 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-11-1(3) (1963); 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF
MANUAL § 4230.011 (1966).
122 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231 '(1966).
123 See notes 43-68 supra and accompanying text.
124 4 STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4231.2'(1966).
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divorce or legal separation circumstance, there is little of either in
AFDC situations. This is because many attorneys shy away from
these people as clients since their fees are hard to collect from the
ex-husbands.12 5 Whether or not a divorce has occurred is of small
concern to the welfare department, since even without a divorce
decree (and therefore no court order for support) the department
can file an action in Juvenile Court charging the father with con-
tributing to the dependency of a minor.'1
6
Once it has been determined that a dependent child does in fact
exist, an income evaluation must be made. Financial need is based
upon the total value of the real and personal property possessed by
the applicant and dependent children sought to be covered by the
grant. An eligible parent or parents and one child can own realty
up to a total value of $1000. The amount of $250 is allowed for
each additional child up to a final maximum amount of $2000.
Should net assets be under this amount, this factor of eligibility has
been met. However, these restrictions exempt a home owned and
used as a residence, necessary furniture and household equipment
used in the home, and necessary wearing apparel. 127 Items which are
not exempt include, for example, bank accounts, retirement funds,
insurance policies and court judgments.
It is always the applicant's or recipient's legal responsibility to
provide accurate and up-to-date information concerning all factors of
eligibility, e.g., changes in employment status. The burden of show-
ing need, therefore, is upon the AFDC payee. The information
provided by the applicant at the intake interview is checked by the
welfare worker conducting the interview. Should any of the infor-
mation be suspicious or prove to be false, the worker may refer the
case to the county department's Investigation Unit which is charged
with further investigation of the applicant's circumstances.1
2
Since the factors of eligibility are considered to be so important,
the application form which the applicant is required to sign before
becoming eligible for assistance, informs the applicant that if she
provides eligibility information which is knowingly false and would
entitle her to aid to which she would not otherwise be entitled, she
will be liable for fraud.' 9 This form must be signed before any
assistance can be given so that a refusal by the applicant to sign
makes welfare aid legally impossible.
125 Lecture by Mr. Lauren F. Chamberlain, Training Officer, Denver Public Welfare
Department Orientation Class for Welfare Workers, Aug. 5, 1966.
126 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
127 Denver Department of Public Welfare, Policy Letter No. 12, 1959.
128 Denver Department of Public Welfare, Policy Letter No. 23, 1962.
129 Form PA-2, Department of Public Welfare, Application and Initial Determination of
Eligibility- Family; see also Coso. REV. STAT. § 22-11-17 (1963).
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In the event evidence exists which shows that a fraud has been
perpetrated by an applicant or recipient, the case is referred to the
Legal Services Division of the county welfare department. This divi-
sion evaluates the evidence and forwards the information to the
district attorney's office, which takes the case to court. In Denver
County, there are an average of eight to ten cases of fraud per month
and most of the defendants in these cases plead guilty.' As a prac-
tical matter, the fraud cases are prosecuted for their deterrent effect
rather than as a punitive measure or for recovery purposes.13 1 The
reason for this is that from a punitive standpoint, a mother who has
defrauded the welfare department will rarely be imprisoned because
this would separate the family unit, creating a situation which the
department seeks to avoid, not only because it is destructive of the
family relationship, but also because it causes added expense in terms
of care for the children. With regard to the possibility of recovery,
the general economic and educational status of the AFDC recipient
is not conducive to repayment of the defrauded funds.
It is the feeling of many people that the currently required com-
plex eligibility factors are unnecessarily burdensome and time-con-
suming. That this may in fact be true is indicated by a 1963 nation-
wide survey which "revealed that less than 2 percent [of AFDC
families] had apparently intentionally concealed or misrepresented
facts in order to obtain assistance."1 3  On the basis of this statistic,
it would seem that fraud prosecutions are not really needed to deter
fraudulent practices by AFDC recipients and that simplification of
eligibility requirements would make administration of the AFDC
program less expensive, and prosecutions unnecessary. It is submit-
ted, however, that the statistic may be misleading or at least incom-
plete because there is no evaluation of the current deterrent effect of
fraud prosecutions upon the low percentage figure.
CONCLUSION
Public welfare is big business, costing this nation more than $5
billion annually. Of this investment, AFDC requires a substantial
percentage. The factors of adverse psychological effect on welfare
recipients, resulting from general economic deprivation, and the ex-
tent of this financial commitment, combine to demand a study of
those phases of welfare which seek to reduce reliance upon welfare,
130 Interview With Mr. Frank A. Elzi, Legal Services Division, Denver Department of
Public Welfare, Denver, Colorado, Aug. 31, 1966.
131 Ibid.
132 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, A CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC WEL-
FARE PROGRAM 23 (1965).
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rather than perpetrate it. In this context three outstanding areas lend
themselves to prevention or elimination of welfare reliance.
The first such area concerns employment incentives. A more
efficient welfare system benefits both the recipient and the general
public. This is achieved in part whenever the recipients of welfare
earn their own way as much as possible. From the standpoint of
the recipient, employment is a measure of self-sufficiency, indepen-
dence, and pride, resulting in a sense of responsibility which does not
exist when one depends exclusively upon public funds for his personal
needs. From the standpoint of the contributing public, employment for
the recipient means decreased welfare expenditures at the same time the
recipient begins making useful contributions to his society. For these
related reasons, employment incentives are essential. The current
welfare program, although recognizing the value of such incentives,
has not yet provided adequate inducements. Only recently has it be-
come possible for the recipient to seek employment without having
his AFDC grant reduced proportionately. Even now, the only sig-
nificant allowance for the adult is the amount of twenty-five dollars
because that amount is presumed to cover working expenses. There
is no doubt that determination of what amount can be earned with-
out decreasing the size of the AFDC grant is a difficult decision.
The situation where the allowance is too high, making it too advan-
tageous to be on welfare and resulting in double income for the re-
cipient, must be counterbalanced against the other extreme where
the allowance is too low and no attempt will be made by the recipi-
ent to seek employment because it is impossible to have a net gain.
There can be no question about either the value of employment in-
centives or the need for increased allowances. However, determina-
tion of the amount of increased allowances can only result from ex-
tensive investigation of the problems involved and goals sought in
this area of welfare assistance.
Another area which perpetrates reliance on welfare is the physi-
cal separation of parents. This separation commonly manifests itself
by the desertion of the father. When that occurs, two repercussions
are frequently evident; first, the children left in the home are obvi-
ously without a father, and secondly, the father is fleeing from his
legal obligation to support his children. Both effects are serious in
their own way. Children without a father (or mother) are lacking
an environmental circumstance which is important to a well-balanced
childhood. The result of the absence may be over-reliance on the
remaining parent, tendencies toward juvenile delinquency, or general
antagonism toward any authority. A properly operating welfare de-
partment will provide counseling services designed to fill, in part,
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the void left by the deserting parent. Such counseling is both time
consuming and expensive. The county welfare departments in Colo-
rado, to discourage desertion as a means of avoiding the support
obligation, pursue the father and if or when he is caught, the depart-
ments can elect to prosecute him criminally for desertion, or can sue
him civilly for support. A criminal prosecution is chosen if a deci-
sion is made that deterrence is the aim of the procedure. On the
other hand, if it is determined that recovery from the deserting father
is possible, the civil suit will be instituted. At the present time, it
would seem that the welfare department's legal alternatives effi-
ciently operate to deter support obligation avoidance.
The final area conducive to avoiding the welfare cycle concerns
services to be provided welfare recipients. The broad service area
includes a division which focuses on the problems surrounding ille-
gitimacy. Currently there are no mandatory services designed to treat
conditions which result in illegitimate births. Unless extensive effort
is devoted to recognition of the causes of illegitimacy, this problem
will persist.
The final area of services to be evaluated focuses on education.
Education, or a lack thereof, is the primary problem of most welfare
recipients who receive AFDC assistance. The education they lack is
not necessarily detailed formal education, but is rather basic educa-
tion which is essential to day by day existence, e.g., which food is
most nutritious, how to avoid over-spending a fixed income, basic
child care and numerous other examples which a majority of people
take for granted. Parents lacking such basic education frequently
fail to appreciate the advantages of any kind of training or teaching
and consequently, these same parents tend to pass their lack of appre-
ciation onto their children. The result is a perpetuation of a hostility
for education. The logical effect of this hostility is a continuing
need for welfare assistance from generation to generation. Such
continuing needs mean an ever expanding welfare program, which
costs more and more tax dollars. In the current welfare program,
education appears to be slighted, since barely more than one per cent
of the AFDC grant is specifically allocated to meet education ex-
penses. In addition to this financial deficiency, adults receiving
AFDC funds can escape education with impunity because welfare
departments can only "encourage" and cannot require that recipients
partake of available educational facilities. As a result, very few re-
cipients take either the time or trouble to learn what causes their
problems and how their problems can be solved. Their problems
remain unresolved, except to the extent that a welfare worker enters
their lives and solves their problems for them. On the basis of this
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state of affairs, it is submitted that education and training in the
basic problem areas of their existence should be made mandatory by
appropriate legislation. The essential nature of education cannot be
understated; extensive effort can profitably be expended in the fu-
ture in pursuit of this goal.
Jerry E. McAdow
MEASURING THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS -
A STUDY OF INCOMPLETE CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
T HE problem of determining the custody of children presents the
courts with the task of resolving complex social issues within
a framework of legal rules and procedures. Today the governing
legal principle in custody matters is that the best interests of the
child will be the paramount consideration.1 In theory this doctrine
has great merit since the words "best interests of the child" seem
to recognize the social aspect of child custody while providing a
legal justification for the court's award, based upon the guidelines
of a sound and equitable rule of law.
At the same time this rule has opened new channels of inquiry
to the courts to aid them in weighing the intricate human factors
that comprise a custody proceeding. The courts now often appoint
investigators or social workers to analyze the various non-legal facets
of a custody matter, accepting their reports and recommendations as
evidence to aid them in arriving at a decision.
2
In the final analysis, however, it is the judge himself who, in
the exercise of his discretion,' must render his decision in the child's
best interests. He must sift through the psychological test reports
and the social worker's statistical data, maintaining an awareness of
the human equities of the situation.4 Then he must assimilate the
evidence according to his own notions of what is really in the best
interests of the child.
These notions reflect traditional assumptions of social behavior,
yet from the standpoint of the behavioral sciences they are incom-
plete. An awareness of the sociological implications and ramifica-
tions of these conceptions might aid the judge, faced with the di-
1 Oster, Custody: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21 (1965) ;
Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672 (1942). For cases in vari-
ous jurisdictions see 24 AM. JuR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 783 (1966).
2 Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943) ; Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 2 App.
Div. 2d 744, 153 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1956); West v. West, 208 S.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 856
(1946).
3 Usually the decision of the trial court will not be overruled unless there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949). See also
Oster, supra note 1, at 23.
4 One judge described the situation as follows:
These contested child custody cases are never easy, and this case is no excep-
tion. From the nature of such disputes, involving as they do one of the basic
instincts and great primal urges of human existence, whichever way judges
rule is bound to leave a trail of heartache and pain. But decide them we must,
for it is our job....
Bowler v. Bowler, 355 Mich. 686, 694, 96 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1959).
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lemma of a child custody determination, in the exercise of his dis-
cretion for the best interests of the child.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE BEST INTERESTS RULE
At early common law the courts based their decisions in custody
matters primarily on the principle of the father's property right in
the child." The concept of a child as property vested in the father
gave him an almost absolute custody right. Little attention was
given to the interests of the mother, who as a married woman had
relinquished her property rights to her husband. Likewise, the wel-
fare of the child was not always considered. The father by virtue
of his property right was considered the child's natural guardian
and as such was entitled to custody. It was only upon proof of
misconduct on the part of the father resulting in abuse of the child
that the father's natural guardianship would not prevail.'
Gradually this strict doctrine favoring the father was modified
by statute in England' and by case law and statute in the United
States' toward a recognition of an equal right to custody in the
mother. The traditional property right concept became replaced by
more equitable considerations concerning the welfare of the child,
resulting in the development of the best-interests-of-the-child rule.
The underlying principle of the rule is that no longer does
either parent have a prima facie right to the child's custody. Hence-
forth, the court will exercise its discretion for the child's best inter-
ests.9 The best interests rule seemed at the time to serve as a panacea
for the delicate problems with which the courts had been faced of
overcoming presumptions in favor of one parent or the other.10
The principle was codified in the United States in varying
forms," but always giving the courts a broad guideline for their
determination of custody. Within the penumbra of the rule, the
courts were forced to create various classifications of abstract terms
indicative of the child's best interests to be used as criteria for the
5 Cf. Ex parle Skinner, 9 Moore C.P. 278, 29 Rev. R. 710 (C.P. 1824) ; Rex v. Greenhill,
4 Ad. & E. 624, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836).
6 Re Spence, 2 Ph. 247 (1847).
7 Talfourd's Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54; Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, 49 & 50
Vict., c. 27.
8 For a collection of American cases showing this shift toward recognition of the mother's
right to custody, see Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920).
9 Oster, supra note 1, at 22.
10 "For that matter, the law reviews and critical writers generally approve this test
without exception and hail the high achievement of the courts in deciding this
delicate question by such worthy principles. Courts and legal writers alike seem
so pleased with themselves in hitting on the best-interests-of-the-child test,
that they are both unable and unwilling to think of anything else."
Sayre, supra note 1, at 678.
11 Oster, supra note 1, at 22.
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adjudication of custody cases. Such measures as age and sex of the
child, preference of the child, and fitness of the parent are examined
in the cases for the purpose of determining the child's best inter-
ests. 2 These are the considerations announced by the courts which
serve to reveal the underlying assumptions upon which custody is
awarded in the exercise of discretion.
II. CUSTODY BETWEEN PARENTS: THE UNDERLYING NOTIONS
A. Age of the Child: A Relative Concept
Many jurisdictions will award custody of very young children
to the mother."3 In Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,14 the husband sought
to have the custody decree awarding the five-year-old daughter to
the mother changed in his favor. The trial court granted custody to
the father, but the appellate court reversed the decree, saying, "There
is the natural right of the mother, who is not shown to be unfit, to
nurture and care for her child of tender years, and ordinarily the
child's best interests are served by her love, care and attention.' ""
Little consideration was given to the fact that the husband had re-
married, and that his new wife was always at home and willing to
care for the child. The mother, on the other hand, was working at
the time the divorce was granted and had worked ever since, hiring
babysitters to care for the child. As to these facts, the court simply
concluded that the husband's remarriage disclosed no change of con-
ditions that would support a modification in the custody decree and
that the child who was of kindergarten age would no longer need
babysitters as much as before. 6
While the child of five in the Fitzpatrick case was considered
to be of "tender years," children of ten and twelve were not so
classified in Nicol v. Conlan,17 where custody was awarded to the
father.
In some jurisdictions the preference of the child is given con-
sideration by the courts, provided that he has reached a certain age.
In Hurly v. Hurly,' the custody of two girls, aged eleven and thir-
12 Ibid.
Is Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 541, 5 P.2d 246, 249 (1931):
"Courts are disposed - properly so - to award to the mother ... custody
of very young children, especially girls, even where the mother's conduct has
been such that, if the child were older its custody would have been placed else-
where."
Accord, Leary v. Leary, 61111. App. 2d 152, 209 N.E.2d 663 (1965) ; Payne v. Payne, 399
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
14 207 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
15 Id. at 797.
16 Ibid.
17 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
18 411 P.2d 359 (Mont. 1966).
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teen was awarded to the father. The court reasoned, "We cannot
overlook the present ages of both; each child is at sufficient age to
form an intelligent opinion as to custody."'" The consideration of
a child's age from the legal standpoint seems to serve a twofold
purpose. It can be used to determine the parental needs of the child
"of tender years" or it can serve as a measure of the merit in allow-
ing the child to exercise his choice.
A sociological analysis of this issue discloses that any arbitrary
age at which maturity is reached is impossible to calculate for all
children. A young boy or girl may reach physical maturity at an
early age ahead of his emotional experiences. ° The critical time of
puberty may not always conform to the chronological norms which
the law imposes, and this conflict between legal requirements and
actual conditions deserves recognition by the courts.
Under the age and sex tests used by the courts when applying
the best interests rule, a teen-aged girl may be placed in the father's
custody for reasons of preference or economy at an age when she
needs a mother's understanding. One court has recognized the socio-
logical problems involved in any arbitrary chronological age of legal
maturity. In Russell v. Russell2 the argument was raised that a
child under the age of fourteen was "of tender years" because a
statute declared that a child over fourteen could choose his own
guardian. The court found the contention to be unsound, reasoning
that:
The Legislature has not declared that a child under the age of 14
years is to be treated by the courts as a child of tender years within
the meaning of those terms as used in section 246 of the Civil
Code. The sex is to be considered as is also the physical develop-
ment. There cannot be any fixed and certain age of minority which,
in all cases and for all purposes, can be said to constitute a child of
"tender years." 22
B. Fitness of the Parent: The Notion of Motherhood
The test to determine the fitness of the parent to have
custody is most revealing of the underlying assumptions of the best
interests rule. One criterion is, "which parent can best provide an
atmosphere conducive to the child's healthy growth? '2 3 In the case
of Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,'24 the custody of a seven-year-old boy
was awarded to the mother, despite the fact that, since she was a
Christian Scientist, doubts were raised whether she would provide
19 Id. at 361-62.
20 SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 94-95 (4th ed. 1947).
21 20 Cal. App. 457, 129 Pac. 467 (1912).
22 d. at 461, 129 Pac. at 468.
2 Oster, supra note 1, at 25.
2417 Misc.2d 83, 158 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 165 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dept.),
ajffd, 4 N.Y.2d 699, 151 N.E.2d 897 (1958).
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the child with proper medical care. The court reasoned that if cus-
tody of the child were awarded to his father, the child would be
deprived of the adult companionship he needed, due to the father's
absence from the home during his working hours. On the other hand,
if the boy were given to his mother, "he would enjoy the companion-
ship, care and parental guidance normally received by a child of his
age."
25
The court's assumption favoring the mother as being more fit
to have custody of the child rested on its traditional concept of the
motherhood role. The notion of motherhood is inextricably linked
to any conception of the home, family, and child. Its natural attri-
butes have been described as love, care, and nurture of the child.21
As one legal writer has said, "The assumption is that woman, by
nature or culture or through a combination of natural and cultural
forces, is better suited than man for providing the care every child
needs."
27
Conversely, the notion of the father's traditional role in the
family is equally as pervasive in the court's determination of paren-
tal fitness. This notion has been ably described by a sociologist and
expert on family relations.
The average father is lacking in appropriate "child-care" skills, be-
cause his socialization in the male role has (1) led him to deprecate
such skills, (2) required him to have little practice in them, and
(3) permitted him to hand the appropriate duties over to his wife.
The role of husband and father, moreover, is defined particularly
as breadwinner, and with few exceptions in our society this activity
requires at least eight hours or so daily for at least five days weekly,
at the times when children require most care.28
Society's concept of motherhood, which many courts employ in
their application of the best interests rule, seems to create a pre-
sumption in favor of the mother that can only be overcome by a
showing of unfitness which would place the mother at fault.29
It is difficult to describe with precision the positive attributes
that constitute the court's notion of motherhood. The term is as
undefinable as the best interests rule itself. Insight into the concept
can be gained, however, by examining the negative attributes of
motherhood, evidenced by a mother's behavior by which the courts
deem her unfit to have custody.
In Bunim v. Bunim,30 the wife was admittedly shown to have
committed repeated adulteries with another married man. The court
25 Id. at 85, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
28 Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 207 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
2 Oster, supra note 1, at 26.
28 GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 312 (1956).
2 Oster, supra note 1, at 29.
30 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949).
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found that such conduct was "repugnant to all normal concepts of
sex, family, and marriage,"" and awarded custody to the father.
While the court couched its reasoning in terms of "sex, family, and
marriage," it seems clear that the wife's moral transgressions had
contradicted its basic notion of motherhood. 2 It would seem to be
inconsistent that a wife can be an adultress and a proper mother at
the same time.
However, the wife's adulterous conduct does not always create
a presumption against her in custody matters. In Verdin v. Wade,3"
a mother who was pregnant by her lover was successful in regaining
custody of her two children after she subsequently married him.
The court reasoned that her present "path of rectitude" was more
important than her past misconduct in determining the question of
custody.34 The woman's moral misconduct may or may not conflict
with the court's notion of motherhood, depending on the peculiar
facts and mitigating circumstances of each case. It is submitted that
in Verdin, the mother's marriage to her lover not only legitimized
her child but also restored the image of motherhood and family
which had been previously shaken by her adulterous conduct.
Alcohol and motherhood are as incompatible as drinking and
driving in terms of a mother's fitness to have custody. The alcoholic
mother finds difficulty in receiving custody of her children.35 Her
drinking seems to contradict the devotedness a court expects in a
mother.
Since the notion of motherhood is so closely related to the
concept of the home, the fact that a mother neglects her household
duties may be a consideration in depriving her of custody.3" Also,
if the mother has voluntarily relinquished custody of her child by
abandonment or agreement, custody is very often given to the fa-
ther.3 7  By her abandonment she seems to have contradicted the
concept of motherhood and raised serious doubts as to her fitness
31 Id. at 394, 83 N.E.2d at 849.
32 For other cases where an adulterous mother has lost custody, see Grubaugh v. Grubauzh
200 Cal. App. 2d 151, 19 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1962) ; Heater v. Heater, 254 Iowa 586, 118
N.W.2d 587 (1962) ; Shrout v. Shrout, 224 Ore. 521, 356 P.2d 935 (1960). In Parker
v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960), there was an inferred presumption that
the mother was unfit to have custody if found guilty of adultery.
3 129 So.2d 571 (La. Ct. App. 1961 ).
34 Id. at 573. But see Keer v. Cress, 194 Pa. Super. 529, 168 A.2d 788 (1961).
35 Floyd v. Floyd, 218 Ga. 606, 129 S.E.2d 786 (1963) ; Lichtenberg v. Lichtenberg., 15
Wash. 2d 226, 130 P.2d 371 (1942).
36 Howells v. Howells, 79 S.D. 480, 113 N.W.2d 533 (1962).
37Leach v. Leach, 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956) ; Townsend v. Townsend, 358
S.W.2d 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); In re Smith, 222 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
In the cases involving parental agreement, it might be argued that the wife relinquished
her right to custody solely because she could not otherwise have obtained the divorce




to be trusted with the child's custody. In Ullman v. Ullman,8 the
father had been awarded custody of his 212-year-old child in a sepa-
ration decree alleging abandonment by the wife. The court acknowl-
edged that "the child at tender age is entitled to have such care,
love and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can usually
give,'"'" but found that in the light of her voluntary act of abandon-
ment, "it would be a strange inconsistency should the court, after
deciding that the mother had gone unjustifiably from her husband's
house, visit upon him the penalty of the home broken by her fault
and of losing his child....
Some of these tests of parental fitness are closely allied with
the traditional fault concept. In determining the fitness of the
parent, the premise seems to be that the fit parent is the one who
is not at fault. The woman who does not conform to the notion
of motherhood is at fault and the assumption is that the father will
better care for the child.
C. Modern Roles of the Mother
A role analysis of the family members is a useful tool of sociolo-
gists in determining family relationships and attitudes. Motherhood
is only one of the various sociological roles assumed by the wife in
our society. The behavioral scientist recognizes the other emerging
roles of companion and partner played by the modern American
wife.
41
The companion role depicts the wife as enjoying the privilege
of being the object of romantic aspirations and having leisure time
for social or educational activity. The duties of the companion role
include the wife's cultivation of social contacts beneficial to the
husband and the maintenance of intellectual alertness.
The partner role obliges the wife to contribute to the financial
support of the family according to her earning ability and to main-
tain the status of the family by success in a career. The wife as
partner enjoys the privilege of equal status with the husband, ex-
emption from domestic duties to him, and financial independence.
While these two emerging roles may appear distinctly attribut-
able to specific socio-economic groups, they in fact overlap and are
commingled. One finds that a companion-wife in the upper middle
class may often be working, an obligation peculiar to the partner
38 151 App. Div. 419, 135 N.Y. Supp. 1080 (1912).
39 Id. at 424-25, 135 N.Y.Supp. at 1083.
40 Id. at 421, 135 N.Y.Supp. at 1081.
41 See generally BROOM & SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 369-72 (3d ed. 1963). A detailed de-
scription of several roles of the American wife is found in BOSKOFF, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF URBAN REGIONS 157-59 (1962).
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role.42 However, her motivations for discharging this function of
the partner role may in fact be toward the fulfillment of her role
as companion, such as an attempt to overcome the boredom that can
accompany leisure.43 She may be economically motivated, not to
maintain financial stability in the family, but to retain its upper
class social status for the preservation and cultivation of advanta-
geous social contacts of her husband.
The commingling of these two roles and their underlying moti-
vations are as important for this discussion as the suggestion that
both of these roles are distinguishable from, and represent a depar-
ture from the traditional motherhood role assumed by the courts.
If equal consideration were given to these emerging roles of the
modern wife and mother in our society, it might be discovered that
the mother in a custody matter may no longer be confined to tra-
ditional household and child-rearing duties consistent with the no-
tion of motherhood. Instead, she may very often be actively engaged
in outside social activities within the upper middle class or may be
working.
D. Motherhood and Family Unity: Practical Difficulties
Assuming that the wife has fulfilled the court's notion of
motherhood on the basis of her conduct prior to the custody award,
the issue is raised whether she will in fact continue to fulfill this
role as a single parent. An examination of this question rests on
the concept of the organization of the family in our culture. Family
unity is a desired goal in our society in which the role of mother-
hood plays a major part.
However, marriage does not automatically give rise to a family
relationship as expected, but may in fact amount to no more than
a means of legitimizing the child conceived out of wedlock.44 Fur-
thermore, the family in a custody matter is always a disunited family.
Its structure as an organized unit has been dissolved by the divorce
or separation decree. Kingsley Davis has described the plight of
the child in such a disunited family:
Having formed a union which is socially defined, which involves
mutual rights and obligations, and which clearly has as its main
function the rearing of children, the parents separate and thus de-
prive the child of its socially prescribed milieu. If he remains with
one parent he lacks the other- a real loss, because each parent
plays a necessary and complementary role in the child's life.
4
5
42 For a discussion on married women in the labor force, see MILLER & FORM, INDUSTRIAL
SOCIOLOGY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS 59-60 (2d ed. 1964).
43For a discussion on boredom as an attribute of the companion role, see BROOMI & SELZ-
NICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 370.
"Goode, Family Disorganization, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 491 (2d ed.
Merton & Nisbet ed. 1966).
45 Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1944).
1967
DENVER LAW1 JOURNAL
An anthropological approach to the concept of family organi-
zation shows the shortcomings of any notion of family unity in
American custody matters. The family structures of various cultures
are divided into two basic types. The nuclear or conjugal family
structure consists of the husband, wife, and children. The extended
or consanguine family is made up of several blood relatives and
their own conjugal units. The extended family consists of the clan,
a wider concept of the kinship group.
46
The structure of the modern American family is dominantly
conjugal,4 7 whereas the family in many non-Western cultures is of
the extended type. Care and custody of children in an extended
family relationship presents few problems, since the cultural values
do not consider the immediate family as the sole or most important
kinship unit, and the functions of child rearing are distributed from
the outset. The child thinks of his family not as centering around
his immediate parents, but as a joint household of various blood
relatives. Therefore, if a divorce or separation occurs, the child's
family unit is not really dissolved, since the remaining clan mem-
bers continue to fulfill the duties of child raising. 8
In the American conjugal family, however, divorce or separa-
tion of the parents means dissolution of the unit. As Kingsley Davis
observes:
With the principle of kinship substitution and the custom of the
great household abandoned, the child of a ... divorced parent has as
a rule nowhere to turn except to the other parent. He does not re-
tain the balanced family life that a child in a kinship society is likely
to have. He is therefore a 'problem' in a much more pressing sense.
49
Upon the dissolution of the nuclear family by divorce or separa-
tion, three responses of the remaining spouse may be manifested. 5°
(1) Reconstruction of the Basic Unit With a New Member. The
parent can remarry with the anticipation that her new spouse will
legally adopt the children to restore the family to its original state
or take on a lover who will fill part of the role of the missing parent
but may not restore the family to a legitimized nuclear status. The
remaining spouse may also find a surrogate parent for the child in
the person of a relative or housekeeper. (2) Reorganization of the
Remaining Members By Assignment of New Roles Within the
Structure. The parent may reassign obligations performed by the
absent spouse to herself and her children, such as delegating her
46 See generally BROOM & SELZNICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 355-56.
47 1bid.
48 Davis, supra note 45, at 701.
49 1d. at 705.
50 See generally WINCH, THE MoDERN FAMILY 721 (rev. ed. 1965).
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usual household chores to her children and assuming a new role of
provider herself. (3) Dissolution of the Family Unit. The parent
may terminate the nuclear family by taking the children to live with
grandparents.
When any of these three responses is manifested, any tradi-
tional notion of motherhood seems to be undermined, due to the
practical difficulties with which the divorced custodian is faced.
As Robert F. Drinan has stated, "It seems fair to say that American
law has not thought out a consistent legal theory by which the once-
married but emancipated, and now divorced, woman can fulfill all
her duties to . . . the children over whom she has custody."'"
In a few jurisdictions a tacit sociological analysis of the issues
raised by these practical difficulties has afforded a basis for a change
in the custody award. In Thalassinos v. Thalassinos"2 the wife who
had been awarded custody was employed on a part-time basis and
absent from her daughter for three days a week. She had employed
several different maids to care for the child in her absence. The
husband, on the other hand, had remarried and his new wife was
not employed. The court, in awarding custody to the father con-
cluded that the wife's absence from her daughter during working
hours "deprives the child of the care, instruction, supervision and
companionship of a parent which are not only desirable but essential
to her well being and happiness."1
3
The mother in that case had attempted to assume the role of
provider out of necessity and had delegated her motherhood role
to a surrogate parent in the person of the various maids she had
employed. The husband had reconstructed the basic family unit
by remarrying. His second wife, who was not working, seems to
have fulfilled the role of motherhood which would more fully
serve the child's best interests.
The wife in Wood v. Wood"4 had taken her two children to
live with another young mother and child. The two mothers, who
were employed at different hours, shared the care of the children.
The husband who had subsequently remarried, sought to have the
custody award changed in his favor. The court found that the wife's
arrangement for the care of her children was temporary at best,
and concluded that she "had not been able to establish a home that
gave assurance of continued adequate care and supervision. "" Cus-
51 Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAM. L. 101,
102 (1962).
52 77 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1947), afd, 274 App. Div. 807, 81 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1948).
53Id. at 314.
54 207 Cal. App. 2d 33, 24 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1962).
55 Id. at 36, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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tody was awarded to the father, who "appears to have established
a stable home and was prepared to provide adequate care, super-
vision and training for the children. '
56
These two cases represent an awareness on the part of the
courts of the importance of a sociological inquiry into all of the
circumstances involving parental roles and their relationship to the
responses of the remaining spouse upon dissolution of the conjugal
family.
In both cases the mothers, in order to meet the practical necessi-
ties of their situation as sole parent, had assumed roles opposed to
the traditional notion of motherhood and more analagous to the
fatherhood role. It is submitted that in cases where the mother must
assume the role of father, which the courts have found is usually
not in the best interests of the child, that she should not be entitled
to custody under the traditional "motherhood" test. In such cases,
the mother and father should be considered on an equal role status
and other factors should be given consideration in determining
custody.
III. THE INCOMPLETE USE OF SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
A CASE IN POINT
The situation that occurs when custody is to be determined
between one natural parent and third parties presents somewhat
different judicial considerations. One reason is that the cause of
family dissolution may often have been involuntary rather than
voluntary. Family disunity may have resulted from the death of
one parent rather than divorce or judicial separation. A recent de-
cision by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Painter v. Bannister7 has
aroused much public interest and controversy. Although the court
in the Bannister case announces that its decision was in the best
interests of the child,"' the case is an exceptional one in terms of
the assumptions used in its determination.
The issue which usually faces the court in these cases is whether
to proceed on a premise of family unity from the standpoint of
blood ties and parental rights or to regard the child as an entity
apart from the nuclear family. The presumption of parental rights,
stemming in part from old common law doctrines and in part from
the natural notion of blood unity is difficult to overcome, unless
the parent is shown to be unfit.59
5 sId. at 37, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
57 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 317 (1966).
58Id. at 156.
5 For a discussion of the parental right doctine, see 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306, 309-10 (1945).
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Painter v. Bannister appears to be an attempt by the court to
inquire into the role of the family as a socializing factor in the
child's development. The traditional issue of parental right is not
considered. Instead the court seems to assume as a sociological axiom
the notion of family stability, and further to determine which social
class is exemplary of family stability in the best interests of the child.
It is for this reason that Painter v. Bannister merits discussion.
Mark Painter's mother died in an automobile accident in 1962
when he was three years old. His father asked Mark's maternal
grandparents, the Bannisters, to care for the child temporarily. Two
years later, after Mr. Painter had remarried, he asked the Bannis-
ters for Mark's return, which they refused. An action was filed in
the Iowa District Court to determine custody, which was granted
to Mark's father. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the custody
decree in favor of the Bannisters. The court found that the life Mark
would be exposed to if custody was granted to his father would be
"unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellec-
tually stimulating.' '60 On the other hand, the Bannister farm pro-
vided Mark "with a stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class,
middlewest background and an opportunity for a college education
and profession, if he desires it."'61 The court concluded, "We be-
lieve security and stability in the home are more important than
intellectual stimulation in the proper development of a child."62
There were no issues of parental fitness 63 or parental right64
deemed paramount in Painter v. Bannister. Rather, the court's deter-
mination rested on a choice between two different sociological en-
vironments, which it admittedly did not have a right to consider.65
If the child's best interests required a sociological examination
of different environments, then an inquiry should have been made
into the effects each might have on a child. Instead, the court con-
sidered the testimony of Dr. Hawks, a child psychologist, which
concerned Mark's "father image" as now resting in Mr. Bannister
rather than Mr. Painter. The testimony of Dr. Hawks is not to be
entirely discounted here, but it does seem incomplete in terms of the
sociological issue involved. Yet the court considered it as conclusive
of Mark's best interests. 6
60 Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 317
(1966).
61 Id. at 154.
62 1d. at 156.
631d. at 154.
641d. at 156.
65 Id. at 154.
66 Id. at 156-58.
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The court's emphasis on security and stability in the home as
opposed to intellectual stimulation seems to place an extremely high
value on what might be called mediocrity as the desired ideal in a
family relationship. The danger of such a notion has been ably
pointed out:
[I]t is of primary importance that the court should keep its eye
on excellence, and seek to secure the very richest, finest life for the
child, rather than fix its eye on mediocrity and feel that its duty is
done when it has secured so-called normal home life.67
The court in Painter v. Bannister has determined a child's best
interests on the basis of two assumptions of social behavior. First,
by preferring stability in the home over intellectual stimulation, it
would seem to assume that mediocrity in social activity is best for
the individual. Secondly, the court concludes that middle class,
middlewest rural society is the desired example of stability. Un-
fortunately, the court's notions find no basis in the facts of be-
havioral science. As eminent sociologists have stated:
There would be little agreement, even among scholars, as to what
constitutes ... mediocrity, or debasement of culture. From a scien-
tist's point of view there is too little precision in these conceptions
to make them suitable for objective treatment. They fall within more
speculative types of discourse.68
Elsewhere, they state:
Nor does it (sociology) assume that the middle way is everywhere
and always the right way: disparaging connotations of the word
mediocrity, the condition of being intermediate between extremes,
should be enough to ward us off that bland and simple-minded
assumption.6
9
Not only is the assumption that mediocrity and stability are
definable or attributable to a particular social class untenable from
a sociological point of view, it is also in conflict with the constitu-
tional rights of parents to raise their children, enunciated in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.70 The Supreme Court in that case stated, "The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children ... "71
The court's decision in Painter v. Bannister raises the question
of whose best interests are really being inquired into, those of the
child or those of society in terms of the kind of child it wants its
67 Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CH. L. REv. 672, 683 (1942).
68 Nisbet, The Study of Social Problems, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 2 (2d ed.
Merton & Nisbet ed. 1966).
69 Merton, Social Problems and Sociological Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROB-
LEms 791 (2d ed. Merton & Nisbet ed. 1966).
'o 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
7' Id. at 535.
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families to produce. It seems that if such importance has been placed
on the value of the family as a primary force in the child's socializa-
tion process that this question is better left to the family itself.
Also, it must be realized that the family is but one of the social-
izing elements in the child's development. Educational institutions,
peer groups, and to an increased extent in our age of technology,
television and other mass media all contribute to the social develop-
ment of the child. Were Mark Painter to be raised in the Bohemian
environment of the Painter household, could it not be argued that
through the socializing agencies of mass media he would receive
an adequate awareness of middle class mediocrity, at the same time
he would be benefitting from his richer experience of intellectual
stimulation?
CONCLUSION
The best interests rule reflects an awareness on the part of the
courts that the problem of child custody requires the examination
of many non-legal issues. As one court has stated, "The difficulty
of the custody problem lies not in the law, but in an analysis of the
facts and in the application of the law."72
Due to the breadth of the best interests rule, the courts have
been forced to employ various conceptual criteria such as age, sex
and preference of the child, and parental fitness in their analysis
of the facts. Traditional notions of motherhood, fatherhood and
family unity permeate these considerations, serving as tacit assump-
tions of what is in the child's best interests.
A sociological examination of these conceptions demonstrates
that as conclusive presumptions they are incomplete. The role of
motherhood is an effective measure of the child's best interests only
when it is considered in conjunction with other emerging roles of
the modern wife.
Given the alternative responses with which the divorced or
separated custodian is faced upon dissolution of the American fam-
ily, a woman may be forced to shed her traditional role as mother
in order to support her child. Under these circumstances the child
in fact may or may not be deprived of the parental care he needs,
and which the courts assume can only be provided by the traditional
mother.
What is needed in the application of the best interests rule is
a thorough acquaintance with the sociological tools available in
custody matters. In a few cases this need has been recognized by
the courts, suggesting a trend toward a greater awareness of the
Hurly v. Hurly, 411 P.2d 359, 361 (Mont. 1966).
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value of the behavioral sciences in the consideration of child custody
disputes.
The final decision in a custody case still rests with the judge
in his exercise of discretion for the child's best interests. The effec-
tive use of discretion in such matters requires an abandonment of
the misconception that the traditional notion of motherhood alone
is a conclusive test of the best interests of the child. Other con-
siderations must enter into the analysis of the facts. Is the woman
in a particular custody matter fulfilling the role of companion or
partner? Can the mother, if awarded custody, continue to fulfill
her role as a mother, or will she be forced by circumstance to assume
a new role which may be inconsistent with the child's best interests?
Has one of the parents remarried, thereby reconstructing a basic
family unit which might provide a more beneficial atmosphere for
the child?
By departing from traditional notions and addressing them-
selves to a broader sociological analysis of the issues in custody
matters the courts will more fully serve both the best interests of




RECIPIENT - SHOULD HE ACCEPT A JOB?
INTRODUCTION
E MPLOYMENT security acts, which exists in nearly every state,
are designed to provide income to a worker who through no fault
of his own, has lost his job.
The Colorado Employment Security Act,' originally enacted
in 1935 as the Colorado Unemployment Act, is an example of how
this end is accomplished. Under the act employers coming within
its purview make contributions,2 based on their employees' wages,
into a state unemployment compensation fund.' Payments from this
fund are paid by the Unemployment Compensation Commission to
applicants who have filed the forms and have otherwise qualified.
4
These unemployment benefits serve the purpose of providing the
claimant with income while he searches for new work. The overall
program is aimed at returning the claimant to the active work force
as soon as possible. To achieve this end, the claimant must comply
with certain requirements to remain eligible for the payments. Thus,
during his period of unemployment, he must be registered at one
of the State Employment Offices maintained throughout the state
by the Department of Employment Security,' be available for work,
and conduct a thorough and active search for new employment.'
Another condition takes priority over the above requirements
in importance to the worker: he cannot refuse an offer or referral
of suitable work. A violation of this condition precipitates the dis-
continuance of the benefits.7 The significance of this provision lies
not only in the loss of the claimant's sole source of income but also
in the vagueness of its terms. By studying factual problems arising
under this condition and interpretations placed upon it, this un-
certainty will be more apparent. Guidelines may then be suggested
which would benefit not only the claimant in determining whether
his action will breach the requirement, but also the agency that must
determine if the condition has been breached. In light of this fact,
1 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 82-1-1 to -13-6 (Supp. 1965).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-6-1 (1963).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-7-1 (1963).
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-1-2 (1963) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-7 (Supp. 1965).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-7(2) (1963) ; see also Reg. 7A of the Regulations of the
Colorado Department of Employment Security.
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-7(4), (8) (Supp. 1965).
7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-8(6) (c) (i) (Supp. 1965).
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this note will be devoted to discussing both opinions and problems
which have emerged from this requirement.
I. OFFER OF WORK
In order for a claimant to disqualify himself from receiving
benefits for failure to accept suitable work, he obviously must have
first received an offer of work. Although the existence of an offer
will usually be an easy factual question to resolve, certain situations
may arise which cause some difficulty. Does general knowledge of
job openings in a worker's occupational field constitute an offer if
he feels he could qualify for the work? Is a help-wanted advertise-
ment in a magazine or newspaper an offer of work in the statutory
sense? Situations like these lack elements which usually attend an
"offer of work" in common parlance.' Normally an offer is for a
particular job and is directed at and communicated to the claimant
personally. Furthermore the existence of an offer requires that the
"offeror" anticipated an acceptance or rejection. Applying this test
to the situations involving advertisements or general knowledge of
job opportunities, it would seem that they should not be considered
an offer of work. However, if the worker who possesses a unique
skill in an occupational field which can be used by few employers,
refuses to investigate a job offer in an advertisement made by one
of those employers, he may, by the very nature of the work and
limited number of potential employers have had an offer of work
within the meaning of the statute. Courts have had occasion to apply
the above standards. Thus, a call from a claimant's employment
service asking whether he is interested in sales work, to which the
claimant answers in the negative, cannot be considered as an offer.9
It lacks the specificity which inheres in an offer. Likewise, a state-
ment by an employer to his former employees that they might be
given jobs if they would file applications was not sufficiently
definite to be an offer. Hence, the employees' failure to fill out
applications was not a refusal to accept suitable work.' °
II. REJECTION OF WORK
Few problems arise with respect to whether an offer has been
rejected. It would seem possible for a claimant to reject an offer
8 Although advertisements and "want ads" in a magazine may not constitute an offer
under the suitable work provision, it should be recognized that a claimant's failure
to inquire about such offers may disqualify him from receiving further benefits on the
ground that he is not actively seeking work under COLO. REv. STAT. § 82-4-7(8)
(Supp. 1965).
9 Jackson v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security, 124 Ind. App. 648, 120
N.E.2d 413 (1954).
10 Muncie Foundry Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Security Division, 114 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 891 (1943).
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not only by express refusal but also by his conduct. Once a claimant
has received what is considered a valid offer, he should be required
to exercise a certain degree of diligence in accepting the offer. Thus,
a claimant who receives an offer of work and accepts it two weeks
later only to find the job filled, might properly be denied further
unemployment benefits because he has "refused" work. This result
would seem even more valid if the offer is for seasonal work and
the position must be filled immediately.
The problem has arisen as to whether or not an offer has to be
made before there can be a refusal. Despite the conceptual difficulty
in the issue, it was presented to the court in Loew's Inc. v. California
Employment Stablization Comm'n.1' In that case nine motion picture
studios had agreed with a casting corporation that the latter was to
hire extras for the former. Extras were paid $10.50 per day when
appearing in scenes using less than thirty persons and $5.50 per day
when more than thirty persons were required. Separate telephones
were used for hiring in each group, and extras were to call both
numbers each day to apply for work. The claimants had both tele-
phone numbers but called only the $10.50 number. They filed for
benefits for the period of time during which no $10.50 work was
available. However, during the same time period extras were needed
for the lower salary work. The court held that their failure to call
the second number when work was available was a refusal even
though there had been no specific offer of such work.
III. SUITABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT
Whether particular employment is "suitable" is one of the
more perplexing questions presented by the statutory provision dis-
qualifying a claimant who refuses that employment. To determine
whether offered employment is suitable most state legislatures have
supplied their administrative agencies with specific guidelines by
which to determine the suitability of employment for its claimants.
In Colorado, for example, it is provided that:
In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an indi-
vidual, the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals,
his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior
earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing
work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available
local work from his residence, shall be considered. Notwithstand-
ing any other provisions of this chapter, no work shall be deemed
suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under
any of the following conditions:
(ii) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lock-
out, or other labor dispute.
11 76 Cal. App. 2d 231, 172 P.2d 938 (1946).
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(iii) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those pre-
vailing for similar work in the locality.
(iv) If as a condition of being employed the individual would be
required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from
joining any bona fide labor organization.' 2
Despite these enumerated guidelines, many situations have been
presented which require resolution by court and agency decisions.
A. Health, Safety and Morals
This standard is an attempt to make the job fit the claimant
rather than forcing the claimant to work at a job which would
seriously affect his health, safety or morals; no individual should be
required to accept employment which would be physically detrimental
to his well-being .Thus, a woman lacking satisfactory transportation,
who would not accept nightshift work in an undesirable neighbor-
hood, was not disqualified from receiving further benefits. Her
action was not a refusal of suitable employment. 13 An elderly woman
suffering from neuritis refused a job offer which would have re-
quired her to work twelve consecutive hours on two of five working
days. She was held by the referee not to have refused suitable em-
ployment because the job would have adversely affected her health. 4
In another case, the claimant was justified in refusing a spray paint
job on the ground that he was allergic to paint.'5
Generally, courts have taken a liberal view in determining
whether employment will impair the health or safety of an indi-
vidual.
However, whether or not emotional and mental health is en-
compassed by the health and safety exception to disqualification
seems uncertain. In one case the referee seemed to suggest that
emotional and mental health problems, as well as physical hazards,
will be a sufficient basis for refusal. In that case, the claimant refused
to return to a job in a department where she had been slurred or
insulted and tripped or hit while going downstairs. Because the
claimant had two previous experiences in the department which
12 COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-8(6)(c)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1965).
13 Referee's Decision-847 (Colo. 1955) [hereinafter cited as RD). The author has taken
Colorado administrative decisions from the Commerce Clearing House Unemploy-
ment Insurance Reporter, Vol. IB. The citation system consists of two letters desig-
nating the appellate body which heard the case. Thus, RD means "Referee's Decision."
The digits following the letters are the number of the case; all cases decided during
any given year are numbered in consecutive order. The abbreviation, "Colo." has been
inserted to remind the reader that Colorado law is being cited. The cases reported in
the Unemployment Insurance Reporter are extracts rather than entire opinions. Many
agency decisions cited by various writers are taken from the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Interpretation Service: Benefit Series. Since this service is not available to the
author, no reference will be made to it.
14 RD-6382 (Colo. 1953).
15 Sledzianowski v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 37,
76 A.2d 666 (1950).
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were so upsetting as to interfere with her work and give her a
nervous condition, the referee held that she should not be precluded
from receiving benefits due to her refusal.16
Other cases have been more explicit in saying emotional or
mental problems fall within the health exception. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that a victim of St. Vitus' dance was justified
in refusing a piece work job because it would make him too ner-
vous, 17 and an Iowa court held that a person with tendencies toward
nervousness was not required to accept a night job with mental
patients.' 8
Despite the fact that the courts and agencies have been fairly
liberal toward the claimant where his physical and mental well-
being are concerned, the burden is on the claimant to prove that a
potential job will adversely affect his health or safety. Evidence to
accomplish this is usually prior experience or medical records. But
the problem is treated differently where a claimant refuses a job
without adequate proof of harm reasonably anticipated from a
prospective job. In Wolfgram v. Employment Security Agency,' 9
benefits were denied where the claimant refused to accept a job in
a mine because work several years previously at a lower level of
the mine had caused heat rash. In rendering its opinion the court
said, "Where a claimant refuses an offered job because of a fear
that such job would be detrimental to his health, without further
investigation, or inquiry, he is deemed ineligible for benefits unless
he first gives the offered job a fair trial."20
This manner of treating cases differently on the basis of whether
prior experience or medical reports exist seems justified. Without
such a qualification, the claimant might easily resort to a defense
of refusing a job on some fictitious physical or mental condition
which he could claim would be aggravated by his acceptance. How-
ever, this is not to say that if a claimant has no medical records or
prior experience, his refusal should automatically be considered a
violation of the suitable work provision. In such cases the reasons
for refusing on a health basis should always be considered carefully.
One frequently litigated question is whether a claimant's religion
should be taken into consideration in determining whether he has
refused suitable employment. The situation arises where claimant
16 RD-2268 (Colo. 1949).
17 Dep't. of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa.
Super. 571, 49 A.2d 259 (1946).
18 Forrest Park Sanitarium v. Miller, 233 Iowa 1325, 11 N.W.2d 583 (1943).
19 77 Idaho 298, 291 P.2d 279 (1955).
20 Id. at 300, 291 P.2d at 281 (1955) ; see also Broadway v. Bolar, 33 Ala. App. 57, 29
So. 2d 687 (1947) (claimant failed to investigate job) ; Claim of DiStefano, 277 App.
Div. 823, 97 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1950) (failure to try out job).
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refuses to accept a job because it will require him to work on a day
which interferes with his religious beliefs. In 1963, the United States
Supreme Court decided this question on constitutional grounds.
21
In holding that the South Carolina Employment Commission violated
claimant's First Amendment rights under the Constitution by dis-
allowing her claim, the Court said:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one band, and abandon-
ing one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work,
on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts
the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship. 2
2
The majority of state high courts which have been confronted
with that issue have held that refusal of work for religious reasons
does not disqualify claimant from receiving benefits. In In the
Matter of Miller,23 the claimant was a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, which teaches that the sabbath is from sundown
Friday until sundown Saturday during which time no work is to be
performed. The North Carolina Supreme Court decided that work
on Friday night was not suitable for her, and she should not be pre-
cluded from receiving benefits. Cases involving similar fact situa-
tions have reached the same result in both Michigan 24 and Ohio.25
In these religion cases, it must be determined that claimant's
religious objection is made in good faith. Obviously, ad hoc adoption
of religious beliefs should not justify refusing employment. It would
seem that religious convictions previously professed might properly
be considered to determine the propriety of the refusal. However,
once it is determined that claimant has honest religious beliefs which
would interfere with his acceptance of a proferred job, the belief
must be respected.
B. Prior Training and Experience
This statutory provision requires that for a job to be suitable,
it must be reasonably related to the qualifications of the applicant.
The basic theory is that the claimant should not be required to
accept a job which involves far less or a different type skill than he
possesses.2" The real problem involved here is how much less skill
21 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22 Id. at 404.
23 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956).
24 Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709
(1954).
25 Tary v. Bd. of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 161 Ohio St. 251,
119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
26 Frequently, this factor is intimately related to the problems of lower wages, the length
of unemployment and general prospects of the claimant's securing his customary work,
and it will be discussed in context with these factors in Section (D) infra.
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does a job require before a claimant will be allowed to reject the
offer in that a claimant may properly be required to accept a job
involving a level of skill which is inferior to that already attained by
him. In a Colorado agency decision, the claimant held a doctorate
in physics and had been last employed as a research assistant in the
missile industry. She refused employment as a door-to-door sales-
man. The referee held that she had not refused suitable employment
in light of her high educational background and lack of experience
in the offered work.
27
Court decisions support similar results. In Pacific Mills v.
Director of Division of Employment Security,28 the claimant had
gone to business college and been trained for office work. She worked
as a secretary for Pacific Mills until she was laid off. Later, she
refused work in the shipping department; the work constituted
stapling tags to pieces of cloth and recording yardage on an adding
machine. Despite the fact that the wages for the two jobs were about
equal, claimant was held not to have refused suitable work. In a
Minnesota case, the court determined that the claimant did not refuse
suitable employment where he had been trained as a steam cleaner
in a dry cleaning department and then refused a job consisting of
light garage work, stockwork and truckdriving.2"
Several cases have held that the claimant is reasonably suited
for a different job even though the levels of skill involved in the
present and former employments are not the same. In Beecham v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp.,30 a night watchman who refused a job as
a janitor was held to have refused suitable work. The same result
occured where a stenographer refused a job as a clerk and typist,"'
a manager of a dress shop would not accept a job as a saleslady in a
department store,32 or a photographic helper would not work as a
stock clerk at substantially higher wages.33
The latter case raises the question of whether a claimant should
be required to accept a job which, although it pays substantially more,
involves far less skill than his former employment. An example might
be a commercial artist who earned $4,000 a year being offered a job
as an inventory clerk at $6,000 a year. It is suggested that the claim-
ant should not be required to accept such a job unless jobs in his
27 RD-24892 (Colo. 1964).
28 322 Mass. 345, 77 N.E.2d 413 (1948).
29 Bowman v. Troy Launderers and Cleaners, 215 Minn. 226, 9 N.W.2d 506 (1943).
30 150 Neb. 792, 36 N.W.2d 233 (1949).
31 Boyle v. Corsi, 277 App. Div. 1155, 100 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1950).
32 Grubman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 175 Pa. Super. 488, 107
A.2d 186 (1954).




former occupational field are extremely scarce. The mere fact that
claimant refuses such a job offer will normally indicate that he
himself places a premium on his own experience and ability and con-
siders utilization of his skill more important than higher financial
reward. Aside from maintaining the personal pride of the individual
himself, it is submitted that maximum utilization of a worker's skills
and experience is a desirable end within the framework of the entire
economic system. However, it should be remembered that one of the
act's primary purposes is to return the worker to the active labor
force and too great an emphasis on maximum use of a worker's skills
may have the effect of thwarting this aim.
C. Prior Earnings and Wages in Similar Employments
The Employment Security Act is designed to preserve as much
as possible the present economic status and standard of living of the
individual. This goal is indicated by the legislative requirements
that the claimant's former wages and wages for similar work in the
locality be considered by the agency charged with determining
whether the unemployed worker has refused suitable work. 4 Both
the prevailing wage rate and the claimant's prior earnings should
be considered at the same time, and if the newly offered job falls
sufficiently short of either standard, the claimant should not be
denied benefits.
In Industrial Commission v. Brady,8" the claimant was a union
painter and had earned $2.39 per hour on his previous job with
time-and-a-half for overtime work. He refused to interview for a
non-union job which would have paid $2.00 per hour without over-
time provision. The referee found that the prevailing wage rate in
the locality was $2.39 per hour with time-and-a-half for overtime.
In holding that the claimant had not refused suitable employment
because the wage offered was substantially less favorable than the
prevailing wage in the locality for that type work, the court said:
Assuming other conditions to be equal, it is apparent that where
the wage differential amounts to $15.60 per forty-hour week, or
$624.00 per year on a forty-week year, such employment . . . was
substantially less favorable to the individual than that prevailing
for similar work in the locality.36
The problem surrounding wage differences and their effect
upon the suitability provision will, in many cases, be no more than
84 As is the case with respect to jobs requiring less skill or training than claimant pos-
sesses, the length of time during which claimant has been unemployed may be an im-
portant factor in considering whether offered remuneration is sufficient. This inter-
relationship will be discussed in Section (D) infra. It should also be appreciated
that the problem of adequate wages is most often encountered in those jobs requiring
less skill and training since a lower skilled occupation will usually involve less salary.
85 128 Colo. 490, 263 P.2d 578 (1953).
86 Id. at 494-95, 263 P.2d at 580.
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a calculated value judgment by the court or agency deciding the
question. Thus, refusals of employment were held not justified where
the difference in salary between former employment and offered
employment was eleven cents per hour,87 where a claimant who had
been employed as a research chemist earning $750 per month refused
a job as a chemical engineer at $500 per month, 38 and where a claim-
ant who had been employed as a general office worker at $100 per
week refused a job as assistant bookkeeper at sixty dollars per
week.8 9 Conversely, a former seamstress earning $1.10 per hour was
justified in refusing a job as a waitress at 62 cents per hour,40 and
a former packer earning $1.44 per hour could rightfully reject an
offer to work as a sales clerk at 60 cents per hour.4
Little can be drawn from the above cases other than the fact
that a wide range of discretion exists in the agencies and courts when
determining whether an offered wage is sufficient. Despite the range
of discretion, certain factors might easily be neglected. A situation
may arise where a claimant is offered a job for which he will receive
compensation commensurate with local standards and prior earnings,
yet he may be required to work substantially longer hours to receive
the salary. In order to properly compare the wages for each job, both
should be converted into a dollar per hour figure. Once this figure
has been determined for the two jobs, the wage difference is readily
ascertainable. What is most important is the meaning of the wage
to the claimant and not merely the salary figure standing by itself.
Another problem may arise where the wage offered conforms
to local standards yet it is still not substantial enough to provide the
claimant with a living wage. Because of this possibility, it would
seem necessary for the agency to look at the claimant's domestic
circumstances in deciding the problem. There may be instances
where the offered wage would be sufficient to support a claimant
with a wife and one child yet at the same time be totally inadequate
for a claimant with a large family. By analogy to a case previously
discussed, the chemist who is single might properly be required to
accept the offer of work as a chemical engineer at $250 less per
month than his former job paid. However, if this claimant has ten
children and a wife to support, he should probably not be held to
have refused suitable work under the same circumstances. To require
87 Claim of Mednick, 270 App. Div. 124, 58 N.Y.S2d 493 '(1945).
8 Lorenzi v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. 573, 180 A.2d
84 (1962).
89 Valentine v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. 574, 180
A.2d 85 (1962).
40 Palmer v. State Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 362, 177
N.E.2d 806 (1961).




the latter to accept the job would not only defeat one of the aims of
the act but also restrict the claimant's mobility to search for a new
job which would provide compensation sufficient to sustain himself
and his family.
A question may arise as to what extent fringe benefits should
be considered in determining wage suitability. A claimant may be
offered a job which falls below the local wage standard yet fringe
benefits incident to the employment may have a value sufficient to
offset this difference. The mere fact that the fringe benefit has a
face value sufficient to compensate for a wage difference should
not be considered as controlling. It may not have such a high value
to the claimant himself. For example, the claimant may have no
interest in a pension plan financed primarily by employer contri-
butions. In some cases the value of such a benefit may be needed by
him to support his family adequately. The agency should attempt to
ascertain the value of the fringe benefit to the claimant in light of
his circumstances and determine its offsetting effect on lower wages
in this manner.
D. Length of Unemployment and Prospect of Securing Work in
Customary Occupation
Where an offered job involves less skill and lower wages, the
courts consider the claimant's length of unemployment and the pros-
pects of his finding similar work in determining whether the job
is suitable. Thus, a job may be unsuitable when first offered yet be
declared suitable if offered again after a period of unemployment.
In Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Department of Employment,42 the Colorado
Supreme Court gave some indication as to when a claimant would
be required to accept a job at substantially lower pay than what he
had previously earned. Claimants had worked in a clothing factory
earning between $1.40 and $2.00 per hour. This operation was trans-
ferred to another locality and claimants later refused to accept work
making overalls in which they could earn only about $1.00 per hour.
The court, in remanding to the district court for further findings
of fact, said:
It is clear that the beneficient purposes of the Act do not con-
tain a guaranty that a job offer must be for wages equal to that of
the old job in order to be deemed as "suitable" work, but work at
a substantially lower wage should not be deemed "suitable" unless
a claimant has been given a reasonable period to compete in the
labor market for available jobs for which he has the skill at a rate
of pay commensurate with his prior earnings. Where the offer is
for work at a wage materially lower than the wage previously earned,
the claimant may be justified in refusing the offer while seeking
42 155 Colo. 433, 395 P.2d 216 (1964).
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employment at a rate of pay commensurate with prior earning
capacity, but this right is not without qualification and the claim-
ant is entitled only to a reasonable opportunity to obtain work for
which he is fitted by experience and training at a wage rate com-
parable to that for which he previously worked.... Work which
may be deemed "unsuitable" at the inception of the claimant's un-
employment, and for a reasonable time thereafter, because it pays
less than his prior earning capacity, may thereafter become "suit-
able" work when consideration is given to the length of unemploy-
ment and the prospects for obtaining customary work at his prior
earning capacity.
4 3
In a New Hampshire case, claimant's previous job was that
of a skilled mender earning $1.04 per hour. After a ten-week period
of unemployment, an unskilled job paying sixty cents per hour,
which claimant had justifiably refused earlier, was held to be suit-
able work.
44
Despite the fact that claimant is allowed a "reasonable" period
of time before he will be required to accept work at substantially
less wages or skill, the problem of determining what is "reasonable"
still exists. Periods of five 45 and of nineteen 46 days have been held
insufficient time to discover new work. One solution to the problem
might be to set up a sliding scale requiring claimant to accept ten
dollars less pay per week after a month of unemployment, twenty
dollars less after two months, etc. However, a system such as this
would seem to be too inflexible to be workable. For example, the
prospect of claimant's obtaining work in his customary occupation
should be taken into account, and it would be difficult to devise a
uniform scale which could reflect this factor. If claimant X has been
unemployed for three months, yet it appears that he has a good
chance of receiving work in his customary occupation, he should not
be required to take a job in a different occupation involving less skill
or lower wages. However, it might be entirely proper to require
claimant Y to accept such a job, even though he has been unemployed
as long as X, if Y's chances of securing a job commensurate with his
skill appear slim.
It is difficult to rationalize the idea that what was once unsuit-
able work to the claimant is now suitable by the mere fact that a
certain amount of time has passed. Rather than accepting a suitable
job under these circumstances, the theory seems to be that claimant
should accept what is available and quit later when he is able to
43 Id. at 441-42, 395 P.2d at 220.
44 Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 48, 45 A.2d 886 (1946).
45 American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa. Super.
77, 46 A.2d 512 (1946).
46 American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa. Super.
74, 46 A.2d 510 (1946).
47 Comment, 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 523, 525 (1964).
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find better employment.4 7 On its face, this seems like a good idea,
but one of its effects will be to severely limit and restrict the claim-
ant in his search for a job commensurate with his ability. It is com-
mon knowledge that most employment interviews are helding during
working hours, and the claimant, who will in most instances be
working during these hours, will not have the time in which to make
an adequate and thorough search. The result may often be that the
claimant finds himself tied down to a job which is in reality unsuit-
able without much chance to acquire more favorable employment or
at least compete with those who are able to interview and make
applications during the day.
Length of unemployment considerations should only arise where
wage and skill differentials are involved. If a claimant has refused
work for religious, health, or safety reasons, the length of unemploy-
ment should not have any impact on his refusal. Those reasons are
just as valid in the first as in the tenth week of unemployment.
E. Distance
The claimant should not be required to accept a job which is
too distant from his home. The practical effect of this guideline is
to tell the worker how much commuting he must do, and an un-
reasonable distance between the claimant's residence and the offered
employment renders it unsuitable." As is the case with most of the
other guidelines set forth by the legislature, determining what
amounts to an unreasonable distance is largely a discretionary matter
on the part of the agency.
In one agency decision the claimant was a resident of Denver
and refused a job offer in California. The referee held that he had
not refused suitable employment in that any job offer which requires
a claimant to re-establish his residence outside the state is unsuit-
able.4 9 In a Colorado Supreme Court decision, two coal miners re-
fused to accept work in a mine located about 175 miles from their
homes. In reversing the agency, the court held they had not refused
suitable employment. The agency had relied on the fact that coal
mining was essential to the war effort.
5 0
In determining whether the distance is great enough to make
the job unsuitable, transportation facilities should be considered
carefully. A job thirty-five miles away from claimant's house may
not be too far if claimant owns a car or if a good carrier system runs
between the two points. However, a job only five miles away should
probably be deemed unsuitable if claimant has no transportation of
48 As a matter of policy, the agency does not require the claimant to relocate for a job.
49 RD-26001 (Colo. 1965).
50 Industrial Comm'n v. Lazar, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P.2d 405 (1943).
VOL. 44
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
his own and other means of transportation are not available. Agencies
seem to consider the availability of a public transportation system in
determining if the distance renders a job unsuitable. In one case
a claimant, who was the mother of five children, refused an offer
to cook at a hospital sixteen miles away because she had no means
of transportation at her disposal. She was deemed not to have refused
suitable employment." A claimant in another case refused a job
twelve miles away because she had no available transportation. The
referee, in holding that she remained eligible for benefits, said that
it was not required of a claimant to have her own transportation
where no common carrier transportation existed.52
F. Other Circumstances
In addition to the statutory guidelines, other factors should be
considered by the agency in determining whether employment is
suitable. One example consists of personal circumstances of the
claimant, and although not mentioned in the statute, they should be
carefully scrutinized by the agency before making a final determina-
tion. In one case, it was held that a woman had not refused suitable
employment because the job required that she work at night which
would interfere with her domestic commitments. 8 Also, where a
claimant failed to apply for an offer of suitable work because of
plans, on advice of a doctor, to move her husband to another state
she was held to have refused work with good cause.5 4
CONCLUSION
Unemployed workers frequently are confronted with the
dilemma of determining whether or not their refusal of an offered
job will result in termination of their unemployment benefit checks.
This dilemma is caused by the uncertainty and vagueness inherent
in the statutory provisions providing for the forfeiture. Although the
statutes usually have guidelines designed to assist the agency in
ascertaining the applicability of the provision, the standards them-
selves are overly broad and, altogether too often, completely non-
existent. Thus, a claimant who has a job offer paying twenty cents
less per hour than his former employment and who desires to know
the effect of his refusal of the new job will only learn from the
statutes that the agency will consider the wage difference in deter-
mining if the worker is disqualified for future benefits. Another
claimant, who has an especially large family, will search in vain for
51 RD-2038 (Colo. 1948).
52 RD1665 (Colo. 1948).
53 RD-1421 (Colo. 1947).
54 RD-8842 (Colo. 1955).
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any indication that family size will be considered at all, let alone
what importance it will have in the agency decision.
The two hypotheticals above raise separate problems. On the
one hand is the situation in which the agency is expressly instructed
to take cognizance of specific facts (wage difference), on the
other hand is the case in which the agency may or may not consider
certain facts (family size) at its discretion. The latter problem war-
rants further legislative attention. Factors such as the size of the
claimant's family, personal domestic commitments, the standard of
living the new job will afford the worker, and the religious beliefs
of the claimant are not mandatorily reviewed by the agency. Hence
it is possible that the agency may overlook them or even apply the
disqualification provision in a situation where these factors would
justify the job refusal. For these reasons it is suggested that em-
ployment security statutes should specify these items in the guide-
lines to the agencies. Although statutory guidelines may be criticized
as being too broad, nonetheless, the claimant is assured that important
facts peculiar to him must be studied before forfeiture occurs.
It must be remembered that inclusion of the foregoing factors
in the statute would not completely solve the claimant's problem.
He would know what facts the agency must consider to determine
disqualification, but he would not know exactly when his refusal
would be justifiable. The statutory guidelines are general, and rightly
so, to provide flexibility in analyzing different fact situations. How-
ever, many cases may arise in which the claimant must know the
effect of his refusal within a short period of time. For example, the
employer may offer the claimant a job requesting that he either
accept or reject the offer by a specified time. The statutory guide-
lines will rarely be adequate to inform him of the effect of a refusal.
At the same time, it does the claimant little good to first refuse the
job and later be told that his refusal terminates his benefit payments.
Since the legislature cannot anticipate the multifarious situa-
tions which will arise under the act and hence cannot be more
specific in its guidelines to the agency, an alternative procedure to
these guidelines may be desirable. The agency could make available
to the claimant forms which request the pertinent information con-
cerning the new job and also the claimant's personal circumstances
which the claimant believes might justify his refusal of the job.
The agency could then issue what would in essence be an advisory
opinion on the effect of such refusal. The opinion should be bind-
ing upon the agency unless the claimant has filed false or incomplete
information or otherwise defrauded the agency. The purpose of such
a procedure should be to inform the claimant of the probable effect
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of a refusal as soon as possible to avoid the claimant's loss of both
the unemployment benefits and a job.
In last analysis the application of the disqualification provision
in unemployment security statutes must rest in the agency. The
flexibility present in the current guidelines, supplemented by ad-
ditional criteria, would assure the worker that his situation would
receive fullest consideration. The proposed procedure would assist
the worker in deciding whether or not to accept a job before the loss
of his unemployment benefits. The end result would be beneficial
to the worker in resolving his initial dilemma and would further the
purpose of unemployment security acts not only by returning the
worker to the active work force as soon as possible but also by
placing him in the most suitable job.
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